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My dissertation finds postcolonial studies hampered by a narrow and misleading 
conception of nostalgia. Part of a broad set of European ideas about time and its passing, 
nostalgia arrived in the colonies first as a genre—proto-nationalist veneration of a supposed 
“golden age”—and later as a way of understanding that genre. That understanding focused on the 
metaphysics of nostalgia’s desired object, finding it flawed. Because of this metaphysical focus 
and its limitations, what might have been a contingent critique of genre was generalized to 
include all forms of affective attachment to the past. Two consequences followed: postcolonial 
authors developed genres of decontextualized wrestling with nostalgia, and postcolonial critics 
missed or dismissed non-metaphysical modes of nostalgia. To get at what is thus missed, as well 
as to situate nostalgia more clearly within the affect worlds and genres of South Asia, my 
dissertation looks to language and translation as crucial sites of nostalgic work. This focus leads 
me away from the novel genre—postcolonial scholarship’s usual focus—towards South Asian 
poetry, which maintains a more active multilingualism and a greater continuity with local 
tradition. 
My dissertation begins by charting the genealogy of the nostalgia concept, from its 
Enlightenment origins to its use by postcolonial critics. Chapter 1 argues that the original work 
of A. K. Ramanujan represents, in the form of what I call nostalgic shame poems, a generic 
fulfillment of the postcolonial critique of nostalgia. Part of a wider body of works concerned 
with the status of homelands, Ramanujan’s nostalgic shame poems rehearse the inaccessibility of 
the past. By contrast, his translations suggest a more productive form of nostalgia that is 
unworried by absolutes. Reading the translations of Ramanujan’s poet-translator peers, Arun 
Kolatkar and Arvind Mehrotra, Chapter 2 argues that their generation contested and reshaped, 
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through their translingual nostalgias, the subcontinental aesthetics of English. Chapter 3 then 
provides a theoretical grounding for my literary-historical claims by turning to Agha Shahid Ali, 
whose attempts to write Urdu ghazal poetry in English uniquely evince nostalgia’s inventive, 
non-dogmatic side. Finally, Chapter 4 turns to the linguistic pole furthest from English in the 
Indian nationalist imagination: Sanskrit. Contrary to popular perception, Modern Sanskrit 
continues to produce an ample but vastly understudied body of literature that invites us to rethink 
familiar debates about South Asian multilingualism as well as nostalgia. My dissertation closes 
by proposing that the pairing of English and Modern Sanskrit suggests that the concepts of 
language death and vitality map in unexpected ways on these languages, revealing the 
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By examining post-Independence poetry from India through a lens trained at the affective nexus 
of language, cultural memory, and poetic form, this dissertation argues that conventional 
accounts of nostalgia are insufficient to the postcolonial context. Postcolonial nostalgia is 
generally seen as a response to painful rupture with the past. The prevailing accounts that I seek 
to complicate focus on how the nostalgic response risks denying rupture altogether and installing 
in its place a ready-made nationalist fantasy. Instead, I propose that nostalgia relates to the past 
as diversely as translations relate to their originals. In each case, a source is mobilized only via 
its present interpretation in the receiving culture. Finding their languages tarnished by 
imperialism and its legacy, the poets I consider seek to rehabilitate them by creating a nostalgic 
space of translation where new alternatives can be born. 
This dissertation discusses two bodies of literature, one in English and one in Sanskrit. 
These literatures do not, for the most part, interact directly. Indian poets writing in English as a 
rule take no active interest in poetry written in Sanskrit, except—as Chapter 2 will suggest—by 
distant way of negating the style of Indian English that was formed, among other ways, most 
notably via Orientalist translations of Classical Sanskrit texts during the colonial era. Small 
exceptions do occur, most notably in the case of Purushottama Lal (styled P Lal), the founder 
and publisher of the important Writers Workshop in Calcutta as well as an important translator 
from Classical Sanskrit. No major poet in English, however, has shown any awareness of the 
specifically modern poetry written in Sanskrit.1 Modern writers in Sanskrit, by contrast, are 
                                                 
1 That is, no major poet has spoken of it, explicitly or allusively. Poets are not unaware that 
Sanskrit continues to be used, however. Anjali Nerlekar, in her study of 1960’s Bombay print 




necessarily aware of the force exerted by English literature, including the possibility of Indian 
literature being written in English. On the whole, however, they show no particular interest in the 
specific texts produced in that other tradition. The image of English held dear by Modern 
Sanskrit writers remains overwhelmingly that of Shakespeare and Romantic poetry, i.e., the 
colonial cannon. 
Despite the lack of direct interaction between these two traditions, this dissertation finds 
it useful to put them under the same critical lens—or perhaps more accurately, to use them 
jointly to fashion a new lens. Specifically, I argue that both traditions share preoccupations with 
translation, cultural memory, and nostalgia that distinguish them from their vernacular-language 
peers and that both arrive at those interests by way of a shared inheritance from colonial 
language ideology, Orientalism, and the aesthetics of modernism. The first three chapters will 
explore the more widely read poetry in English, looking at, successively, the impact on it of 
nostalgia discourse (the habitual concerns and frames we bring to bear in conversations about 
nostalgia), the reasons why nostalgia arises and why translation and translingual writing broadly 
are adequate responses to it, and finally what theory of nostalgia might be more adequate to it if 
our usual nostalgia discourse produces the effects described in Chapter 1. Then I turn to Modern 
Sanskrit as a foil to Indian poetry in English. My suggestion is that Modern Sanskrit’s self-
awareness of its death entails a kind of nostalgia that may productively be placed alongside that 
of Indian poetry in English.  
The rest of this introduction lays out the key theoretical and scholarly debates into which 
my dissertation enters across three sections: on nostalgia, Indian literature in English, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
displays writing in Sanskrit (in the form of a benedictory epigraph), Marathi, and Gujarati in 
easy juxtaposition (123). 
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Modern Sanskrit. The first two strive in relatively straightforward terms to rehearse where the 
field is and how my project intervenes within it. The section on Modern Sanskrit deviates 
somewhat from that pattern, given the relative lack of on-going scholarly conversation around it. 
Instead, it provides a synoptic look at the question of Sanskrit’s purported “death” and the 
complications involved in either agreeing or disagreeing with that diagnosis.  
NOSTALGIA 
Nostalgia, as a word and as a phenomenon, is notoriously difficult to pin down. Fred Davis, a 
sociologist who helped pioneer its study, found the term itself “susceptible to semantic 
vagueness, drift, and ambiguity” (7). What to him seemed an obstacle, however, to others has 
been a tantalizing provocation to further study. Linda Austin’s survey of nostalgia’s long 
nineteenth century, for example, revels in the details of how it “appears to operate on the margins 
of all the disciplines it touches, violating the standards of each” (197). The lesson of both of 
these scholars’ remarks should be context-sensitivity. “Nostalgia” is less a unified phenomenon 
than a space where disparate strands—of feelings, histories, and philosophies—meet and messily 
interweave only to depart again on new trajectories.  
These days, nostalgia is a fairly ordinary word, no longer the jargon it once was. We are 
therefore likely to obscure more than we clarify if we should attempt rigorously to define it—i.e., 
to delimit its conceptual territory. As speakers of English, we already deploy the term with 
considerable flexibility and nuance, and in so doing we register, wittingly or not, the texture of a 
social world shaped by the histories we inherit as we learn our language—learn, that is, how to 
use a word like nostalgia (which is really any word at all). This dissertation takes for granted the 
Wittgensteinian slogan that “the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (Philosophical 
Investigations §43). Now, nostalgia, like most words, is put to a wide range of uses; but among 
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the most prominent are disparagement and a kind of cordoning off. We might, for example, 
disparage some cultural production as “mere nostalgia.” Conversely, we might cordon off its 
enjoyment by saying that, while worthless in absolute terms, it was at least good for quick fix of 
nostalgia, meaning that it offered a “guilty pleasure” otherwise disconnected from the rest of our 
lives. I am interested in how we came to acquire these uses. If asked what the word means, we 
would likely say that it points to, say, a mood, an attitude, or a disposition. How did the name for 
one of those things come to do the work, at times, of disparagement? The answer to that 
question, I will suggest, reveals that we may do more than we intend when we invoke nostalgia 
as a kind of critical shorthand in postcolonial literary studies.    
This dissertation is thus interested not only in the things nostalgia names but also in the 
name itself, or we might say, in the process of naming any given thing “nostalgic.” In so 
distinguishing—between the name (or the naming) and the named—I do not wish to posit the 
existence of such a thing as nostalgia “out there,” carrying on independently of our inadequate 
word. I am rather acknowledging that the uses of “nostalgia” sometimes diverge. Disparagement 
does not exhaust what we can do with the term. Accordingly, and with the caveat already given 
that any definition must be provisional, I offer a sense of what I most commonly mean by 
nostalgia in the dissertation to follow (when, that is, I am speaking in my own voice and not 
ventriloquizing others). Most broadly, I understand nostalgia to be the affective negotiation of an 
interruption of the present by a sense of familiarity lost, familiarity moreover that one knows of 
(at that moment) only through a gestalt of a past era or season. There is much to unpack in so 
dense a definition, but now is not the time. We will have to arrive cumulatively at a clearer sense 
of how these words are used as the dissertation progresses (I note in passing, however, that the 
early sections of Chapter 3 contain the most sustained theoretical explication of the concept on 
5 
 
offer; eager readers would be obliged to turn there). First we need to understand how we came to 
need a definition in the first place, i.e., how we came to have any such word as nostalgia to 
define. I offer the following synopsis of the term’s history not in a spirit of exhaustiveness, but in 
order to tease out five key historical threads that tie into aspects of our lexicon today (and hence 
aspects of the world we use it in and on). 
“Nostalgia” first entered our world as a diagnostic tool.2 Johannes Hofer introduced the 
term in a 1688 Swiss medical dissertation that sought to make sense of the curious behavior of 
some Swiss mercenaries—long notorious as the hardiest and most sought-after of Europe’s 
soldiers—who were utterly debilitated by what seemed an inexplicable longing for home. Hofer 
found that, for the most part, the only cure for this gripping disorder was for the soldiers actually 
to return to the country of their youth. Not returning could be fatal. Being a dissertation, Hofer’s 
theory was naturally quite nuanced and elaborate; and being a seventeenth-century dissertation, it 
can all seem quite foreign to us now. Consequently, I will not rehearse the details. Interested 
readers can turn to the excellent intellectual history offered by Helmut Illbruck in his Nostalgia: 
Origins and Ends of an Unenlightened Disease or to any of the more specialized scholarly case 
studies of the theories that followed in Hofer’s wake, such as Michael Roth’s exploration of 
“Medical Studies of Nostalgia in Nineteenth-Century France.” Here my interests are twofold: 
first in observing the origin of nostalgia as a “problem”—literally a disease at this point—and 
second in locating that problem within the social field of early modern Europe. 
Confronted with the above origin story, we might well wonder, why? What was so 
special about the late-seventeenth century? Why Swiss mercenaries and not others? It wasn’t just 
medical researchers who associated the disease with the Swiss—the latter quickly found 
                                                 
2 The facts of the story to follow are drawn primarily from Illbruck.  
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themselves saddled with a Europe-wide stereotype. As Illbruck has pointed out, there were 
decisive changes afoot in European military life that likely made all the difference. The central 
problem concerned the “rise of standing armies, a process vigorously promoted by absolutist 
monarchs,” whereby “upon enlisting a foreign soldier was stripped of his very foreignness” and 
denied the opportunity to leave service after a successful campaign, as had previously been the 
norm (33, 34). In part, then, nostalgia pointed to a stumbling block in the path of the protagonist 
in one of the stories Foucault taught us to tell, of how the Enlightenment “invented the 
disciplines” (quoted in Illbruck 36). With surprising regularity, nostalgia became associated with 
noncompliant folk in the face of new social projects. According to John Funchion, the idea 
outlived its medical heyday in Europe by taking up roots in the United States. “Home, Sweet 
Home,” for example, was banned on the front lines of the American Civil War for fear of 
soldiers’ becoming afflicted (Funchion 2). But it was not just the soldiers—“slaves, women, 
students, immigrants, and Western settlers all emerged as groups especially vulnerable to this 
ailment” (12). The minority of the American sufferers provided a nice counterpoint to the earlier 
European puzzlement over the prevalence of the disease among those from the hinterlands: the 
Swiss, Norwegians, and Icelanders. 
Entangled with the strictly diagnostic thread of nostalgia’s history is a more philosophical 
strand as well. Philosophers, after all, wanted to make sense of the disease too, urgently even. 
Nostalgia threatened the health not only of its patients, but also, Illbruck stresses, of the 
Enlightenment itself; “enigmatic, particular, and local, the very disease was a challenge to the 
Enlightenment, and was seen as such” (52). Where doctors came up with altitude- and air-based 
theories of nostalgia’s commitment to the incommensurability of place, philosophers like 
Immanuel Kant saw in it more universal problems, like category errors and immaturity. For 
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Kant, the Swiss only think that they miss their old villages and valleys. In reality, their 
“longing…is aroused by the recollection of a carefree life and neighborly company in their 
youth, a longing for the places where they enjoyed the very simple pleasures of life” (quoted in 
Illbruck 131, emphasis original). They wish, in short, not to face maturity and its burdensome 
blend of complexity and drudgery; so they imagine returning to a place where those burdens did 
not exist. Coming a bit later, Schopenhauer will crystallize a favorite interpretation of the 
enabling error that lets the nostalgic confuse place for childhood when he claims that, in 
nostalgia, “time deceives us by wearing the mask of space” (quoted in Illbruck 139). Both 
thinkers share the conviction that nostalgic desire is simultaneously confused about what it wants 
and unable ever to achieve the “real” object of longing, which is now metaphysicalized as an 
inevitable feature of human existence. Kant, for example, interprets the home-coming “cure” of 
Swiss mercenaries as disillusionment. Upon arrival, they realize that what they really wanted 
was not return but a fantasy that they can never actually have (again).  
A third strand of nostalgia arises later than the previous two. More sentimental and 
psychologically normalized than its predecessors, it conforms better to our expectations of what 
nostalgia looks like today. Linda Austin has called it (and the period of its shaping) “nostalgia in 
transition,” as per the title of her book on the subject. Between 1780 and 1917, she argues, 
nostalgia went underground, at least within fashionable European thought. More precisely, it 
dipped out of consciousness and slid into “the recreational nostalgic body,” where it took the 
“form of automatic or habit remembering” (11, 198). Austin sometimes calls this a “transition 
from affliction to aesthetic,” as nostalgics turned from their passive consumption by desire to 
various aesthetic means of “miming the long-awaited return home” (4, 11). As this last sentence 
may make clear, Austin takes the inability to return much more pragmatically than do Kant and 
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Schopenhauer. She stays with the soldier who cannot leave the battlefield but must find a way to 
go on living and working. The “materialist” and pragmatic bent of the new nostalgic practices 
offer, for Austin, a welcome escape from cognitive or spiritual accounts of experience, but she 
notes that, at the time, both scientific and artistic communities remained committed to the latter, 
which accounts for the increasing denigration of nostalgic aesthetics during the period (Austin 
3). In particular, the new nostalgia looked inauthentic (because automatic and impersonal), 
hackneyed (because invested in repetition), and uncritical (because non-reflexive and explicitly 
therapeutic). 
Nostalgia in transition did not, however, pull its aesthetics out of thin air. It appealed to a 
strand of nostalgia arguably older than the term itself—that is, the cluster of conventions whose 
development Aaron Santesso traces in what he calls the eighteenth-century English “nostalgia 
poem.” Santesso is not interested in diagnoses, philosophies, or even the pragmatic practices of 
nostalgia. He cares about its “genre-based foundation” (38). These foundations, he suggests, lie 
in the productive tension between the new novelistic empiricism and an older poetics of 
idealization; “nostalgia poems are a kind of opposite to novels” (67). More concretely, the new 
genre fuses two tired genres, pastoral and elegy, in order to create something “knowingly, even 
pessimistically idealized” (71-72). Laurence Lerner has influentially claimed that pastoral itself 
has always had nostalgia as its “basic emotion” (41). Santesso, however, stresses a crucial 
difference between the premodern pastoral and its modern nostalgia descendants: while 
premodern pastoral “accepts that none of its readers live in the ‘golden days,’” modern nostalgia 
poetry “depends on its audience feeling that they ‘know’ the characters and world that are now 
‘gone,’ even as they recognize that they never did. Modern nostalgia exists only because the 
reader is willing to feel nostalgia” (139). The result is the curious mix of generic and particular 
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that we have come to expect of nostalgic aesthetics, where memories are “intended as 
personal…but almost never individuated” (Austin 61).  
The final strand of nostalgia I want specifically to draw out for inspection is the 
commercial. What is sometimes called the “nostalgia industry” takes the sentimental practices 
that Austin outlines and commodifies them, producing a whole economy around the circulation 
of objects (such as souvenirs) that externalize memory and evade the pangs of nostalgic longing 
even as they tease us with the possibility of such pangs.3 Susan Stewart is among the most 
famous critics of this strand, leading her to call nostalgia “a social disease” (23). By this point in 
nostalgia’s history, however, the weight of the terms history is felt quite clearly as aspects of the 
earlier senses permeate accounts, as the reference to “disease” makes clear, as well as the 
metaphysical spin Stewart gives to her understanding of it.  
These are the five major nostalgic threads on which this dissertation will draw: the 
diagnostic, the metaphysical, the sentimental/practical, the literary-generic, and the commercial. 
Each of the five threads comes with its own negative stereotypes. Viewed from a diagnostic 
angle, nostalgia is disruptive and unproductive; from the metaphysical perspective, it creates 
dogmatic fictions and desires the impossible; in a sentimental mode, it seems unthinking; when it 
draws on generic tropes, it looks clichéd; and when commercialized, it encourages 
consumerism.4 These stereotypes are familiar; they are built into the very idea of nostalgia as it 
                                                 
3 In a review of Austin’s book, Kevis Goodman suggests that what Austin describes “resembles 
quite precisely classic accounts of ideology by Louis Althusser, Pierre Bourdieu, and others” 
(133). This assessment perhaps confuses the nostalgia industry (unified under the ideology of 
capitalism) with the more diffuse and ideologically mixed sentimental practices Austin outlines. 
4 If it appears that I have ignored one of nostalgia’s most common denigrations—as 
reactionary—it is because on this schema, reactionary nostalgia looks much the same as the 
disruptive and unproductive nostalgia of early modern soldiers. Admittedly, those accused of 




circulates within our culture. That this should be so is a central fact of “nostalgia discourse,” 
which is my name for a set of conventions that organize our culture’s use and understanding of 
the word nostalgia, particularly within “critical” contexts such as scholarship, editorials, think 
pieces, etc. In speaking of nostalgia discourse, I intend to stress that these associations are 
backgrounded, that they undergird our everyday ways of speaking about nostalgia in such a way 
that it becomes unnecessary to make them explicit. Therefore I will not expend much particular 
energy citing specific writers who hold these attitudes about nostalgia, except where they are 
relevant to particular texts and issues under consideration. Instead, I appeal to a common sense 
of the appropriateness of an exchange such as the following: While discussing a new television 
show, someone complains that she “can’t stand how nostalgic it is”; her friend, evidently a 
bigger fan of the show, responds, “Really? I thought it offered a pretty complex picture of the 
period.” The appropriateness of the exchange—the fact that we take the friend’s response as a 
relevant rebuttal—rests on a conventional set of connotations that extend well beyond the 
meaning of a word, revealing a cultural commonsense that shapes how we understand and debate 
certain emotional relationships to the past. These associations, moreover, attach in an outward 
reaching network away from the word nostalgia, so that we do not always need to mention it.  
So: nostalgia is often an insult, and it’s certainly “never a compliment” (Brennan 164). 
Noting why and how this is, a few scholars, such as Pakistani anthropologist Nauman Naqvi, 
have proposed that we abandon the term altogether. According to Naqvi, nostalgia provides no 
useful critical category at all, with its historical ties to a “masculinist, overbearing modernity” 
that sees nostalgics as “inadequately modern subjects” who will not relinquish their provincial 
                                                                                                                                                             
social classes, but both sides are being addressed as nostalgic from the perspective of the new 
elite (or the elite’s new modes of rule). In both cases, someone is standing in the way of what the 
new order wishes to call progress.  
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ties to home and countryside” (48). Obviously, my position differs or this project would never 
have gotten off the ground. Among the points in favor of continuing to talk about nostalgia is, 
first, that many people understand and champion their own experience explicitly in those terms. 
We will see one such example in Chapter 3, the Kashmiri-American poet Agha Shahid Ali, who 
went so far as to title one of his volumes, A Nostalgist’s Map of America. One would hope for a 
more sympathetic reading of his work than a debunking of its keyword. A second reason to keep 
“nostalgia” on the table is that it has shaped cultural production even in its more misguided uses 
as an accusation against “inadequately modern subjects,” as I will argue it does the work of A. K. 
Ramanujan, in Chapter 1. On an even broader scale, John J. Su has pointed out that self-
consciousness about doing something that might be considered problematic has become a 
widespread feature of contemporary nostalgia novels (10-11). The final reason to hold onto our 
terminology is that “nostalgia,” despite its often pejorative usage, points to a rich and 
theoretically fascinating set of experiences and actions. In particular, nostalgia (the experience 
named by the word) reveals our involvement in the world to us as problematic, but already laden 
with value terms. I will say more about this below, but first I want to clarify where this 
dissertation is left standing after disavowing pure pejoration. Is nostalgia then “good”?  
I am sympathetic to nostalgia’s defenders, but it is important to stress that I am not 
simply reversing the judgment set against it. I agree with Linda Austin’s assessment that 
nostalgia and its products cover “no uniform ideological position” (4). Alastair Bonnett may 
even be right to oppose efforts at “reclaiming” nostalgia for progressive politics. Nostalgia for 
Bonnett is “a disruptive and unsettling force; something that has the power to question standard 
political labels and distinctions between ‘progressive’ and ‘reactionary’, radical and 
conservative, left and right. Acknowledging nostalgia pushes us into choppier and less 
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comfortable waters” (1). I likewise sympathize with John Su when he says, “My own sense is 
that even the most ideologically compromised forms of longing express in attenuated fashion a 
genuine human need” (3).  
My holding these positions does not mean that I believe that nostalgia comes in good or 
bad kinds. This dissertation firmly rejects the possibility of naming the features of a regressive 
nostalgia over and against those of a more salutary longing. Typologies of nostalgia 
overwhelmingly favor a continuum model that remains obviously indebted to the earliest 
attempts to understand it. On this model, nostalgia is, before anything else, troublesome, 
reactionary, and foolish. The model presupposes that nostalgia at its most basic is primitive and 
that as the light of reason dawns on it, it is awoken into something gradually more acceptable. 
Fred Davis gave an influential early version of this when he divided nostalgia into three “orders” 
(in the sense of first-, second-, and third-order cognition): simple nostalgia, reflexive nostalgia, 
and interpreted nostalgia (17). The first entails the “unquestioned conviction that the past was 
better” (64), while the second begins to question that conviction (starts wondering what is true, 
how the past really was, etc.), and the third locates the birth of the conviction in nostalgia (starts 
wondering where the feeling of nostalgia comes from, focuses on the self rather than on the past 
or the present per se).  The most famous formulation of the continuum theory, however, is dual, 
and we owe it to Svetlana Boym. Boym distinguishes between restorative and reflective 
nostalgias, which she assures us are just “tendencies” not “types.” Restorative nostalgia seeks, as 
its name implies, to restore the past in all its glorious specificity. Reflective nostalgia, by 
contrast, acknowledges the passage of time and chooses, instead of restoration, wistful reveling 
in the awareness of loss.  
The problem with these, indeed most, binary accounts of nostalgia (as well as with Davis’ 
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tripartite expansion) is that they imagine some basic thing, “nostalgia,” that then gets either fixed 
or ruined by adding another layer of something else. On one reading of Boym, the basic emotion 
tends toward reaction until reflexivity restores the possibility for ethics and justice.  Ann C. 
Colley, a Victorianist, suggests that the yearning itself—a good thing—can productively 
“attach[]…to a wider orbit and multiple dimensions that continually qualify the experience of 
longing” (7). If, however, one acts concretely on it, fixes the object of longing in a here and now, 
it loses that productiveness. Although her view and Boym’s look superficially different—one 
sees an essentially active longing rightly curtailed with reflection and the other sees an 
essentially reflective longing ruined by taking action—their division is quite similar. Nostalgia 
needs to be disengaged from action to be good. Illbruck has noted a similar point when he asks, 
regarding Boym’s distinction, “does reflective nostalgia then not play a role similar to that of art 
in modern society, a mere pastime for those who are freed from labor?” I, too, am wary of 
“keeping nostalgia at a distance from reality and praxis” (22).  
There is one scholar who has proposed a value-based distinction that has the benefit of 
keeping both halves of nostalgia within praxis: anthropologist Kathleen Stewart. “There may be 
a redemptive nostalgia,” she says, “in a distinction between the (active) production of ‘country 
crafts’ and their (mere) consumption of their (passive) reproduction as empty styles” (234). She 
also paraphrases this as “acting in” versus “acting on” the world (235). Crucially, however, she 
notes that “it is certainly not the ideology itself that makes the difference but the social situations 
to which it attaches” (234). Herein lies the primary insight this dissertation takes up from 
anthropology, and it goes beyond the need to avoid too gross a typology of good and bad 
nostalgias.  
Another anthropologist, William Cunningham Bissell, will help us specify it. He has 
14 
 
argued forcefully against monolithic depictions of nostalgia. “In both popular and academic 
contexts,” Bissell says, “nostalgia is frequently portrayed as a reaction or response to more 
general forces—capitalist restructuring, for example, or the onslaught of modernity. As a result, 
it is often treated as a unified, consistent, and shared phenomenon—a sensibility suffusing an 
entire social field. Nostalgic discourses, however, are anything but singular” (216).  Such 
reminders to attend to cases before generalities constitute a lesson this dissertation takes very 
seriously. Not only do we need to avoid making a monolith of nostalgia, we must realize that 
even individuals do not hold well-defined nostalgias locked in their hearts, taking them out to 
fondle every now and then. Although we can speak of countable nostalgias, we must be careful 
in doing so. Nostalgia is prompted by contexts (seeing a vacation photo on one’s computer while 
at work; revisiting a childhood home; watching a nostalgia film; etc.) Accordingly, I take 
nostalgia to be situated and its values to be located in the moments of its activation (meaning that 
a nostalgic film can produce reactionary responses for some and revolutionary nostalgias for 
others). 
This insight takes us surprisingly far from not only Boym but also most postcolonial 
accounts of nostalgia. Indeed, to the extent that we follow Susannah Radstone’s division of 
nostalgia criticism into historicizing and universalizing, we are forced to leave all historicizing 
accounts behind, or at least to take them with a large grain of salt. Boym, a weak historicist, 
takes nostalgia and the “progress” of modernity to be “like Jekyll and Hyde: alter egos,” 
construing nostalgia as a “defense mechanism” in the face of modernity’s harsher movements 
(xvi, xiv). While indisputable as a general point, if given any specificity it violates our need to 
locate nostalgia only in the moment of its arising. The problem is that we don’t know what, in 
any given moment, constitutes modernity (or postcoloniality) for nostalgia to be the alter ego of.  
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A corollary may make the point clearer. It is often said that what the nostalgic wants is a 
nostos or homecoming. It is also often said that the home so desired is a fiction (as per our 
inheritance of Kant). A witticism by John Funchion puts it nicely, “‘There is no place like home’ 
until the nostalgic participates in its creation” (3). We assume too quickly that we know what 
kind of home is created here, or for that matter, that we know what “creation” means. The 
nostalgic home is precisely something that has been thrown into question, though. The nostalgic 
finds, perhaps suddenly, or is at least reminded that she doesn’t live there. And she may 
remember a time when she believes she did, but that does not mean that she knows what home is. 
Calling it “the moment that she remembers” does an injustice both to the memory (for which it 
refuses to specify any content) and to whatever occasioned her desire. 
The object of desire is better captured by what Su calls “the haunting irony of nostalgia,” 
meaning the sense that the present is haunted by all of the things that “might have been,” as 
articulated around some past moment that points in that other direction (89). Su’s account 
emphasizes nostalgia’s sense of history’s contingency, not the inevitability of progress. Crucially 
it also leaves open the multiplicity of resonances associated with the memory. Home means 
many things, all of which may haunt us. Alastair Bonnett claims that nostalgia “calls us back to 
meaning” (6), and I take him to mean that it raises the question of meaning. Like Su’s haunting 
irony, the call back to meaning is a call to reevaluate the present and the course of history that 
led to it. Su actually shares a similar line of thought when he observes that nostalgia crystalizes 
around ethically “thick” concepts like “dignity” and “greatness,” which are shown precisely to 
raise the possibility of debate and investigation, not as alibis to eschew those same—though 
nothing prevents anyone from refusing the “call” to meaning-making (135). In Chapter 3, I 
expand on these insights using a phenomenological approach, but for now, I want to return to the 
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state of the scholarly field.  
Although I have already disagreed preemptively with many postcolonial takes on 
nostalgia, if we are going  to take seriously the question of context, we must begin by getting the 
lay of the land with respect to nostalgia in the two largest scales of framing that concern us: the 
postcolonial and the South Asian. Postcolonial studies in general and those of South Asia in 
particular have had a recurrently intimate (if often implicit and tangential) relationship with 
nostalgia. Particularly in its transnationally oriented moments, postcolonialism has lavished 
attention upon such nostalgia-soaked keywords as “home,” “exile,” “belonging,” “roots,” 
“nativism,” and its often anti-nostalgic opposite, “cosmopolitanism.”5 In general, however, 
nostalgia per se has not been much theorized, or rather has been used as a short-hand for much 
larger tacitly assumed theories. Perhaps most prominently, nostalgia has featured as the name for 
the structuring affect and impetus behind nationalism, as when Gayatri Gopinath observes, “The 
nation (as many critics have asserted) is a nostalgic construction, one that evokes an archaic past 
and authentic communal identity to assert and legitimize its project of modernization” (468). 
While undoubtedly there have been nostalgic appeals made on behalf of the nation, I neither 
want the nation reduced to nostalgia nor nostalgia reduced to the nation. Both take us too far 
from the contextualized nostalgia that interest me. 
Some headway into theorizing nostalgia in postcolonial literary studies has been made 
recently by Dennis Walder, in his Postcolonial Nostalgias: Writing, Representation, and 
Memory, as well as in scattered articles on individual writers (references to which pepper this 
dissertation). We can be grateful to Walder for provincializing European nostalgia criticism. Like 
                                                 
5 For an example of such work that includes an explicit discussion of “nostalgia” and its 
conceptual relevance to postcolonialism and cultural criticism broadly, see Timothy Brennan’s At 
Home in the World, especially pages 164-165. 
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most work on nostalgia from a literary-critical perspective, however, (and indeed like most 
postcolonial work from that perspective) Walder’s book remains overwhelmingly novel-
centered.  The form of criticism he develops attends to “the imaginative reconstruction of the 
past” within postcolonial novels (12). And he claims that “without the element of reflexivity, of 
self-analysis, the past becomes a distorting fiction” (164). When it comes to the poetry this 
dissertation considers, however, the past is not “reconstructed.” And yet, I argue, it is nostalgic. 
Moreover, it is not always self-reflexive. This, too, is misleading when applied as a criterion to 
the poetry before us (or indeed any art). For, while Walder’s claim is absolutely true of a person 
(across their life) or a culture, it is less certain that a particular poem needs to be an example of 
that self-analysis, merely that it needs to be taken up within a life that also encompasses 
reflexivity. 
Within nostalgia criticism, a number of postcolonial scholars have outlined various types 
of nostalgia (beyond the good/bad binaries we have already problematized).  Patricia Lorcin has 
differentiated between colonial and imperial nostalgias, where the former names the 
“embellishment of lived experience” by former colonizers (i.e., those who lived in the colonies) 
and the latter names “the loss of empire” and has more to do with power, rather than lifestyles (2, 
9). Bissell has used the same terms to different ends, using “colonial nostalgia” to refer to the 
nostalgia of the colonized for colonialism, whereas imperial nostalgia belongs to the colonizers. 
In that respect, colonial nostalgia looks a lot like what Jacob Dlamini has called “native 
nostalgia,” the nostalgia of a “black South African” who “remember[s] apartheid with fondness” 
(13). Dlamini’s nostalgia is even more attenuated in its desire for return than Bissell’s colonial 
nostalgia. In fact, it offers an important lesson for nostalgia criticism more broadly: sometimes 
nostalgia does not want return so much as an acknowledgment that there were lives worth living 
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then too, indeed worth mourning the loss of, even for a better world.  
For the most part, this dissertation will not worry about kinds of nostalgia in this way, 
namely in terms of a shared idea of home or a shared reason for holding it close to heart. That 
work has generally already been done with great sensitivity. The one exception will be what I 
call “counter-nostalgias” in the second chapter, naming a shared nostalgia of the first 
postcolonial generation of Indian writers in English that opposes Orientalist and nationalist 
nostalgia with its own. But what is new in what I outline is the fact that it is not a life-world that 
is missed, so much as a style, or a linguistic possibility. These poets recognize in earlier eras 
other poets who got “back in touch” with the vernacular, forging an immediate language when 
all that seemed available was the hyper-mediated language of classical literature. This nostalgia 
for style is not something that scholars have paid much attention to.  
The other type of nostalgia I will name, “translingual nostalgia,” concerns a category of 
nostalgias, not a single shared nostalgia.  As I use the term, translingual nostalgia refers to any 
nostalgia that imagines the past/present divide as coinciding (or significantly overlapping) with a 
divide between languages.  
Before turning to the next section, I would be remiss not to mention one final frame for 
my interest in nostalgia. Insofar as nostalgia is a paradigmatic and habitual object of critique, my 
dissertation ends up inevitably resonating in certain ways with Rita Felski’s call for post-critical 
modes of reading in, e.g., The Limits of Critique. Her argument’s divisiveness makes me wary of 
committing myself completely to her argument, and indeed my own arguments stand on quite 
separate terms. However, given Felski’s question, “Why are we so hyperarticulate about our 
adversaries and so excruciatingly tongue-tied about our loves?” (13), I cannot help but think my 
dissertation an attempt to give some articulateness to nostalgia’s loves. It should be stressed that 
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the effort to move past critique is not, however, an attempt to reject it once and for all, just to 
provincialize it within a larger subset of analytical tools. Critique, on this view, is characterized 
by a certain skeptical mood that privileges the ability always to call into question even the terrain 
one is standing on. It is, in general, embarrassed of the need to be standing on any ground at all. 
Although critique would rephrase such embarrassment in the form of a claim (that there are no 
final grounds), it does not follow from that claim’s truthfulness that the claim needs constantly to 
be made, nor that not making it entails its denial. Nostalgia is a particularly apt terrain to explore 
such modes as it is one of the most critically maligned affects out there. Moreover, as I argue in 
Chapter 1, the critical impulse has to a certain extent been built into a subset of nostalgic and 
anti-nostalgic poetry (in a genre I call the nostalgic shame poem). Since I want to offer modes of 
reading outside that critical impulse—modes that call it into question without “interrogating” it 
(i.e., without simply taking on a higher-order level of critique)—my methods are (as I understand 
the term) post-critical. I stress that post-critique as Felski proposes it is not apolitical or an 
attempt to bracket politics. It is an attempt to think politics along (analytically) positive lines, 
paying attention to attachments and affirmations as much as what is problematic or insufficient. 
INDIAN LITERATURE IN ENGLISH 
This dissertation participates in and contributes to a number of currents in recent scholarship on 
English-language literature in India. The general thrust of these contributions can be 
characterized in terms of three primary impulses, signaled by the keywords of my title: 
translingual, nostalgia, and poetry. The pull of each term, naturally enough, brings my project in 
line with some scholarly trends and away from others. Poetry pulls me away from 
postcolonialism’s prevailing interest in the novel genre, and in so doing aligns me with critical 
trends less invested in representation and mimesis. Nostalgia invites me to join in recent 
20 
 
reconsiderations of postcolonial aesthetics, drawing attention away from the field’s often 
doggedly sociological concerns. Finally, the translingual locates the object of my research 
between or across languages, hence firmly embedded in specific multilingual contexts and at 
some distance from the transnational flows of certain canonical postcolonialisms. Ultimately, 
these various tributaries constitute—to elaborate the riverine metaphor—a kind of braided flow, 
each reinforcing the other and ultimately inseparable, even as specific moments can be attributed 
more to one than another. Since the last section has already specified the interest nostalgia holds 
for me, this section will focus more on the other two keywords in hopes of bringing due clarity to 
the overall project before us.  
Let us begin with the dissertation’s quite conscious drift away from the novel genre, 
which has consumed so much of recent literary-critical attention. The problems associated with 
such an overwhelming focus on one genre have not gone unnoticed.6 A recent  (2018) special 
issue of the Journal of Postcolonial Writing, for example, draws attention once again to the need 
to attend also to, as the editors put it, “‘[m]inor’ genres in postcolonial literatures.” It goes 
without saying that the “minority” of these genres implies no value judgment; it simply “refers to 
the ways in which cultural products that fall outside the novel format are minoritized by 
postcolonial scholarship” (Munos and Ledent 3). Postcolonial poetry would be one notable 
example. Gratefully, that genre has received increasing critical attention over the last twenty 
                                                 
6 Sometimes the novelistic biases of postcolonial literary criticism leads to odd but distorted 
moments of self-awareness, as when Rashmi Sadana considers how a pair of novels—Ahmed 
Ali’s Twilight in Delhi and Anita Desai’s In Custody—nostalgically lament the communal loss of 
Urdu poetry (34-45). Sadana argues that these novels participate in a familiar metaphorical 
equation of English with the novel and Urdu with poetry, where the former absorbs the latter 
even as it mourns its doing so. What she ignores entirely, however, is the quite separate existence 
of Anglophone poetry and its much less melancholic (but still nostalgic) dialogue with the Urdu 
canon, some of which we will see discussed in Chapter 3. 
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years, a trend to which this project contributes.  
At the forefront of that growing body of work is Jahan Ramazani’s pathbreaking The 
Hybrid Muse: Postcolonial Poetry in English (2001), which first set the stakes for the field. A 
number of articles and monographs have followed in its wake, expanding and nuancing our 
picture of the terrain mapped out by Ramazani. Notable examples in dialogue with this 
dissertation include Rajeev Patke’s Postcolonial Poetry in English (2006), and Ashok Bery’s 
Cultural Translation and Postcolonial Poetry (2007). More recently, however, scholarship on 
the poetry discussed in these books has shifted its attention somewhat, following disciplinary 
trends, away from the “postcolonial” and toward categories like the “transnational” (Ramazani’s 
2009 A Transnational Poetics) and the “global” (Omaar Hena’s 2015 Global Anglophone 
Poetry: Literary Form and Social Critique in Walcott, Muldoon, de Kok, and Nagra). While 
these works continue to produce fresh insights, I believe that there is cause to regret the field’s 
decreasing dialogue with the local and the vernacular, a point to which I will return below. By 
zooming in on a more precise moment—one generation (born between roughly 1920 and 
1950)—in a single national context, I hope to expand and ground the thematic concerns of earlier 
scholars, restoring at the same time some of the multilingual complexity into which this poetry is 
born. 
One of the first questions to arise in the study of postcolonial poetry asks simply, why 
have scholars so often ignored it? As Ramazani notes, part of the reason for the genre’s relative 
neglect is that “postcolonial criticism is largely grounded in mimetic presuppositions about 
literature,” and poetry is “harder [than fiction or drama] to annex as textual synecdoche for the 
social world of Nigeria, Trinidad or India” (Hybrid 4). My own deep skepticism of those 
“mimetic presuppositions” will take me even further at times than Ramazani, who still tends to 
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talk of an “experience”—whether “split cultural” or a “postcolonial”—being variously 
“mediated,” “registered,” and “express[ed]” (2, 75). Particularly toward the end of Chapter 3, I 
will push for a more sensuous and affective account of poetic form as a way of shedding the 
theoretical blinders brought on by too-constant focus on issues of mimesis and representation.  
I gain some encouragement in doing so from the work of Ananya Jahanara Kabir, whose 
desire for “moving beyond narrative” also brings her to questions of nostalgia and affect 
(Partition’s Post-Amnesia’s 15). Kabir insists that increased attention to the “lyric impulse” over 
and against the “narrative impulse” helps keep at bay the latter’s tendency toward “linear 
causality” and the relegation of political “conflicts to the category of faits accompli [sic]” (19, 
17). For Kabir, the two impulses form a spectrum, and any given work shuttles and bumps 
among various points along that spectrum. It is not that novels and films are deadening where 
poetry and painting are emancipatory; to the contrary, one of the reasons for attending to the 
lyric impulse where it is most obvious (in the musical interludes of Indian popular cinema, 
painting, lyrics, etc.) allows us eventually to return and see the workings of explicitly narrative 
texts more clearly. In particular, we are able to “recuperate the vernacular vocabulary of 
longing,” which tends to crouch in moments of lyric intensity, not within the ordered logic of 
narrative (23). This dissertation therefore remains particularly attentive to moments where what I 
call nostalgia is really (also) a shade, say, of viraha or yād, placed into the larger circuits of 
nation, globe, and history.  
The careful attention to aesthetics and aesthetic history implied by the foregoing brings 
me also into dialogue with scholars trying to rethink the place of aesthetics in postcolonialism 
broadly. Like critics such as Deepika Bahri, I care about the “lack of a sufficiently developed 
critical framework for addressing ‘the aesthetic dimension’…of postcolonial literature” with 
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clear reference to society and politics (1). While what follows is not an attempt to theorize such a 
dimension explicitly—and I suspect no such singular dimension exists—I hope to provide a kind 
of poetic pushback against Bahri’s exclusive and exclusionary focus on the novel and its 
“cognitive and rational content,” which she finds delivered through “mimesis and representation” 
(17). In particular, by attending to the ways in which nostalgia already implicates value (by 
calling the present into question and bringing some affective claim of the past to bear on it), I 
hope to illuminate the potential of artworks to ignite or fuel certain modes of political desire.  
While I will not engage their work substantially, I nonetheless recognize this dissertation 
as sharing with recent scholars the larger enterprise of breaking our field free of the exclusive 
grip of modernist and postmodernist aesthetics, “celebrating the magical, the parodic, and other 
forms of ‘post-realisms’” (Anjaria 4). The reconsideration of “realism in the colony” by Ulka 
Anjaria, for example, relies on the dual observation that, (1) when it comes to supposedly 
outmoded forms and aesthetics (such as realism), postcolonial critical common sense often relies 
on stereotypes rather than developing its own models adequate to specific contexts, and (2) often 
those stereotypes belong more appropriately—to the extent they belong anywhere but the trash 
heap—to the European contexts where they emerged, not to the (post)colonial contexts where 
they arrive as familiar accusations of belatedness. Jahan Ramazani’s work has similarly 
problematized any attempt to project American anxieties about a stereotyped “lyric ‘I’” on 
postcolonial poetry (3).  
The move away from the stereotypically “postcolonial” novel—with its modernist-
derived aesthetics, nation-state-centered thematics, and relatively large global market—brings us 
quickly into a variety of landscapes one might call “vernacular,” following S. Shankar’s 
characterization of that term as “oriented away from the transnational, the modern, and the 
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hybrid and toward the local, the traditional, and the culturally autonomous” (xv). Postcolonial 
poetry interestingly bridges the two terms, rooted as that poetry often is in intimate local coteries 
that nonetheless affiliate transnationally (Nerlekar Bombay Modern). One of the more 
remarkable and exciting aspects of Indian poetry in English is how much less anxious it can be 
about the idea of tradition than its novel cousin. That is not to say that it has no such anxiety; it 
shares that much with any modernism. Nonetheless, Indian poets in English traffic much more 
easily with the past, via translation, and with the vernacular co-present through multilingual 
writing than do most Indian novelists in English. All of the poets considered in this dissertation 
are at least translators if not actively productive in multiple languages. This is so even when the 
poets are the “usual” transnational elite situated in American academies (such as A. K. 
Ramanujan or Agha Shahid Ali). Poetry, with its embrace of artifice and greater sense of place 
and tradition (not to mention its readers’ willingness to tolerate extremes of estrangement and 
even incomprehension), encourages a breakdown of Shankar’s vernacular/transnational divide by 
allowing the insularity of the former to travel with relative ease across the globe. 
That said, the idea of vernacularity has remained an important touchstone for this project. 
One way it has done so is by removing the burden of thinking in terms of postcolonial literature 
as exclusively or even especially a form of “writing back.”7 More particularly, vernacularity has 
allowed me to place my work alongside that of Rashmi Sadana’s efforts to clarify in terms of 
literary culture what it means for English to be an “Indian language” (xv). By that I do not mean 
the (also useful but now familiar) consideration of how English has been linguistically 
indigenized into various forms of Indian English, Hinglish, etc. Rather, Sadana draws attention 
to ways in which “English is no longer a postcolonial language,” having become instead a local 
                                                 
7 For the term, now in wide use, see Ashcroft et al.  
25 
 
“mediator” between various languages in India, for example (23).8 Much has been said (by 
Sadana and others) about the Indian National Academy of Letters, the Sahitya Akademi, and its 
use of English as well as Hindi as a translational link language in its efforts to make the various 
literatures of India available to each other as “Indian” literature. This dissertation will 
accordingly spend less time positioning English within such institutional environments, which 
other scholars have already done, than on shedding light on the aesthetic development of English 
as a language with Indian cultural memory affectively and stylistically embedded into it.9  
We thus arrive at a useful point for reflecting on such keywords as multilingualism, 
translingualism, and translation. Arvind Krishna Mehrotra, whose work will be discussed in 
Chapter 2, has repeatedly insisted on the need for better ways of discussing the “multilingual 
sensibilities” of Indian poets in English (Partial Recall 164). He has especially shooed us away 
from the easy nativist gesture of “Angrezihatao” (“drive out English”) or from explaining 
aesthetic success in English according to a straightforward if mysterious “geological model,” 
wherein “each time [the poet] chooses to write he descends, caged canary bird in hand, into the 
thickly-seamed coal pit of the mother tongue” to retrieve and “make available” in English some 
nugget of the “tradition” (164). The model of translingual nostalgia attempts to make some 
progress in articulating at least the affective horizons of the “multilingual sensibilities” of 
Mehrotra’s own generation.  
Postcolonial interest in translation (and translation studies) has often focused either (1) on 
                                                 
8 In the context of Indian poetry in English, Nerlekar has made a similar point about the 
achievements of Poetry India and the little magazines of 1960’s Bombay, with their “systematic 
representation of Indian poetry in English as part of the larger landscape of Indian literatures,” 
jostling alongside those other literatures, exchanging translations on the level of (in-text) parity 
(Bombay Modern 69).  
9 For examples of scholarship on the institutional life of English in India, besides that of Sadana, 
see George or Padma. 
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attempts by the colonizer to organize and “know” the non-West, linguistically and textually, in 
ultimate (if sometimes accidental) service of domination, or (2) on very nearly analogous 
grounds, seeing the postcolonial writer as someone who is translating her culture for Western 
consumption (or to disrupt the Western knowledge of her).10 In the case of Indian translingual 
nostalgia and its translations, however, the intercultural aspect of translation is diminished if not 
eliminated entirely on occasion, if we take “intercultural” to signal a scenario where one group of 
people try to understand another. This is so for two reasons: first, these translations are generally 
across time rather than space (hence the nostalgia); and second, the consumers of the translations 
often enough, like the translator, share access to both languages—the creation of a new version 
and the recognition of its relationship to the original is where the pleasure lies, not in “knowing” 
something new. The new nostalgic translation into English thus parallels (albeit distantly) an 
earlier era when Sanskrit works were translated into vernaculars, where readers and translators 
alike shared familiarity with both versions and had little compunction about altering the original 
to fit new aesthetic and social contexts (although it bears repeating that the terms “original” and 
even “translation” are only used anachronistically and imprecisely to refer to these movements).  
This dissertation’s investment in intra-cultural translation thus also puts it into 
conversation with Christi Merrill’s desire to develop ways of thinking about “texts authored in 
the plural,” her phrase for the kind of text prevalent in South Asia that exists in many retellings 
and (what for Merrill is the same thing) translations. Such texts only seem to diminish in 
translation if we consider them as “authored” by particular individuals. Her desire, which I share, 
                                                 
10 Examples of the former might include Eric Cheyfitz’s The Poetics of Imperialism 
Translation and Colonization from The Tempest to Tarzan or André Lefevere’s “Composing the 




moves away from “a melancholic attachment to a lost speaking subject” (i.e., an “original” 
author) and turns instead to a kind of performativity, which she calls a “shamanistic 
performance, recitation” (30). By moving away from representational accounts of translation to 
“recitative” or otherwise active accounts, we can see translingual nostalgia not as a failed attempt 
at capturing some previous plenitude of meaning, but rather as a variously successful exercises 
that participate in the construction of a present. 
MODERN SANSKRIT LITERATURE 
The other literature of interest to this dissertation besides Indian Poetry in English is that of 
Modern Sanskrit. Readers may be surprised to learn that there is such a thing, that Sanskrit is not 
(exactly) dead. The question of Sanskrit’s liveliness is a complicated one, so I want to use this 
section to offer a bit of history and to situate Modern Sanskrit within literary studies more 
broadly. Before beginning, however, I want to stress how understudied Modern Sanskrit is.11 My 
ambitions in this dissertation, which only contains sustained discussion of a single poet, will 
therefore have to be modest. I am interested precisely and only in how Modern Sanskrit 
exemplifies self-consciousness about language life and death in terms that are resonant with my 
understanding of nostalgia more generally.  
In the section to follow, I will track how Modern Sanskrit’s arrival on the world stage 
                                                 
11 Jürgen Hanneder has offered a discussion of two examples of Sanskrit prose (one late-
nineteenth century, the other early twentieth) under the resonant title “Modernes Sanskrit. Eine 
vergessene Literatur” (“Modern Sanskrit: A Forgotten Literature”). In addition to its two case 
studies, Hanneder’s article contains a few stray observations about Modern Sanskrit writ large, 
noting, for example, that “the mahākāvya tradition of Kālidāsa and Aśvaghoṣa, from its 
beginnings til today is to a certain extent unbroken,” evidence for which he finds in 
Śāradāmaṇilīlācaritam, a mahākāvya on the wife of the Bengali saint Rāmakriṣna (211, 
translation mine). In general, however, my dissertation’s interest in poetry and nostalgia at a 
later, explicitly postcolonial period in literary history makes Hanneder’s article, though 
interesting, not specifically relevant. 
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(and the world stage’s arrival in Sanskrit) inevitably pushes it out of the familiar spotlights that 
contemporary literary study favors for illuminating its objects. To anticipate the arguments to 
follow, I suggest that what is at stake is more than the (very real) fact that Modern Sanskrit 
inevitably falls between the disciplinary cracks when, on the one hand, it fails to appeal to the 
largely philological and historical interests of traditional Indology (the usual readers of 
Sanskrit), and on the other, it lends itself to neither the “writing-back” nor the subaltern-
studies approaches so often favored by postcolonial critics (the usual readers of 
contemporary Indian literature). Instead, following Aamir Mufti, I suggest that the entire 
Orientalism-derived project of “world literature” is brought to bear in the production of 
Sanskrit as a dead language. In order to understand what is happening when Modern 
Sanskrit literature responds to that status—plays with it in its own literary undoing—we 
must therefore trace the complex history of how Sanskrit came to be thought dead. In so 
doing, we will discover that to intentionally write in a dead language in a mood of nostalgia 
for that language can be a potentially subversive act; much more, in other words, than the 
simply repetitive conservatism it might seem.  
The story of how colonial discourse gave Sanskrit its death sentence comes in two parts: 
first, Sanskrit was pinned down, and then its life was called into question. As it turned out, 
questioning was all it took—the pinning had already knocked what life Sanskrit might have had 
out of it. As I hope to show, however, there remains even then, at story’s end, an entity otherwise 
than living, otherwise than dead, carrying on in inscrutable (to Orientalist eyes) anachronism. I 
call that entity Modern Sanskrit. In order to approach it, though, we must flesh out the above 
narrative with a bit more detail. 
First, the pinning down. As is well known by now, “The vast social world that was India 
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had to be classified, categorized, and bounded before it could be ordered” by the British (Cohn 
21-22). One major strategy for carrying out that project involved positing “India” as such as an 
organizing category for scholarly investigation. “India,” though, was not simply a contemporary 
geographic object, it was a “civilization.” Attempts to make sense of that civilization led, as 
various scholars have shown, to a search for textual roots in “its” earliest Sanskrit writings.12 
Prevailing opinion at the time held that “the present condition of a society or civilization [could] 
be understood only as the outcome of its past,” and nowhere better than at the “master moment” 
when the civilization was born (Dharwadker 175). But there were also less loftily academic 
motivations for utilizing the textual-civilizational methodology. First, there were political factors 
that encouraged Hindu- (and hence Sanskrit-) centrism in delimiting the civilization at hand. 
Second, there was a great deal of confusion over the messiness of the present, messiness which 
was readily escaped by turning to the past. The interplay of these motivations led scholars in the 
end to pin down a reasonably coherent field of Sanskrit literature and culture, which was taken to 
be uniquely expressive of the Hindu-Indian civilizational essence. 
To give some texture to these observations (and to point to some evidence for them), let 
us consider the now-notorious case of the colonial construction of “Hindu law.”13 In 1772, 
Governor Warren Hastings issued a new Judicial Plan in Bengal. That plan, which provided that 
the peoples of India should be subject to their “own” laws, was largely responsible for 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Cohn; Dharwadker; Dodson; Mufti; and Rocher.  
13 The history recounted here is elaborated in more detail by, e.g., Cohn, Dodson, and Rocher, on 
whom the following account draws. I choose the perspective of administration and the law 
because it is in that domain that Sanskrit manifestly continues as a vital medium of production 
within colonial culture even as it is relegated imaginatively to the past. Hence the erasure of 
linguistic “life” is clearest. The basic narrative holds true in the other domains of culture—
Rosane Rocher notes the “strikingly similar assumptions” that underpin efforts to understand 
Hinduism despite the lack of explicit administrative motivation (225). 
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establishing British interest in Sanskrit. In practice, the plan meant two bodies of law, one for 
Muslims and one for everyone else, understood as Hindus. The dichotomy was quite inapt, but it 
allowed the British to “cast themselves as the protectors of a vast and suppliant majority that had 
been held under the thumb of Muslim oppressors” in the wake of Mughal rule (Rocher 222). 
Immediately, however, problems arose. Not least was the question as to what “Hindu law” was. 
Hastings’ idea was that there was an “ancient constitution” that had been passed down 
“unchanged from remotest antiquity,” held in trust by Sanskrit-speaking Brahmin scholars, i.e., 
“pandits” (cited in Cohn 66).14 They, however, confounded expectations by seeming, to 
suspicious British eyes, variously incompetent, dishonest, and inconsistent. Goaded by such 
frustrations, one prominent judge at the Supreme Court, William Jones, decided to learn Sanskrit 
himself to “check on” their work (cited in Cohn 28). 
It hardly needs saying, therefore, that British scholars of the late 18th century, like Jones, 
did not come to Sanskrit wanting to become pandits. They came wanting rather to produce state-
of-the-art British scholarship about what they believed the pandits to know. What pandits knew, 
however, was not necessarily what the colonial imagination wished it to be. If the British plan 
was to cut out the supposed middle men and read the laws themselves, the plan had flaws. To 
begin, the laws were complex and nowhere so succinctly stated as the phrase “ancient 
constitution” might suggest. The British required rigorous local instruction if they were to 
understand the texts. But, from what we can tell now, Bengal at the time was no hotbed of legal 
studies; the best Sanskrit minds were occupied with logic. Pandits did try to work with the 
British, though, which led to a “renaissance of dharmaśāstra,” the branch of Sanskrit learning 
that colonial officials and their pandit interlocutors decided corresponded most closely to the 
                                                 
14 For an introduction to the pandit as a cultural phenomenon, see Michaels. 
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English field of “law” (Rocher 237). The correspondence worked better in theory than practice, 
however. As was soon apparent, what a Bengali pandit did with dharmaśāstra very inadequately 
matched what a British judge did with his law books (hence Jones’ initial frustration). The 
British believed, “in western fashion, that for a single problem there was only one single solution 
that could be right” (Rocher 237). Such conviction required further entrenching claims to the 
existence of a single legal code—India’s “ancient constitution”—rather than confronting the 
messy reality, that labyrinth of commentarial traditions used by the pandits. The entire field of 
Sanskrit legal studies, therefore, had to be carefully constructed, albeit under the guise of 
deciphering and “re”-constructing lost origins.  
Similar reconstructions went on in other domains, including religion, aesthetics, and—
most crucially for us—literature. Each shared the basic presuppositions of the legal case, namely 
the whole civilizational logic of what Aamir Mufti has called the “Sanskrit-centered Indic 
complex” (116). In each domain, a particular text gained preeminence through translation and 
Indological study: the Law of Manu for legal studies, the Bhagavad Gita for Hindu religion, or 
Kalidasa’s Abhijñānaśākuntalam for classical Sanskrit literature. Each text had, of course, been 
valued by the tradition; but only at this point does Sanskrit become, in the literary sphere, “the 
language of Kalidasa.” For that matter, only here does the Indian tradition come into being.15  
Already we can see two dimensions of what I am calling the “pinning down” of Sanskrit 
tradition. First, scholars posit a traditional unity. Second, that unity is located in the past—a past 
                                                 
15 Sheldon Pollock rightly notes that there were parallel forms of “hierarchizing textualization” 
in precolonial South Asia (“Deep Orientalism?” 100). Where the colonial version differed, 
however, from its precolonial parentage (to which it directly appealed and of which it availed 
itself in its own project) is in linking the textuality to a given culture. Previously the texts 
provided truth simpliciter, not the truth of the Hindus, say, or of India. That is, we are now 
dealing with the foundations of a “national” culture.  
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which, in practice, exists only textually. We might speak, in a figurative mood, of Sanskrit being 
given a center of gravity that pulls attention toward its well-specified location in the past, toward, 
for example, the flourishing of Kalidasa at the Gupta court in the fifth century CE. But what is 
the attention drawn away from? Besides the obvious vernaculars, more recent Sanskrit writing 
also recedes from view. Note that texts produced in the intervening years between, say, the 
sought-after constitutional Ur-text and the present are, in this Indological framework, made both 
redundant (as only an elaboration of that first impetus) and quite likely decadent. In short, they 
become pointless to study.16 As Rosane Rocher notes, the denigration of the later tradition was 
likely exacerbated by the tradition’s own tendency to present itself as “derivative and 
commentarial” (229).  
Consequently, the pandits “ceased to be considered the living guardians and interpreters 
of the indigenous tradition and were downgraded to assistants to, and employees of, the British” 
(Rocher 239). But this is only true of the “tradition” as newly constituted by the British. Other, 
more minor (in the sense of small, local) lineages continued along more or less customary lines. 
Michael Dodson stresses that even colonially employed pandits often continued to teach 
according to “traditional” methods at their homes. Colonial needs, moreover, were various. In 
order to undermine former channels of patronage (and hence the authority of former patrons), the 
administration also offered purely customary patronage to Sanskrit culture otherwise unaffiliated 
with administrative projects (Dodson 49). So, as a medium of communication, of instruction, 
indeed of textual production, Sanskrit the language continued popping up all over the place even 
                                                 
16 A striking symptom of this mentality: only recently have scholars begun seriously to map out 
“Sanskrit knowledge systems on the eve of colonialism,” (Pollock “Introduction”). That means, 
of course, that for most of the history of Indology, the most obvious gap in its understanding of 
Sanskrit culture lay precisely where Indology actually met its object of study. 
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as Sanskrit the culture came to be pinned in an image of stagnation. Even the colonial 
administration continued to use the living half of the language. Warren Hastings collected 
petitions written in Sanskrit “to be filed against his impeachment” (Raghavan, Modern Sanskrit 
Writings 3). And, most obviously, the court continued to hire pandits to write judicial opinions 
(in Sanskrit). Nevertheless, the axiology of Indology could only dismiss such uses of the 
language as inexpressive of anything “Sanskritic” or even Indian, as they are clearly products of 
the colonial relationship. What is a classical Indologist to do with any of the many Sanskrit odes 
to British monarchs? 
Thus Sanskrit was pinned down as a cultural field and as an object of historical 
knowledge. Colonial projects to standardize subsequent education ensured that this fixed image 
of Indologized Sanskrit was given back to the language for self-replication. Because the 
government wished its pandits to write legal opinions uniformly, according to the British notion 
of India’s ancient constitution, schools were established to teach and perpetuate the British-
mediated Sanskrit tradition. Henceforth Sanskrit literature comes increasingly to mean, 
metonymically, Kalidasa, not the work, say, of a nineteenth-century Nepali pandit.17 It is thanks 
to that legacy that an otherwise marvelous book called The Modernity of Sanskrit can refer not to 
any modern texts in Sanskrit, only to the role classical texts play in modernity (Sawhney). 
Now that we have a working grasp on the first half of Sanskrit’s colonial death sentence, 
we can turn to the second half, which comes not in the textual but in the social domain. Leaving 
the manuscripts behind, what did colonial-era thinkers make of Sanskrit’s relative placement as 
one language among others? Initially, there was much confusion on the point. Many held that 
Sanskrit was artificial, invented by “insidious Bruhmans [sic]” to keep their secrets (Cohn 25, 
                                                 
17 See Schneider.  
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37). William Jones disagreed, but thought it no older than “pure Hindi,” which he considered the 
truly “primeval” language of northern India, Sanskrit having arrived through the supposed Aryan 
invasion (Dodson 127). Another observer noted that the pandits themselves “assert that 
[Sanskrit]…was never used as a common medium of communication among men,” favoring 
instead a divine interpretation of the language (cited in Dodson 125). Each alternative had its 
own conceptual consequences, but the question was largely an academic one when pursued 
among Sanskritists. 
In a variety of venues, however, the socio-historical placement of a language came to 
matter a great deal. That is because the British operated on what Robert Young calls a 
“nominalist monolingual model” of language (1209). Under that model, languages are discrete 
and nameable (hence the nominalism) and each speaker has a unique relationship with only one 
language, her so-called “mother tongue” (hence the monolingualism). Unfortunately, the model 
fundamentally failed to capture precolonial South Asia’s linguistic complexity. As Lisa Mitchell 
notes,  
At the very beginning of the nineteenth century someone in southern India might 
find it perfectly natural to compose an official letter in Persian, record a land 
transaction in Marathi, send a personal note to a relative in Telugu, perform 
religious ablutions in Sanskrit, and barter with the vegetable vendor in Tamil, all 
in the course of a single day. (159) 
And, she goes on to argue, none of those languages would have been the source of feelings of 
communal identity. Nevertheless, the nominalist monolingual model prevailed. Likely fueled by 
the rise of utilitarianism in nineteenth-century imperialist discourse as it clashed with the 
classicism of Sanskrit-centered Indology, the model came to a special prominence in political 
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decision-making, leading to claims about language and community taking center stage in 
competition for resources and authority.18  
In terms of Sanskrit, this all means that it was immediately declared dead. Not just in the 
publications of the British, as it had been before, but by Indians themselves. Sheldon Pollock 
tells of the first known example, from 1857, the year of the “Mutiny” that marked both the 
decisive arrival of the British state apparatus and the first great image of indigenous resistance to 
it (“Death” 394). The Indian in question, a Gujarati poet by the name of Dalpatram, invokes the 
idea that Sanskrit had been dead already for a millennium (!) in an elegy in remembrance of 
Alexander Kinloch Forbes. Aside from being Dalpatram’s friend, Forbes was a colonial 
administrator who founded the Gujarat Vernacular Society in order to encourage Gujaratis to 
“develop” their supposed mother tongue (Isaka 7). It is no coincidence that the arrival of 
Sanskrit’s funeral coincides with the consolidation of a British-sponsored turn to the vernacular, 
nor that the poet declaring the death should become the acknowledged founder of “modern” 
Gujarati literature.19 As we are coming to see, modernity in South Asian languages comes at the 
cost of Sanskrit’s vitality (as perceived from “outside”—i.e., as seen from the mediating 
“neutrality” of English20—not as practiced internally).  
Sanskrit’s death knell then echoed across the subcontinent. In South India, people used it 
to leverage the value of the still-living Tamil, India’s other “classical” language (Ramaswamy 
44). In colonial Bengal, Ram Mohan Roy stepped into the Anglicism-Orientalism debate, 
deploying strategically rhetoric both sides could agree on: the Indological stereotype of Sanskrit 
education as “what was known two thousand years ago, with the addition of vain and empty 
                                                 
18 For an account of the rise of utilitarianism and its impact on Orientalism, see Majeed. 
19 See also Kothari. 
20 On “English as vanishing mediator,” see Mufti (16). 
36 
 
subtleties since produced by speculative men” (43)—never mind that this was not a 
characterization that he quite believed on its own terms; it spoke to his audience and served his 
ends, i.e., getting his countrymen access to the language and knowledge of the then-current 
power (Robertson). Nor were vernacular proponents in North India any more sympathetic to 
Sanskrit’s claims to vitality, as new vernacular legitimacy lay precisely on monolingualist 
grounds. As one twentieth-century Hindi critic put it,  “Even if English had not arrived to 
interrupt and break our tradition, we would still be forced to abandon Sanskrit today, because it 
is no longer the language of the common person” (Dvivedi, cited in Sawhney “Who” 299).21 
Leaving aside the question whether any standardized language in India at the time belonged to 
the “common man,” notice the assumption that “we” can only have one language, and so must 
turn to the vernacular. Gone is the possibility of Sanskrit maintaining a separate literary sphere of 
practice. 
The decisive moment in adopting the monolingual model comes when speakers rethink 
their relationship to language. That is one of the key insights of an important book by Lisa 
Mitchell on South India’s embrace of mother-tongue monolingualism. Whereas previously 
people in South Asia—and, for that matter, pre-eighteenth-century Europe (Yildiz)—approached 
languages as “tools for particular tasks,” now languages took on personal meaning, as attributes 
of identity (Mitchell 10). Accordingly, people had to take care of “their” language, keep it alive, 
and make it whole and healthy. Otherwise, they, as a community, would cease to exist (Mitchell 
89-90). Sanskrit, however, had no such community identity, except perhaps on caste grounds—
grounds which, needless to say, quickly lost their own legitimacy (with good reason).  
                                                 
21 I am not saying that these political claims are illegitimate, only noting that their cumulative 
effect is to reinforce the notion of contemporary Sanskrit anachronism. 
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It would be a step too far, however, to say that Sanskrit was uniformly disavowed. It was 
widely esteemed, albeit in the form of the “heritage” whose production we saw above, by the 
emerging bourgeois classes who became in time the leaders of anti-colonial nationalism, as well 
as by ideologues of linguistic purity.22 The latter gave Sanskrit a modicum of continued 
productive vitality, placing it rhetorically at the head of languages like Hindi, as their great 
legitimator and lexical storehouse. Sanskrit thus lived on, but only as the teleological endpoint of 
a “Sanskritized” Hindi or Bengali, a register that is popularly held abstruse, out of touch, and 
parochial—hardly the associations a living language would wish to have.   
The problem with these many circulating deaths is that Sanskrit never really “lived” to 
“die.” It just didn’t fit the monolingual model’s biologism. Indologists have long realized this.23 
As Sheldon Pollock notes, one could say that Sanskrit was “born dead” (“Death” 393). 
Increasing uneasiness with pat biologism has given way lately to a profusion of colorful, if not 
particularly helpful, metaphors. Sanskrit has been called, at one point or another, a “ghost” 
(Vajpeyi “Return” 46), a “vampire” (Sawhney “Who” 298), and a “zombie” (Knutson 120). It 
has even been likened to H. P. Lovecraft’s Chthulhu (Knutson 16). Such extravagant metaphors, 
while not unfounded, ultimately manage to hold onto Sanskrit as freak exception, instead of 
using it to problematize the language model that so manifestly fails to do its object justice. Let 
us, then, emphasize the artificiality of Sanskrit’s not simply dying, but becoming, of a sudden, a 
long-dead ancestor.  
It would be equally artificial to insist, defensively, anachronistically, that Sanskrit was 
always living and continues to be so today—in short, that Sanskrit simply prompts us to clarify 
                                                 
22 For examinations of the relationship between Hindi, nationalism, Sanskrit, and Hinduism, see 
Dalmia (on the 19th century); Orsini (on the early 20th); and Rai.  
23 Rapson had already made the point by 1904. 
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what we mean by language life. The relationship between Sanskrit and its environs has shifted 
frequently over the course of its history. Sanskrit itself is plural. One scholar’s partial list of its 
forms includes: “Vaidika, … ‘Classical’ Sanskrit with [its] many styles … Pāṇini’s ‘Bhāṣā’, Epic 
Sanskrit, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, Ārṣa Sanskrit (the language of the ṛṣis), Aiśa Sanskrit (the 
language of Īśa or God), Buddhist Tantric Sanskrit … colloquial Sanskrit, Ardhasaṃskṛta, 
‘Quasi-Sanskrit’, etc.” (Vasudeva 186). Each lived in a different way, if lived is the word one 
insists upon. One of the more interesting questions in a literary history of Sanskrit is precisely 
what kind of life a given period found in the language, i.e., what distinctive uses Sanskrit’s 
writers felt it to have at that time. That varies from the “language-intrinsic evocativeness” of the 
multilingual dramas of Kalidasa (Vasudeva 204) to the increasing “depth” of reference brought 
to the table as cosmopolitan and local intermingle in the vernacular millennium (Bronner and 
Shulman 2). 
To recap: Sanskrit’s death sentence operated on two levels. First, as Indology definitively 
arrived on the Indian scene, its institutional and methodological investments split Sanskrit into an 
“essential” body of texts, on the one hand, and an insignificant but diverse set of continued 
language practices, on the other. Later popular, scholarly, and political discourse rendered even 
the latter practices apparently anachronistic, superfluous to what was going on more “naturally” 
in the “mother tongues.” 
Readers familiar with Aamir Mufti’s recent Forget English! may recognize in the above 
story a shifted perspective on what Mufti calls the “institution of ‘Indian literature,’ that is, the 
single event of its emergence and insertion into the space of world literature” (Mufti 38). That, 
too, is a two-part process, involving “the Sanskritization of tradition, on the one hand, and the 
invention of the modern vernaculars, on the other” (116-117). Mufti’s account, though, focuses 
39 
 
on the successful, emergent end of the story—the body of writing newly reconstituted as India’s 
contribution to world literature. His goal is to denaturalize, exposing the new world literature’s 
genealogical roots in the Orientalist project. I am interested instead in what got left behind. 
Modern Sanskrit, I contend, is such a remainder. But what exactly remained? 
Unfortunately, as Jürgen Hanneder notes, “This [i.e., colonial] phase in the production of 
Sanskrit works remains until today one of the blank spots in Indology” (299).24 At the level of 
crude generalization, though, we can follow V. Raghavan in observing that Sanskrit’s modernity 
began with a bifurcation. Some pandits continued along the traditional path, while others 
interacted more interestedly with the colonial government and its new institutions (“Sanskrit 
Writings”). They—the latter collaborators—gave birth to a complex series of renegotiations, 
borrowings, and innovations that can only be accounted for under a new historical heading: call 
it “modern.” Thus began a slow and uneven slide from writing which was “merely” left behind 
by the worldly gaze to the literature constituted in being left behind. 
Allow me to clarify. If Sanskrit’s entry onto the world stage via projects like Jones’ 
translations of Kalidasa came at the cost of specifically Modern Sanskrit’s ability also to stand 
on that stage, it does not mean that Modern Sanskrit writers simply ignored the on-going 
pageantry. As time went on, new literature in Sanskrit began increasingly to register 
symptomatically its newfound status as imperiled (and eventually dead) inheritor of the tradition 
as seen by the world at large. Symptoms therefore register both aspects of the “death sentence” 
outlined earlier. First, we find the language absorbing a self-image inflected by Indological 
discourse. Thus the European infatuation with Kalidasa, and his Abhijñānaśākuntalam in 
                                                 
24 There have been a number of historical sketches from inside the tradition. Most are largely 
bibliographic in nature, peppered with casual evaluation. Seminal such accounts can be found in 
Raghavan’s article “Sanskrit,” as well as his book-length Modern Sanskrit Writings. 
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particular, returns to Modern Sanskrit as a matter of its very definition. Modern Sanskrit 
becomes “the language of Kalidasa,” and, as if to prove the point, an unprecedented flurry of 
texts appeared explicitly engaging the poet’s legacy. Satya Vrat Shastri has provided scholars a 
boon in this regard, offering some of Modern Sanskrit literatures’s finer criticism in two 
volumes: one on sixteen literary works recounting Kalidasa’s life story and another on forty 
works otherwise related to his poetry. Works considered span the twentieth century, and even 
then the list is non-exhaustive.  
The second way that Modern Sanskrit took on the burden of its new status comes in an 
immense self-consciousness about language choice. Now appears a new genre of meta-poetry, 
which takes the Sanskrit language itself as its subject. “Sanskrit” appears personified in “her” 
own works. She might be the object of an apostrophizing eulogy, or she might confront her 
linguistic competitors dramatically. Radhavallabh Tripathi recounts an example of the latter: A. 
R. Rajaraja Varma’s turn-of-the-century Gairvāṇīvijaya (“Victory of the Language of the Gods,” 
i.e., Sanskrit).25 It depicts the lady Sanskrit, “[t]hwarted by the overpowering impact of English 
and Anglicization,” as she “approaches [the god] Brahmā and makes an appeal to save her from 
oppression.” Various Indian languages, along with English, are brought to plea their cases, and 
Brahmā settles the disputes, telling everyone present “to live peacefully and make room for each 
other’s growth” (Tripathi Introduction 4). Not yet has Sanskrit’s death become an inevitable 
feature of the language, but the seeds are sown. Later authors will find themselves needing to 
imagine a new birth for their language entirely (see, e.g., Kaṇtakārjuna). By the time we reach an 
author like Radhavallabh Tripathi (b. 1949), the issue of language vitality is front and center. 
                                                 
25 Unfortunately, Tripathi does not give a date and I have been unable to find a copy of the text myself. 
Varma, however, lived from 1863 to 1918, and his other available works show him to have been active 
throughout his adult life; hence, my reference to it as a “turn-of-the-century” text 
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Tripathi’s Laharīdaśakam will provide this dissertation an opportunity to explore in detail how 
that vitality is negotiated. 
OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
Focusing on the work of scholar-poet A.K. Ramanujan, my first chapter examines the theoretical 
apparatus that has so far dominated scholarly critique of nostalgia. Ramanujan’s original poetry 
shares with that critique the assumption that nostalgia is a delusive temptation. That assumption, 
which derives from the concept’s Enlightenment origins, leads Ramanujan’s poetic persona to a 
false dichotomy: he must either renounce his nostalgia or defend it by demonstrating his definite 
access to the past. Unable or unwilling to do either, he attempts to show at least that he knows 
nostalgia to be indefensible, i.e., bound to fail in its quest for the past. What results is 
Ramanujan’s famously exquisite irony. I argue, however, that this irony represents less a victory 
over nostalgia’s delusions than the further entrenchment of an assumption that postcolonial 
nostalgia represents a failure to embrace modernity. 
By way of escaping that bind, my second chapter turns to translations by the generation 
of poets to which Ramanujan belonged in order to show what an epistemic focus misses when it 
looks at nostalgia. When Ramanujan’s translations are placed in context alongside those of other 
post-colonial Indian poet-translators, such as Arun Kolatkar and Arvind Krishna Mehrotra, it 
becomes apparent that their generation attempted what I call a counter-nostalgic (re)vitalization 
of the English language. That is, they oppose ordinary nostalgia, which they find moribund and 
cliché, with their own more aesthetically and politically subversive nostalgias. Specifically, they 
perceive the prevailing poetic English in India as bound by 19th-century Orientalist translation 
aesthetics, which render it both nationalistic and imperial. To escape that stricture, these poets 
translate medieval devotional works that were disesteemed by Orientalists. The resulting 
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translations suggest new styles and affective possibilities that the poets then borrow for their own 
work without claiming to represent or revive the past “in itself.” In so doing, they assemble 
translingual counter-traditions that oppose both facile globalism and parochial chauvinism. 
In order to specify the theory of nostalgia underpinning these literary historical claims, 
my third chapter turns to Agha Shahid Ali, perhaps the most unabashedly nostalgic poet to 
emerge from postcolonial South Asia. Free as it is of epistemic preoccupations, his work 
suggests that nostalgia is best approached phenomenologically. Rather than focus on what 
images of the past emerge under nostalgia, Ali’s poetry invites us to attend to how they emerge 
and in what contexts. His work thus highlights two aspects of nostalgia that have especially 
interested phenomenologists: its disruption of the present and the indefiniteness of its object (i.e., 
the fact that it looks at a present fragment but is “about” an underspecified world of the past). I 
argue that Ali’s early poetry takes advantage, at a thematic level, of the ambiguity of nostalgia’s 
object in order to hold the postcolonial present open to question. Leaving thematics behind, I 
then turn to Ali’s later attempts to write Urdu ghazal poetry in English, which illustrate how 
nostalgia can be formalized and put to similar use without referring directly to the past at all. 
If the first three chapters attest to a shared conviction among a generation of Anglophone 
South Asian poets that the English available to them was lifeless and that it could only be 
revitalized with a nostalgic translation from some other language, Chapter 4 sharpens this 
observation theoretically by turning to another language with a fraught relationship to the 
present. Radhavallabh Tripathi writes in Sanskrit, a language widely but wrongly believed to be 
dead. Nonetheless, its perception as dead shapes how it is written, and Tripathi’s poetry serves as 
a case study for how nostalgic attention can fix language as a sign of another time while 
simultaneously deploying that language to comment on the present. In other words, it shows how 
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the concept of language death, approached alternately as cause and symptom of nostalgia, can 
serve as an aesthetically productive lens for viewing the world.  
My conclusion reflects on what it might mean to consider certain forms of postcolonial 
English as analogously “dead” in the sense developed in the context of Tripathi’s Sanskrit. Such 
a question helps highlight the specificity of the place of English in South Asia as well as the 
multilingualism of which English forms a part, a multilingualism inflected by pervasive nostalgia 
for pasts when language was in touch with the world.  
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CHAPTER 1: NOSTALGIC SHAME 
INTRODUCTION 
Having laid out in the Introduction a brief synopsis of nostalgia theory and its history, I begin the 
body of the dissertation by turning to a poet whose work exemplifies one important aspect of the 
postcolonial inheritance of that history, namely shame. That poet is Indian-American Attipat 
Krishnaswami Ramanujan (1929-1993), better known simply as A.K. Ramanujan. Ramanujan 
published in two languages (English and Kannada) and translated into English from five 
(Kannada, Telugu, Tamil, Malayalam, and Sanskrit—although the latter two were very 
infrequently the object of his attention). He remains one of the most acclaimed translators and 
scholars of South Indian language and culture, with a rich body of work across the three domains 
of scholarship, translation, and original poetry. This section will be interested primarily in his 
original poetry as it is inflected by the other two aspects of his work. Chapter 2 will devote more 
attention to his translation work.  
Ramanujan’s canonicity within studies of postcolonial poetry—he is discussed in all 
three of the major monographs on the topic (Ramazani; Bery; Patke)—makes him an ideal place 
to begin rethinking some of the field’s assumptions about nostalgia. Ramanujan is famous for his 
corrosive and often witty ironies as well as his careful self-reflexiveness. He is also quite 
obviously obsessed with the past, roughly one sixth of the pages of his Collected Poems contains 
at least one of the following words: memory, reminiscence, remind, the past, forgetting, ghost, 
remember, ancestral, and history. More oblique references paper the rest of the volume. Such 
repetitive concern, when filtered through the irony and self-reflexiveness, has earned him a 
respected position as someone whose relationship to nostalgia is both distanced and nuanced, 
able to avoid the emotion’s pitfalls while also pointing them out.  What this chapter argues, 
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however, is that his ironies and his self-reflexiveness are not quite so simply salutary as critics 
are inclined to believe. What looks like an escape from nostalgia’s clutches is actually, I suggest, 
the result of being that much more firmly caught in the grip of a particular image of nostalgia as 
something that would assert things about the world, past and present. It is an image that makes of 
nostalgia a shameful thing, requiring either guilty acknowledgment or active defense. Ramanujan 
is too self-aware and honest to choose the latter, but his attempts to acknowledge nostalgia do 
not eliminate it; they only expose him as still haunted by nostalgia and even less certain of his 
grip on the world.  
In the sections that follow I explore, successively, (1) a key figure of Ramanujan’s—“the 
watchers”—that offers an initial picture of his anxiety and shame, (2) how the trope of being 
watched plays out across the bulk of his original poetry and what that says about his poetics, (3) 
the role translation plays in the division of Ramanujan’s work and how that division is shaped by 
nostalgia, and finally (4) the ways in which his understanding of nostalgia limits and conditions 
what his poetry can do.  
1.1 RAMANUJAN’S “WATCHERS” AND THEIR VIEW FROM NOWHERE 
We begin not with nostalgia, but with a set of quite different affects, loosely grouped around 
shame and anxiety. “Anxiety” is the title of a meta-literary poem from Ramanujan’s first poetry 
collection, The Striders (1966), but the pervasiveness of the mood in his writing has often been 
remarked upon, as, for example, by Manmohan Krishna Bhatnagar (143). Arvind Krishna 
Mehrotra, himself a major voice within the tradition of Indian poetry in English (and a topic of 
discussion in Chapter 2), has even called it Ramanujan’s “major theme” (“Looking” 301). 
Mehrotra notes, however, that what he means by “anxiety” goes by several names in the poems 
themselves: “‘despair’, ‘fear’, ‘anger’, ‘madness’, ‘lust’” (“Looking” 301). Mehrotra is 
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undoubtedly correct that he has uncovered something “major” underpinning a variety of 
differently named phenomena in Ramanujan’s texts, but I think we can sharpen his terminology. 
I would, for instance, prefer to give categorical primacy not to anxiety but to shame. Mehrotra 
omits that word from his list, but I will argue that it is really what makes sense of the others. 
Moreover, I will move shame further into the background than Mehrotra does when he calls it a 
“theme.” Instead, I hold it to be a pervasive mood that colors any given theme that Ramanujan 
takes up. 
One such theme—indeed a “major” one—is nostalgia. What I hope to show in what 
follows is that these two broad clusters of moods—anxious shame and nostalgia—are co-
constituted in the body of work before us. More specifically, Ramanujan’s original poems can be 
taken as so many attempts to stage the shame of nostalgia, as well as perhaps to work through it 
(albeit unsuccessfully). That formulation likely makes clear why I prefer to distinguish between 
the mood of shame and the theme of nostalgia. Whereas plenty of poems by Ramanujan are 
anxious or ashamed, very few are nostalgic in anything like the way Agha Shahid Ali’s are.26 
Instead, he figures nostalgia as an intrusion, a pitfall, or an embarrassment. My name for the 
genre thus created will be the “nostalgic shame poem,” a conscious echo of what Gillian White 
calls the “lyric shame poem.” At this point in the argument, however, let us stay with particulars, 
zooming in on a handful of exemplary texts. 
A revealing set of figures haunts the third and final volume of original poetry that 
Ramanujan published during his lifetime, Second Sight (1986). Ramanujan calls these figures his 
“watchers,” and they linger silently in the work’s background, popping up every now and then 
                                                 
26 For a discussion of that poetry, see Chapter 4 below.  
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only to “impose nothing, take no positions” (Collected 137).27 Needless to say, their explicit 
inactivity far from guarantees their irrelevance. Spread as they are throughout the volume, they 
suggest a larger structuring force, a way of naming and visualizing the “anxiety” that will 
provide us our entry into Ramanujan’s oeuvre.28  
The watchers belong to an unmarked series of poems in Second Sight which ultimately 
derive from an earlier, abandoned project called “Composition.”29 Vinay Dharwadker, in his 
introduction to Ramanujan’s Collected Poems, describes a late draft shown to him in 1985—now 
retitled “Elements of Composition”—as “a single, long poem of a few hundred lines arranged in 
about twenty-five sections. It was a meditation on what we call the ‘nature’ of self and poetry, 
interspersed at various points with passages reflecting on certain ‘epiphanic’ moments in his life” 
(xxxvii). Dharwadker was impressed by such a “major poem,” but Ramanujan remained 
convinced that the work would be misread if published as is. “He…felt strongly that the formal 
and thematic unity asserted by the long poem contradicted one of his central insights in it, that 
his own ‘truth is in fragments,’” and besides felt that readers would draw false parallels to other 
long poems in English (xxxvii). Accordingly, the work was divided, reworked, and scattered 
across the pages of a collection of other, often quite different poems. The mutual resonance of 
the fragments-cum-standalone poems was not diminished, however. If anything, the poems exert 
a gravitational pull across larger swaths of his oeuvre than they otherwise would have as a unity, 
reinforcing Dharwadker’s sense that “Ramanujan’s poetry is like a circular labyrinth, in which 
                                                 
27 Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent citations for Ramanujan’s poetry come from his 
Collected Poems (1997).  
28 For the purposes of this section, I will continue to use Mehrotra’s term, anxiety, because it 
more obviously and immediately captures the effect of “the watchers.” Shame is a higher-order 
presence that I will only argue for in the next section, once we better know the basics of the 
mood we are working with.  
29 For a draft history of this project and its descendants, see Rodríguez (Appendix 2).  
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all paths lead back to the point from where we start, no matter where we begin” (xxxvi).  
Bearing that context in mind, let us examine the watchers themselves—what they are and 
how they contribute to the larger ethos of Ramanujan’s poetry. A reader of Second Sight first 
encounters them in “Questions,” the fifth poem of the collection (130-131). It opens rather 
darkly:  
Eating, being eaten 
 parts of me watch, parts of  me burn,  
rarely a clear blue flame 
 
without a sputtering of questions: 
 why now, where here, why the Down’s 
syndrome 
The “sputtering” continues for another seven lines of increasingly grotesque imagery—“a 
favourite dog eating puppies / in the garden”—until at last the shock value lies in juxtaposing an 
opposite—“why the fall into bliss on a cloudy afternoon?”  These titular questions, however 
strikingly posed, are familiar enough in their existential gist. They demand reasons—ultimate 
reasons—for everything, such as it is. What is worth noticing is their origin. “Questions” figures 
the poet’s self as an amalgam of seemingly sadistic “parts”  that watch each other burst into 
flame. Just as chemical impurities make a clear fire spit vivid yellows and greens, something 
contaminates the clean burn of the poet’s self, causing questions to burst forth.  
Something shifts in the poem’s second section, which can refer—casually, without 
remark—to “the watchers.” The distance and autonomy of that name seems to signal a deeper 
alienation than was previously implied only by the multiplicity of parts. The scene, though, is not 
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without its ambiguity. We only infer the continuity of the watchers with the first section’s “parts 
[that] watch.” The connection is not stated. Instead, these figures appear as if anew, now in the 
sputtering questions themselves: “were the watchers there” at the poet’s many rebirths? As the 
image of the self is projected further into the past, the watching parts separate further from what 
they are a part of, until they gain what seems an entirely distinct identity as not just (some) 
watchers, but the watchers—and the watchers of some particular one who can speak 
independently in the first person. That autonomy carries forth across the rest of Second Sight. By 
the time we get to “Waterfalls in a Bank,” a poem about other matters entirely can nonetheless 
end with “my watchers watch[ing] from their nowhere perches” (190). 
Where, though, did they come from—or is that a question that can be specified no further 
than we already have? Unusually for Ramanujan’s work, “Questions” opens with an epigraph 
that may help: “Two birds on the selfsame tree: / one of them eats the fruit of the tree / the other 
watches without eating.” Also unusual for Ramanujan is its orthodox, Sanskritic provenance in 
the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad (3.1.1). In the context of that Upaniṣad, the quoted verse offers a 
miniature allegory, which Ramanujan wittily nods toward with his reference to the tree as 
“selfsame.” His translation, however, otherwise suppresses, among other details, two modifiers 
that make the allegory more perspicuous. The birds are specifically “fast friends” (sayujā 
sakhayā), united as and until they find themselves “clinging” to their tree. Whereas previously 
the self, figured dually but unitedly as a pair of birds, must (presumably) have flown unbeholden 
to the ways of the world, it splits after landing, leaving one half to partake of the delicious fruit 
while the other looks on. Didactically, but helpfully, the following verse clarifies that one bird is 
man (puruṣa), while the other is God. When the former—now described as grieving in delusion 
(śocati muhyamānaḥ)—sees the latter, he is released of his grief (vītaśokaḥ). Nothing ever 
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explicitly indicates which of the birds is God, but the force of parallelism and the tradition’s 
metaphorics of karmic fruit suggest readily enough that the watcher is God and the eater is man 
(although here “fruit” is not the more usual, generic phala but pippala, the specific fruit of the 
peepal/bodhi tree).  
Given the allegorical background, we might still wonder how it informs “Questions.” 
True—that poem, like the Upaniṣadic passage, deals with parts of the self. Likewise, those parts 
either “watch” or “burn” (the Sanskrit for “grieve” first signifying “burn”). For Ramanujan, 
however, the confident line between the two sides blurs as the number of parts multiplies 
indefinitely. In the end, we cannot even say with certainty that each part does not burn and watch 
in turn, leaving God no special role at all. The unclarity of which parts watch and which burn 
may be precisely what causes the unevenness of the flame, the titular questions popping out of 
confusion. Still, as we know, God, or a more menacing, god-like conglomerate eventually does 
get projected, in all its distinctness, back out into the world, if admittedly with little hope any 
longer of solace to be found in spotting it, unlike in the more fortunate Upaniṣadic bird of 
delusion. The result is that the self remains under a constant, if “impotent,” surveillance which 
exceeds any particular social formation or relationship, notably including culture.30 
The watchers’ transcendence of culture is not merely left to be inferred along such 
convoluted lines, though. It is signaled all but explicitly in the second section of “Questions,” 
where, as noted above, the poet wonders if the watchers had been present for each of the poet’s 
previous births. Birth, incidentally, had been central in the first section too, but less obviously so. 
Each question had touched on it: the child (born) with Down’s syndrome, “the dead twin’s cord 
                                                 
30 The watchers are described as “impotent” in their eponymous “The Watchers” (137), a poem 
that I will have occasion to reference again shortly below.  
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of birth / noosed // around his brother’s neck,” even the dog eating its offspring. The only 
seeming anomaly is the “fall into bliss,” but that too can mean either a tumble into this world or 
(what amounts to the same thing in its tradition) the Christian Fall from Eden. If that reading 
seems stretched a bit thin, consider the middle of the long final question, which makes up the 
entirety of the poem’s second section:  
were the watchers there 
 
with me, being born over and over, tearing 
 each time through a waterbed paradise, 
the original ocean 
 
of milk, gills for lungs, the whole body 
 a sucking at the nipple, a past perfect 
of two in one 
The question extends a few lines forward and back, but what I have quoted is sufficient for us to 
see the piling on of myths and traditions of human genesis. In addition to the perhaps strained 
reference to the “fall” in section one, this section lets “paradise” pull from “original ocean” a 
clear echo of “original sin”—a resonance made yet louder with the evocation of a “past perfect,” 
utopia lost.  And yet, the original ocean is not of sin but of milk, as in the Buddhist creation myth 
told in Aggañña Sutta. Then, as we progress through the image, “gills for lungs” screams 
Darwinian evolution, and the “past perfect” of “sucking at the nipple” does likewise for Freudian 
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psychoanalysis, given Ramanujan’s sympathies for each.31 As if its overtly existential 
questioning were not enough, the poem draws on every cosmic system at its disposal. The 
watchers transcend them all, or at least the poet wonders if they do: “were [they] there?”  
Whether the watchers were “there” or not, the question itself locates them at a remove 
from all cultural or historical particularity, even if only imaginatively. “Questions” does not find 
a more fundamental basis for its watchers than the tree of Vedic times, whose roots may seem for 
the speaker disappointingly shallow in light of recent encounters with modernity and “Western” 
modes of thought as well as with counter-Brahminical social and aesthetic movements (such as 
those Ramanujan himself more usually championed as a scholar and translator). The watchers 
thus stand outside any particular horizon. The scope of what they watch incorporates even the 
attempt to make sense of them. As the obviously applicable poem, “The Watchers,” puts it, “they 
watch without questions…they watch even the questions” (137).  
Even so, their silence, like the silence of a god, seems to frustrate Ramanujan insofar as 
they “impose nothing, take no positions” (137)—for presumably they also judge, or at least one 
might think, as “witnesses,” they would have the moral obligation to do so; and yet they do not 
act. As “The Watchers” peevishly observes, “impotence / is their supreme virtue” even as they 
witness “a Chinese wall // cemented with the bonemeal of friends” (137). Still, inaction aside, the 
poet himself feels their gaze as a kind of accusation: “my watchers are silent as if / they know 
my truth is in fragments” (178). As watchers, they know and judge, and so create an image of 
perfect knowledge as a real possibility, that of taking up “the view from nowhere,” as analytic 
                                                 
31 I draw attention here to the fact that all but the Darwinian story entail a nostalgic narrative—an 
Eden, a time of pure souls or of perfect communion with the mother. For now, I merely underline 
it, without commentary. To understand its significance, it is necessary to keep following the our 
interpretive thread through shame and anxiety.  
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philosopher Thomas Nagel’s resonantly named book puts it. One wonders whether the watchers 
do not thus, by appealing to the feeling of being seen from such a perspective, provoke, for the 
poems’ persona as for us, the questions that they refuse either to ask or to answer. 
But that is precisely the issue, how they come to seem to refuse the poet’s questions—for 
that matter, how they come to seem anything at all when their involvement is so far from even 
the already distant Vedic God whose glimpse at least could relieve man’s suffering. And yet, as 
“The Watchers” insists, “mere seers / they make the scene” (137). Scholars have done an 
admirable job of drawing out the implications of various thematic strands of what appears on that 
poetic “scene.” Jahan Ramazani, for example, has emphasized the ways in which “Ramanujan 
indulges but critically revises the genealogical and eschatological impulses of much postcolonial 
literature and theory” (Hybrid 93). Ashok Bery has specified that Ramanujan’s poetry is, like 
“India’s cultures” themselves, “palimpsestic, reflexive and translational” (155).  And Nakul 
Krishna has shown how the insistence on sensation and the body disrupts Orientalist stereotypes 
of Eastern spirituality (“Five Senses”). All of them quote poems like “Questions” and “The 
Watchers” in support of their claims, and it is not hard to see why, with those poems’ intractable 
commingling of cultures as well as their insistence on the surprise of particulars. As effects or 
consequences of the perspective and concerns imposed by the figure of the watchers, these are 
undoubtedly salutary, as the above scholars testify. However, I am interested in the question why 
and how the watchers come to play such a role, and how far their influence extends into the rest 
of Ramanujan’s work. Phrased otherwise to remove any poetic literalism, my question concerns 
the extent to which the watchers are an apt, concrete figuration for a much larger structuring 
aesthetic that shapes the basic projects of Ramanujan’s original poetry. I have already claimed 
that they are, and to illustrate how, I turn to a handful of poems unrelated to “Composition” and 
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its Second Sight descendants.  
1.2 THE SHAME OF BEING WATCHED 
That the watchers might be a figure for anxiety—epistemic, moral or otherwise—is clear 
enough. I have, however, recurrently mentioned shame as equally relevant to Ramanujan’s 
poetics. How shame fits into the picture I have been sketching around the watchers thus remains 
to be shown, as do the stylistic quirks that reveal both shame and anxiety outside its explicit 
naming in watcher-figures. These will be the principal aims of the following section. Below we 
will see how, on a thematic level, Ramanujan figures the writing experience itself as alienating 
and productive of an anxiogenic gaze, and, on a stylistic level, how Ramanujan’s poetry is 
imbued with shame in (among others) the following four ways: it implicates the reader, it 
suppresses context, it surprises in order to shame us for being surprised, and it raises questions 
unanswerably. How these are related to shame can only be shown by way of examples.  
Let us begin with the most basic phenomenon the watchers ought to inspire us to look for 
elsewhere in Ramanujan’s work: the experience of being seen. Conveniently enough, being seen 
figures centrally in one of Ramanujan’s finest meta-poems, the posthumously published “The 
Black Hen.” The poem is fairly brief, running in its entirety:  
It must come as leaves  
to a tree  
or not at all  
 
yet it comes sometimes  
as the black hen  




on the embroidery  
stitch by stitch  
dropped and found again  
 
and when it's all there  
the black hen stares  
with its round red eye  
 
and you're afraid. (195) 
The opening stanza channels Keats’ famous injunction that poetry be natural: “if poetry comes 
not as naturally as the leaves to a tree, it had better not come at all” (Letter to John Taylor). 
Nothing, however, puts these words irrevocably in the mouth of Keats or anyone else; they 
belong as much and as sincerely to the voice of the poem as to any other. Perhaps somewhat 
surprisingly, the sentiment that “it had better not come at all” does not conflict with what 
follows, which can be read at least as much as an expression of regret—that something came 
when nothing would have been better—as a rebuttal—that Keats was wrong to say how poetry 
“must” come. However he feels about it, for Ramanujan, the poem is a fitful, half-blind pursuit 
that yields much more than bargained for.32  
Notice how, stylistically, the “The Black Hen” implicates readers in its fraught emotions 
and uncertainties. Not only does it appeal to a colloquial “you” rather than the more formal 
                                                 
32 The persona in this poem remains ambiguously fond of Keats’ idea. The “actual” Ramanujan 
attested in his diary that he took the idea as his “belief and practice” (quoted in Rodríguez 443). 
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“one” or personal “I,” it uses the basic movement of the poem to reinforce the reader’s passivity 
and alienated paralysis, much like the depicted poet’s. Formally, “The Black Hen” is tightly 
controlled, almost as if its writer is attempting to hold at bay the forces his work necessarily 
releases. The breezy cadence of the opening leaves (which really belong to the musical Keats) 
gives way to the increasingly emphatic and punctuated line endings of the second and fourth 
stanzas, which mirror each other around the central “stitching.” As enjambment diminishes, 
metrical stress falls equally on the two syllables of “black hen,” and then on the trisyllable “black 
hen stares.” These stresses initiate a slow-down that reaches its climax with the stanza’s closing 
“round red eye,” a verbal sequence that nearly demands pause between each word and certainly 
demands one afterward, before the reader breaks to the next stanza for the final “and you’re 
afraid.” That last line, hanging there in the space of an otherwise empty page, fails to complete 
the poem’s obvious visual as well as metrical symmetry around the center. That final emptiness 
is where the terror of the poem resides, as it “looks” at you from the intimidating eye that must 
lie behind the blankness. We readers, like the poet, feel both subject and object of a “stare,” the 
line hanging as it does in uncertain incompleteness. 
Such strategies for implicating the reader find a complement in a second tendency of 
Ramanujan’s exemplified by “The Black Hen”: its careful suppression of context. We are never 
told what “it” is and can only infer from our knowledge of Keats and of Western poetic 
conventions more broadly, with their marked tendency toward meta-poetry. Part of the anxious 
ominousness of the poem comes from the need to conjecture and stand in the uncertainty of that 
conjecture. The suppression of context in general is common enough in Ramanujan’s poetry, but 
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the specific repetition of vague and threatening “its” is remarkable.33 Even poem titles alone 
prove the point: “Any Cow’s Horn Can Do It,” “When It Happens,” even, simply, “It.” In each 
case, our lack of knowledge about “it” sets an off-kilter tone that veers toward both anxiety (that 
it could be something bad) and shame (that we don’t know what it is).  
A third tendency—really a deepening and fusing of tendencies one and two—lies in what 
we might all Ramanujan’s poetics of shameful surprise, where poet and reader alike either 
bumble our way through some confusion or confidently walk down what seems an easy path 
until, in either case, a surprise that should not have been a surprise hits us in the face. In “The 
Black Hen,” this shock takes the somewhat minor form of realizing that the eye poses a kind of 
threat only at the end, when it is too late, and despite the eye’s being clearly named and 
anticipated throughout the poem, while “we” were stitching it together (a monstrous image for 
how to make an eye, outside the explicit context of embroidery). That sense that “I should have 
known better”—the dark reverse side of Ramanujan’s preferred brand of suspense—haunts much 
of his poetry. (I will explore a more overt example below when I take up Ramanujan’s nostalgia 
more explicitly.) Occasionally the mistake is pinned on other people, as in “Some Indian Uses of 
History on a Rainy Day,” where an Indian professor visiting Nazi Germany mistakes the 
meaning of a swastika for a sign of home and comfort. Generally, however, the fault is either the 
poet’s or his addressee’s, which often enough amounts to the same thing. As “Time and Time 
Again” makes clear, though, at least sometimes our feeling of insufficiency is meant to register 
                                                 
33 For examples of other techniques of suppressed context, see Ramanujan’s predilection for 
opening poems in the middle of a train of thought, without introduction, as for example when he 
opens a poem with the word “and”: “And search / for certain thin- / stemmed bubble-eyed water 
bugs” (3) or “And that woman / beside the wreckage van / on Hyde street” (15). The latter also 
illustrates the use of deixis that we lack access to (we are presumed to be familiar with “that 
woman,” but we, as readers, are in fact not). 
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the fact that there is never enough context. That poem is about clocktowers (and hence 
regularity), until, as it says toward its end, “One day you look up and see one of them / eyeless, 
silent, a zigzag sky showing // through the knocked-out clockwork, after a riot” or some other 
unpredictable occurrence like “a night of lightnings” (64). The regularity of a stable context can 
always be disrupted by the irruption of the random, the irregular, the violent. That knowledge—
viz., of insufficient knowledge—is a driving force across Ramanujan’s work. 
To underscore and clarify the role the inadequacies of knowing play more broadly in 
Ramanujan’s poetry, consider “No Amnesiac King.” “One knows by now one is no amnesiac / 
king,” it opens. Although the “you” of “The Black Hen” has shifted formal registers to “one,” the 
basic move is the same. Already, too, we are enlisted on the side of the poet, who needs 
reminding—chiding, really—of what he is not. (“You know by now,” said other than to signpost 
an academic lecture, carries with it an implicit but—“but you don’t act like it.”) Even that 
reminder seems insufficient. As the poem goes on, after seven couplets developing the fantasy, 
the next stanza is a fragment, “Or so it seems,” pushed all the way to the right of the page, 
breaking the train of thought and the confidence behind it: 
Or so it seems 
 
as I wait for my wife and watch the traffic 
in seaside marketplaces and catch 
 
my breath at the flat-metal beauty of whole pomfret, 




in the fisherman’s pulsing basket, 
and will not ask, for I know I cannot, 
 
which, if any, in its deadwhite belly 
has an uncooked signet ring and a forest 
 
legend of wandering king (126-127) 
A handful more lines round out the poem, but already in the quoted portion we see the staring-
eye motif, the unexpected shift of and to particulars (from “one” to “I” and from fantasy to harsh 
reality), paralysis, and Ramanujan’s ever-intractable doubt.  
As with the epigraph to “The Watchers,” understanding that doubt requires us to know 
something of Indian, particularly Brahminical Sanskrit, mythology. The poem plays on the story 
of Kālidāsa’s famous fifth-century play, Abhijñānaśākuntalam, in which a king falls in love with 
young woman in a remote hermitage, named Śakuntalā, only to forget her at a crucial point in the 
narrative. A ring is supposed to revive his memory, the token he left with her when last they met. 
The ring, however, is lost before the king fatefully denies Śakuntalā his love and a rightful place 
in the palace for her and their joint son. When the ring is eventually found in the belly of a fish, 
the king realizes what he has done and is wracked with guilt. Eventually, happy endings ensue 
and everyone is reunited.  “No Amnesiac King,” then, is basically a poignant tarrying with the 
knowledge that life is no fairy tale. The poignancy lies in the difficulty of “successfully” 
knowing this. Sure, “by now” the poet knows happy endings do not come so easily or 




What interests me centrally is the shame that undergirds the poem. The opening line—
“One knows by now”—attests to it in ways we have already seen, but also in the perspectiveless 
becoming-object of the poet-subject of the scene. When the poet refers to himself as “one,” he 
speaks as if observing someone else from some other distant but unspecified position. He 
becomes an object, and yet he does so by projecting his feelings onto an imagined other. In other 
words, he speaks as if from the position of his watchers. In noticing this, I believe we have 
arrived at a point where we can begin to articulate the connections between anxiety and shame in 
this poetry.  
Being seen can take many affective forms: guilt at being caught, arousal (or disgust) at 
being checked out, fear at being spotted, embitterment at being monitored, or anxiety at being 
scrutinized. The affects of Ramanujan’s poems, although they flirt with that last possibility—
anxiety—shade more obviously into shame. Anxiety requires uncertain outcomes, a question 
whether failure or some other disaster will strike. Ramanujan’s poems, though, have far too 
vague a sense of what success would even look like. What would it mean successfully to know 
that “one is no amnesiac king”? We might be able to answer that question if Ramanujan wished 
simply to contrast knowledge with an obvious delusion, such as a well-known beggar 
imperiously commanding passersby to go search fish stalls for his missing ring. But 
Ramanujan’s speaker does know that he is not simply an amnesiac king; what he cannot let go of 
is deeper than propositional mis-knowledge of that sort. 
Shame is famously both individuating and de-individuating in this way, as Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick, for example, has observed (37). This is particularly obvious in cases where—unlike in 
“No Amnesiac King”—one’s shame really does stem from some anonymous one’s behavior. 
(Sedgwick gives the example of an “unwashed, half-insane man” walking into the hall mid-
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lecture to harangue anyone and no one before urinating at the front of the room—the audience 
would cringe in shame.) But “No Amnesiac King” forces the speaking “I” to feel his particular 
shame on top of what shame he imagines emanating from the fact that other people, too—
specifically families—believe it: “whatever mother may say or child believe” (126). Moreover, 
we are reminded in the second stanza that the temptation to believe the stories is not new. The 
problem is longstanding, and it is only now that he is trying to let the stories go: “One cannot 
wait any more in the back / of one’s mind for” that fairy-tale chain of events (126). The message 
is clear: the poet needs to grow up and accept reality, which is (as will become central to my 
argument later) a prototypical example of anti-nostalgic shaming.  
Consider one other characteristic of shame relevant to understanding  “No Amnesiac 
King,” namely the “proto-form” so often taken by that affect: “eyes down, head averted” 
(Sedgwick 36). While Ramanujan’s persona in the poem does not look away, he does stress that 
he “will not ask, for I know I cannot.” Interpretively, that “cannot” leads in a number of 
directions—to ask would not be sincere, the poet would not be understood—but most relevantly 
for us, it suggests that he is too ashamed to ask. I saved this aspect of the poet’s shame for last, 
because it requires us to delved deeper into an issue that may seem to lead temporarily away 
from shame per se (to which we shall return).  
Specifically, we must observe that there is actually a broader self-reinforcing pattern in 
Ramanujan’s poetry—a feature common enough to delineate a genre—wherein Ramanujan 
raises unanswerable questions, i.e., questions that he refuses to let be answered, questions posed 
unanswerably. These questions recall the watchers not only because those figures too refuse 
properly to ask questions, but more importantly because they cannot, by virtue of being what 
they are, answer any questions posed them—and nearly all Ramanujan’s questions in the 
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“Composition” sequence seem to want the watchers’ answers. Indeed, Ramanujan’s persists 
across the board in its occupation with the privately raised question.  
Let me underscore that persistence by stepping away momentarily from Ramanujan’s 
poetry in order to observe a moment from a novella Ramanujan published in Kannada, Someone 
Else’s Autobiography (1978). Made available to English readers in the straightforwardly titled, 
Poems and a Novella, a collection of translations of Ramanujan’s works in Kannada, Someone 
Else’s Autobiography tells the life story of K.K. Ramanujan as provoked by a chance encounter 
with a doppelgänger of sorts, A.K. Ramanujan. Barely concealed in fiction, it closely echoes the 
authorial Ramanujan’s own interests and life. What draws my attention now is its fifth chapter, 
in which K.K. Ramanujan wonders about possible “other” siblings than the four his family 
acknowledges. He “feels” that he has another brother, and he is “certain” that he has another 
sister. The only shape the latter certainty takes in narration, however, pertains to which girl his 
extra sister is; he never establishes how he came to know that any such sister should exist. Quite 
plausibly, he has only found a girl on whom to cathect the doubts that in his extra brother’s case 
remain free-wheeling.  
What is striking in the narration is the constant rhetoric of suspicion and conjecture: “As 
far as I know,” “I have suspected,” “This would account for the strange sounds,” “I sometimes 
think,” and “I kept feeling” all appear in the first paragraph of the chapter’s speculations (225). 
The narrator’s logic is that of the paranoiac. He has conjectured that his brother must have gone 
to Africa; then he finds a photo of someone his mother claims is “the son of our uncle’s first 
wife. He went away to Africa or somewhere.” To which the narrator responds (to reader alone, 
crucially), “Africa again! Just as I thought” (226). The narrator quite explicitly never manages to 
bring the matter to speech throughout his life. At age 12, when he becomes convinced he knows 
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who his sister is, he finds himself “agitated and anxious to investigate these matters further.” 
Naturally, there is an obvious solution: “I wanted to question all of them directly,” he admits, 
“the woman at the post office [who he supposes to be his sister], Amma, Appa. My opinion 
about them had changed completely. I was scared. I couldn’t trust anyone in Ontikoppal” (228).  
Granted, the generic context is quite different, and narrative invites other considerations 
than Ramanujan’s poetry; thus K. K. Ramanujan is paranoid in ways quite different from the 
persona of Ramanujan’s poetry. Even so, one parallel is hard to ignore. Both figures easily 
imagine their way into other perspectives from which the answers to their questions become 
themselves suspect. K. K. Ramanujan’s paranoia means that his parents answers would remain 
ever suspect. A. K. Ramanujan’s answer, say, to “why here, why now,” would remain suspect for 
its incompleteness, for its being given from within life rather than outside it. In other words, both 
are skeptics in the strongest sense of the word—people before whom the world withers as they 
wonder at it. “I [am] wedded to doubt / and only married to a woman,” as the speaker of one of 
poem puts it (168).  
It may sound like a stretch to say that such a familiar question as “why did this child have 
to be born with Down’s syndrome?” is asked inappropriately, as if Ramanujan raises the 
question only to create the existential crisis of which it is obviously an expression. One might 
also feel tempted to retort that any poem comes with a level of artifice that requires “creating” 
the problem it wants to raise. I hardly deny that. It is nonetheless the case that Ramanujan is a 
poet who opens abysses between himself and the world, between himself and others. We will 
discuss more examples below, but it may help in this context to recall philosopher Stanley 
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Cavell’s work on skepticism.34 Cavell suggests that philosophical skepticism is a matter of 
mood, something we sometimes work ourselves into when we think metaphysically about the 
world around us. One of his key insights is that this mood is intractable. One cannot think one’s 
way out of or “solve” skeptical problems; one can only find oneself simply back in the ordinary 
world we hold in common. One danger of skepticism carried too far is that it leads to a refusal of 
commonness, a denial that we live together in a shared world.35 When Ramanujan, in “Drafts,” 
scans a Chicago crowd, he struggles to make each and any face into the “Hyde Park rapist’s 
face” (157), and thus shows the hostile turn that his skepticism can take.  
But we have left shame behind, or at least we seem to have. Let us find it again. 
Ramanujan’s watchers, if productive of shame (at, e.g., inadequately knowing the world), are 
also thereby productive of skepticism, which in turn reinforces the pressure of the watchers’ 
gaze. There is a vicious circle here, and it is not without its pleasures. Ramanujan’s exquisite 
irony rests on it, and it is therefore the source of much aesthetic satisfaction. It is also the source 
of his poetry’s “reflective” and “critical” outlook on the world, which—we saw above—critics 
like Ramazani and Bery praise. That will be the topic of the next section, which will finally draw 
nostalgia explicitly into our picture. My point, however, will be less to share in their critical 
valorization of Ramanujan’s critical tendencies than to point out those tendencies’ connections 
                                                 
34 My summary here can only be a pitiful sketch of what Cavell painstakingly sets out and 
explores in works spanning his career. My summary, though, draws most heavily on his extended 
discussion of skepticism in The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and 
Tragedy.  
35 For Cavell, that might at times be taken as a virtue; the ability to see that you and I do not live 
in the same world can be powerful in your or my attempts to change things and to find new ways 
of holding the world in common. In any case, Cavell acknowledges what he calls “the truth of 
skepticism” (47), arguing that trying to refute skepticism is still to stay inside it. What I am not 
say, therefore, is that Ramanujan is wrong, only that he tarries in this realm at some risk, and 
certainly in active threat to any sense of community he claims to seek.  
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with more ambiguously productive and helpful phenomena such as postcolonial shame and the 
false universalizing of scholarly values.  
1.3 TRANSLATION AND NOSTALGIA 
My desire in this section is to re-describe what other scholars have already made familiar with 
respect to nostalgia in Ramanujan’s poetry. My claim is not so much that they are wrong as that 
they have considered the poetic situation rather narrowly and so praise too easily and 
unequivocally what may be worth interrogating a deeper level. The scholar whose work will set 
the initial terms for this discussion is Rajeev Patke, who offers one of the more synoptic visions 
of Ramanujan’s life work, linking his poetry to his translations and vice versa.  
Patke’s larger goal is to “illustrate the homology between translation and migration” in 
postcolonial poetry (Postcolonial 228). To do so in Ramanujan’s case, he treats Ramanujan’s 
original poetry as attesting to the experience of migration, which in turn explains and motivates 
the work his translations do:  
The relationship of Ramanujan’s poems in English to his translations is 
antithetical, like the relationship between a photographic image and its negative. 
The activity of translation seeks to recover from an invoked and imagined past a 
plenitude that is lacking in the poet’s own life and times. (228) 
The exact terms of Patke’s description are debatable, but the basic insight seems valid. 
Ramanujan’s translation work does carry a different, even opposite, charge compared to that of 
his original poetry. What concerns me, however, is the extent to which Patke naturalizes such a 
relationship, i.e., assumes that we know just what migration is and means in general. I quote him 
at some length so that we get a clear sense of his interpretive tack:  
Ramanujan's poetic world is the narrative of a three-part journey…In the first 
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instance, the world to which the poet migrates is represented as depletion. The 
self feels isolated, without a sense of connectedness to a community. The second 
stage of this journey turns to a world compounded of memory, fiction, and desire, 
in order to recollect or invent a realm of possibility in which the self and all its 
modes of thought, feeling, and action are connected to a communal way of life. 
The final stage of the figurative journey entails using language to bring the 
remembered and imagined past to bear on the present through the activity of 
translation. (229) 
In the prior quotation, Patke was careful to qualify the past as possibly “imagined,” and here he 
extends the hedge to the present, which is only “represented” as a lack. Even with such 
cautiousness, however, Patke’s account still relies on the assumption that the basic narrative (of 
depletion, desire, restitution and the causal relationship among them) is true at least to the 
subjective experience of the poet—true, moreover, of a certain kind of migrancy more broadly, 
not just of Ramanujan’s in particular. That is to say, Patke naturalizes a specific kind of nostalgic 
desire as a common, worldly condition that precedes any articulation in, say, poetry. To put the 
consequences in terms of the specifics of Ramanujan’s poetry before us, Patke locates the shame 
and anxiety that I have been discussing in the “depletion” or lack that spurs the eventual 
translation work that will provide some recompense. If that is so, the consequences for what I 
have been arguing would be significant, so I want to spend some time unpacking this particular 
box of concerns. 
To begin, I want to muddy the waters between the two “antitheses” of Ramanujan’s 
poetry and translation. Translation, after all, also appears within Ramanujan’s original work, 
most conspicuously as a word: in one poem, the poet “must translate and turn,” as if roasted on a 
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spit, in his “own particular hell” (34); in another, he “guess[es]” that his “mother’s migraines 
translate…/ into [his own] allergies, a fear of black cats / and a daughter’s passion // for bitter 
gourd and Dostoevsky” (158). Neither use suggests much confidence. From a perspective such 
as Patke’s, the first must look like an excellent example of the regret Ramanujan faces in needing 
to translate in the first place. He finds himself doomed to oscillate between an image of the past 
and the fact of the present, never quite satisfied on either side.36 The second passage only 
underscores the strained ambitions and “guess”-work of translation, i.e., that it never quite is 
what it claims to be.  
Perhaps more revealingly, translation also appears in Ramanujan’s poems in the subtler 
guise of sudden resemblance, i.e., moments of mental “translation” that intrude on present 
consciousness: “And then one sometimes sees waterfalls / as the ancient Tamils saw them, / 
wavering snakeskins, // cascades of muslin” (189). By now we should be trained to see that 
“one” as an alienated pointer to the poet himself, and it is. Ramanujan is one of the few people 
who would see such waterfalls (decorations in a Chicago bank) in those terms, since he is among 
the first translators of ancient Tamil poetry, indeed one of its “re-discoverers.” On the face of it, 
then, the moment depicted would seem to be one where the “world to which [Ramanujan] has 
migrated appears meaningful only when related to the world migrated from, in nostalgic double 
focus” (Patke 229). And yet, as the alienated pronoun, “one,” already intimates, “meaning” may 
not be so readily available, even in the stereoscopy of a nostalgic vision. Indeed, this is one of 
the watchers’ poems, so the absence of answers or restfulness is unsurprising.  
                                                 
36 A challenge to this reading is that the “hell” in which translation happens is “only in my hindu 
[sic] mind.” That is to say, it is part of an explicit and utter refusal of what the speaker calls being 
“modern”: “Yes, I know all that. I should be modern / Marry again. See strippers a the Tease / 
Touch Africa. Go to the movies…But sorry, I cannot unlearn // the conventions of despair…I 
must seek and will find / my particular hell only in my hindu mind” (34). 
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One of the poem’s more vivid “translations” (if translation of a less literal/literary sort 
than the calqued waterfall metaphor) underscores the extent to which Ramanujan’s work often 
finds nostalgic translation to be a cruel joke or embarrassment, even when it technically (or 
seemingly) provides the kind of “plenitude” that Patke suggests: 
As I hear the waters fall, the papers 
 rustle, and it’s evening: a paralytic sadhu, 
tapdancer of St. Vitus’s dance, 
 
knocking his steps out on the pebbles 
 with no reflexes left in either knee, 
lifts with his one good finger 
 
his loincloth, and pisses standing 
 like a horse on my childhood’s dark 
sidestreet, aiming his stream 
 
at two red flowers on the oleander bush, 
 as a car turns the corner. 
Headlights make his arc 
 
a trajectory of yellow diamonds, 
 scared instant rainbows, ejecting spurts 




by the commonplace cruelty of headlights. (190) 
The translations here are so absorptive of the poet’s attention that not only does the material of 
the present vanish, so does the passage of time. From standing in a well-lit bank, we jump 
suddenly, inexplicably to a dark street-corner, where (presumably) a homeless Chicagoan 
relieves himself in the alley and viscerally recalls the memory of a “similar” scene from the 
poet’s childhood.The striking scene has caught the attention of two recent scholars, Jahan 
Ramazani and Akshaya Kumar. Ramazani is quite impressed, and his enthusiasm is worth 
quoting at length: 
This startling confluence of Western modernity and an ancient Eastern way of life 
produces an epiphanic moment, when, to speak a little grandly of an old man's 
urination, both liquid and light seem transfigured into something beyond 
themselves—either East or West, precolonial or postcolonial. A luminous 
‘exchange of contexts,’ this climactic image figures in part Ramanujan’s own 
poetry: a humble world lit up by poetic form, an ancient sensibility started by its 
encounter with modernity, a traditional Brahman past metamorphosed by the 
onset of the Western present—in short, a metaphor-making poesis that hybridizes 
and transfigures its cultural resources. (Hybrid 80) 
Akshaya Kumar, inspired by Ramazani’s interpretation, finds that the poem “speaks volumes of 
the spiritual impoverishment of the West” if even a sadhu’s urine become transcendent (74). 
While, on one level, both critics are correct in their remarks, they miss something essential when 
they leave out the enveloping shame and anxiety of the watchers. The voice of the poem knows 
that to see the piss in this light is shameful—not for Western modernity (no one else on the 
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sidewalk fawns over the aesthetics of the urine) but for the one who misses home enough that 
such a sight could constitute a moment of nostalgic ecstasy, ruined by the “cruel” ordinariness of 
a car driving by. We are faced with a poem that figures translation as reckless, offering a silly 
sort of comfort with no connection to reality, just as we were with “Some Indian Uses of History 
on a Rainy Day,” where the Indian professor in Nazi Germany mistranslated the German 
swastika. That is, in general, how nostalgia (and nostalgic translation, its most common form) 
figures in Ramanujan’s poetry—as a shameful intrusion. The poem just prior to “Waterfalls in a 
Bank,” “Chicago Zen,” not only confirms this but offers a mockery of the seeming alternative, 
presentism. 
“Chicago Zen” is one of Ramanujan’s most explicit thematic engagements with nostalgia 
as well as one of his most despairing moments of self-accusation. The four-part poem begins 
simply enough. The first section consists of four condescending lines, “Now tidy your house, / 
dust especially your living room // and do not forget to name / all your children” (186). The 
heckling tone continues in the second section, which advises to “[w]atch your step. Sight may 
strike you blind” in ways more or less identical to the pissing scene we have already seen (now it 
is a battery of visions vaguely associated with India—so vaguely as to include in the end simply 
“drown[ing], eyes open, // towards the Indies, the antipodes”). The third section echoes a phrase 
we have already seen: “Now you know what you always knew,” only here the thing that “you” 
live in denial of is not the falsity of fairy tales, but the falsity of nostalgia’s promises more 
generally. Each form of homecoming the nostalgic might hope for is dismissed:  
the country cannot be reached 
 
by jet. Nor by boat on a jungle river, 
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 hashish behind the Monkey-temple, 
 
nor moonshot to the cratered Sea 
of Tranquility, 
The list continues, eventually finishing, 
    Nor by any  
other means of transport,  
 
migrating with a clean, valid passport  
no, not even by transmigrating 
 
without any passport at all (187) 
The only solution is to live in the now, which (for Ramanujan at least) is no solution at all, as the 
fourth and final section makes clear: 
Watch your step, watch it, I say, 
especially at the first high 
threshold, 
 
  and the sudden low 
one near the end 





  and watch 
for the last 
step that’s never there. (188) 
 As a vision of presentism to combat nostalgia, that is pretty bleak. The line breaks taunt with 
possible closure only to subvert it. The “first high” and “sudden low” could each refer to 
emotions. Likewise “the end” suggests death, until “flight” counters that maybe the diasporic 
subject of the poem flew home after all; but no—it is a flight of stairs that end. Except they don’t 
really end either, for the last step is “never there,” a pun on the contradictory possibilities that the 
step is missing and that it is never reached. Couple such paradox with the previous section’s 
undignified capstone advice to heed “all calls of nature,” and it begins to seem that poet offers 
less a critique of nostalgia than a picture of nostalgia mocking itself upon realizing that once it 
starts thinking in terms of sight and seeing the world right, there is no escape. 
We can observe now that what Patke calls Ramanujan’s “nostalgic double focus” 
deprives his world of meaning; it does not give real plenitude—or more precisely, nostalgic 
double focus is what ironically holds out the possibility of meaning only to pull the rug out from 
under it at the last minute, while “the watchers watch, from their nowhere perches.” The mutual 
imbrication of nostalgia, shame, and anxiety of Ramanujan’s poetry is thus quite clear. We must 
be careful not to the former to an effect of the latter to causes. If anything, as the next section 
shows, nostalgia holds a privileged place among the origins of shame (at least to the extent that 
anything has an origin in Ramanujan’s poetry). 
1.4 THE NOSTALGIC SHAME POEM 
As we have seen, Ramanujan’s original poems rarely indulge nostalgia, they prefer to observe it 
cooly. Rarely is not never, though. “Prayers to Lord Murugan” has enough nostalgic trappings—
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plangency, poignance, unabashed desire—to justify proving the rule. Exceptional though it is, 
“Prayers to Lord Murugan” is one of Ramanujan’s most famous poems, iconic and personal 
enough to warrant reading at his funeral (Krishna 348). What interests me here is that, speaking 
later of his experience writing the poem, Ramanujan feels the need almost to apologize: “I had 
felt…that the future needed a new past. Many things have changed since then and so have I. But 
the mood, the relation to what the god Murugan means, is a real one, and I hope it speaks not 
only for me” (CE 192). The tone of these remarks is hardly, in any straightforward way, 
ashamed, but the impulse to distance and to hedge is striking. When discussing other of his 
poems, he does not adopt such an uncertain posture, so I find it worth investigating and 
commenting on.  
First, a fuller description of the poem itself is in order. “Prayers to Lord Murugan” is a 
capstone sequence of eleven short poems in Ramanujan’s second volume of poetry in English, 
Relations (Collected Poems 113-117). As a footnote to the poem suggests, Lord Murugan is an 
“[a]ncient Dravidian god of fertility, joy, youth, beauty, war, and love. He is represented as a six-
faced god with twelve hands” (113). The titular prayers revolve around a tonally shifting but 
essentially nostalgic set of entreaties: “Lord / of faces // find us the face / we lost early / this 
morning” or, to quote the ninth section in full,   




from sanskrit [sic] and the mythologies 





of London and return 
the future to what 
it was. 
As this excerpt makes clear, the horizon for these prayers is explicitly postcolonial. The 
entreaties even take a punning shot at Macaulay’s infamous Minute: “Master of red bloodstains, / 
our blood is brown; our collars white” (116).  They are also fairly clearly inflected by 
Ramanujan’s translation work.  
Although the fundamental thrust of the work is nostalgic, the tone at the surface level can 
be quite exuberant. “Lord of new arrivals / lovers and rivals: / arrive,” begins the first section. 
The play of phonemes, coupled with the fertility and vitality of the god so invoked, lends a sense 
of excitement that is met by following images of “cockfight and banner-/dance,” of a scene 
where, “on this and the next three / hills // women’s hands and the garlands / on the chests of 
men will turn like / chariotwheels” (113). Even the “despondency” of the sections where the poet 
calls out the degraded present ripples with the energy of close observation, playful juxtaposition, 
and phonetic delight:  
We eat legends and leavings, 
remember the ivory, the apes,  
the peacocks we sent in the Bible  





for muslin: wavering snakeskins, 
a cloud of steam. (115) 
Here we see the first published occurrence of the phrase that will later haunt Ramanujan’s 
stereoscopic vision in some Chicago bank: wavering snakeskins. As if the force of that metaphor 
demanded juxtaposition with urine, the next lines deliver it: “Ever rehearsing astronauts / we 
purify and return / our urine // to the circling body” (115). Note the difference in context, 
however. What is here a wry joke becomes in the later work a bitter pill swallowed because 
nothing else remains. The form of the prayer keeps open the hope that one might be “delivered” 
from the image, which here is voluntarily recalled; later it will come as an unwanted and 
inescapable flash of metaphorical conjunction.  
Why, though, does Ramanujan hesitate quite to endorse the poem upon later reflection? 
He does not say explicitly, other than to note that “[m]any things have changed since then and so 
have I” (117). On a historical level, certainly, changes did occur. Notably, Ramanujan tells us he 
wrote “Prayers to Lord Murugan” in 1967. He was serving as reader for a dissertation on 
Murugan by Fred Clothey at the University of Chicago. Ramanujan himself, however, was in 
Madras (now Chennai). As he read the chapters “a series of prayers formed themselves in [his] 
head” (Collected Essays 192). The resulting poem “talks about some Indian attitudes to the 
Indian past, with which [he] was somewhat despondently preoccupied at the time” (192). 
Specifically, he felt at the time “that Sanskrit itself and all that it represented had become an 
absence, at best a crippling and not an enabling presence, that the future needed a new past” 
(192). 1967 is a notable year to have been thinking such things, as it falls in a period of agitation 
in Madras State. In 1965, movement from the center to push for the Sanskrit-derived Hindi as the 
sole official language for the country led to intense backlash in the South. 1967 saw the Indian 
76 
 
National Congress party lose its hold in Madras State to the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, a 
party dedicated to advancing Dravidian identity and interests. Since then the Congress Party has 
never regained control in the state. In keeping with the pro-Dravidian sentiments of the ruling 
coalition, Madras State was renamed Tamil Nadu in 1969. Accordingly, we can observe that 
some of what changed for Ramanujan between the writing of and remarking on “Prayers to Lord 
Murugan” is the contextual tenor of a claim that “sanskrit” (lower case in original) has become 
stifling.37 
Convincing though it is in its particulars, I am not convinced that the historical reading 
exhausts what is important about Ramanujan’s partial disavowal of his poem. Specifically, I 
suspect that some of what separates him from the poem is less a matter of external “changes” 
than of newfound self-consciousness about the text’s sincerity. A poet famous for his ironies 
may flinch when faced with a text where his watchers were kept so far at bay—even though 
“Prayers to Lord Murugan” is not exactly bereft of irony (cf. the self-reference to “wavering 
snakeskins” or the closing request to “cure us at once / of prayers”). When the poem asks for 
deliverance from “sanskrit” or requests that the “Lord of the sixth sense / give us back / our five 
senses,” it can sound like the poet is all to certain of what is lacking in the present and where in 
the past the solution might be found. A more typical pose for Ramanujan to strike would have 
him seeing that legends and leavings are all there is for the eating, that Lord Murugan is no more 
available for the poet's address than are his watchers. 
Both Ramazani and Patke have pointed to the cause of Ramanujan’s worries and shame 
over nostalgia, albeit somewhat unwittingly. As Patke puts it, Ramanujan’s poetry attests to the 
                                                 
37 In terminology I will develop more fully in the next chapter, I would call this a clear example 
of a counter-nostalgia, i.e., an opposition to one nostalgia (Sanskritic) by means of another, 
generally less hegemonic nostalgia (here Dravidian). 
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experience of life “as if it were a text without contexts” (232). That notion plays well with his 
suggestion (aiming for wider reference than Ramanujan specifically) that there is a “homology 
between translation and migration.”  If migration is like moving a text from one context to 
another, then the inapt or unfamiliar context of the receiving culture can make the migrant too 
feel decontextualized. Ramazani, it would seem, agrees, albeit articulating his homology 
somewhat differently, now between metaphor and postcoloniality.38 Because of that resonance, 
he says, “the postcolonial experience is especially amenable to aesthetic expression” (Hybrid 
75).  
The question I want to raise, which neither Ramazani nor Patke does, concerns why life 
is being lived as a text in the first place—with or without context. In Ramanujan’s specific case, 
several facts present what seem the obvious answers. Ramanujan was a textual scholar, holding 
distinguished professorship at the University of Chicago. He was also a translator, likely more 
famous as such than as an original poet. So for Ramanujan to worry about what it means to 
present a text to a new culture is easily taken for granted. What is less easily taken for granted is 
the notion that his life is a kind of text (presented for whom to read?). Any scene in life can be 
“read.” That is clear from the poetry Ramanujan produces as well as from experience, but to start 
reading any given scene requires motivation. Ordinarily, such motivation is situated, exhausted 
as soon as the occasion itself fizzles. For Ramanujan’s poems, however, the reading is skeptical, 
as we have seen. It lacks context for asking, which is why it finds the answer and its (inevitably 
limited) context endlessly insufficient.  
The answer to how Ramanujan ends up in such an aesthetic bind is undoubtedly 
                                                 
38 In an earlier version of his argument, Patke had claimed that the “homology [was] between 




overdetermined. I am nevertheless convinced by Patke’s suggestion that, for Ramanujan, 
translation and original poetry are caught in a nostalgic cycle (assuming we attenuate the 
certainty of Patke’s tripartite narrative and its clear directionality), and I am inclined also to add, 
given the poems we have read, that Ramanujan’s awareness of its being a nostalgic cycle is part 
of what fuels its movement. That is to say, he assumes (or, perhaps, in his eyes, “knows” from 
experience) that a nostalgic person wants an “absolute” reproduction of the text in the target 
culture, of the past in the present. As a result, it is easy to use a poem to explore how that desire 
and its underlying assumptions fall shamefully apart under the cold external gaze which the 
desire itself invites. As this dissertation argues, however, that is not the only mode of 
apprehending or pursuing nostalgia—it is not even the only mode of apprehending Ramanujan’s 
nostalgia, as is shown by his translation work, “Prayers to Lord Murugan,” and other poems 
more stylistically than thematically concerned with his translations.  
Scholars have made much of the “self-proclaimed failures” of Ramanujan’s poetry, in 
particular as the means by which his poems produce their own kind of (ethical) success (Nerlekar 
“Converting” 128). They are correct to do so. Anjali Nerlekar, for example, has carefully shown 
how Ramanujan stages the failure of the usual nationalist-nostalgic move to metaphorize women 
as the site of tradition and lost origins. “In this awareness of the limitations of his usage of the 
patriarchal discourse,” she claims, “he transcends that discourse” (144). Ashok Bery, as 
mentioned above, has made similar arguments about identity and nationalism. What these 
scholars have missed, however, is that Ramanujan’s original poetry are still part of the larger 
nostalgia discourse that they critique (and feel ashamed for not critiquing enough, for not 
stopping the feeling of nostalgia in the first place). His poems are, I suggest, part of a broader 
genre of poems that we might call “nostalgic shame poems” after American poetry scholar 
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Gillian White’s “lyric shame poems.”  
By “lyric shame,” White means “primarily shame experienced in identification with 
modes of reading and writing understood to be lyric, especially as these have been determined by 
a diffuse ‘New Critical’ discourse by now so thoroughly absorbed as to seem natural” (4). The 
emphasis on modes of reading is key, taking our attention away from poems that are or are not 
“lyric” (whether shamefully so or not) toward the imputation of the lyric voice onto texts, readers 
searching for and shaming it where it is found. The lyric shame poem then comes after and in 
awareness of lyric shame as a general issue. It is “a mode informed by the lyric shame situation 
of the late twentieth century—when twentieth-century pedagogical idealizations of a lyric 
‘tradition’ reenter and redouble in the academy in negative form as avant-garde antilyricism” 
(211).  
The particulars of what constitutes lyric shame and its generic realization in the lyric 
shame poem matter little to us here, but we can draw several parallels to the nostalgic shame 
poem. The nostalgic shame poem also comes after its shame, i.e., nostalgic shame. Such shame 
entails knowledge firstly that nostalgia is shameful or (more clinically) “problematic,” and 
secondly that there are particular strategies for reading for and unearthing that problematicness. 
Like the lyric shame poem, it matters little whether the work is written in defense of, abashment 
at, or sustained critique of nostalgia’s shame. The point is that it participates generally in the 
discourse that secures that shamefulness. When Ramanujan writes, for example, of a figure in 
one of his poems, that he has a “concave eye groping only / for mother and absences. Nothing / 
at all is family to that estrangement,” he evokes a readily available (Freudian) interpretation of 
nostalgia, which in turn plugs easily into broader discourses of diaspora and its nostalgias. All of 
this happens throughout Ramanujan’s oeuvre with varying degrees of overt “shame,” it is true. 
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But the watchers are always lingering there, producing sometimes anxiety, sometimes sorrow, 
but always aware what the poet’s nostalgia is and means in a broader post-Enlightenment and 





CHAPTER 2: COUNTER-NOSTALGIAS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN INDIAN 
POETRY IN ENGLISH 
INTRODUCTION 
Having shown, in Patke’s formulation, the “negative” side of Ramanujan’s poetry in the first 
chapter, this chapter turns to its positive side. More than that, it expands the scope of 
consideration widely to consider the larger translating generation to which Ramanujan belonged 
(albeit as an older, more distant member). The desire of this chapter is not to worry about what, 
if anything, is “lost” in translation. These translations are, as it were, pure plenitude. What will 
concern us is their role within the emerging sphere of “new,” “modern,” or simply postcolonial 
Indian poetry in English, where they help indigenize English and revise the translational 
aesthetics of Orientalism and late Romanticism that these poets inherit when they come on the 
scene in the late 1950s and 60s.  
The first section inaugurates our interest in the postcolonial generation of Indian poets in 
English by turning to a remark made by one of its major figures, Arvind Krishna Mehrotra, who 
expressed dismay at finding himself at a loss before the “language of skylarks and nightingales.”  
I tie that remark to some of the broad trends in Mehrotra’s generation, which I also define more 
explicitly.  
The second section goes back to that Orientalist and Romantic phase to explore what that 
Keatsian phrase—“the language of skylarks and nightingales”—might have meant to Mehrotra 
and his peers. In other words, I will be sketching a stereotype so as to explore how that 
stereotype influenced postcolonial poetics. In the process, I will argue that the Orientalist 
translation aesthetics surrounding Sanskrit on the one hand and the late Romantic aesthetics of 
original Indian poetry in English on the other hand are inseparable, both during their time but 
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also in terms of the associations of that style when it came to sit in books before the postcolonial 
generation. 
Section 2.3 then describes what I call the aesthetics of translingual nostalgia that the 
generation develops to break free of the style outlined in the previous section. I argue that they 
consciously reshaped the cultural memory of a particular period not in terms of the content of the 
memory, but in terms of style and emotion. Now medieval bhakti poetry became newly sleek, 
sexy, and linguistically subversive. Nostalgia for that period—specifically nostalgia for an era 
when language broke free of classicism and touched the hard facts of reality in order to disrupt 
them—allows these poets to produce a subcontinental aesthetics of English that is still influential 
today.  
Section 2.4 then takes up a case study of Mehrotra’s translation work and its relation to 
his original poetry in order to give some greater specificity to the account above, as well as to 
argue that scholars have perhaps done an injustice to the translative trend by focusing solely on 
bhakti poetry. Mehrotra also translates from Prakrit, and (as we will see in Chapter 3) Agha 
Shahid Ali also translates from Urdu. The translingual nostalgia of the postcolonial generation 
was subversive of Orientalist and Sanskritic aesthetics broadly; they were not only fans of the 
bhakti poets alone.  
2.1 THE NEED FOR A NEW AESTHETICS 
Until recently there was widespread consensus that “Indian poetry in English doesn’t seriously 
begin to exist till after Independence” (Jussawalla “The New Poetry” 65). People loved repeating 
it: “Genuine Indian poetry in English really began in the nineteen-fifties, and the reader of today 
who is strictly interested in poetry can ignore, except for historical purposes, earlier versifying” 
(Walsh 127). Introducing an influential anthology that would help solidify the narrative, Twelve 
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Modern Indian Poets (1992), Arvind Krishna Mehrotra claimed that the poetry “written between 
1825 and 1945 is truly dead” (1).39 Of these three quotations, two are by the very poets who 
helped birth the new poetry that is, they claim, finally worth reading. All of them agree that 
Nissim Ezekiel was the man who finally gave India its own poetic voice in English, in 1952, the 
“annus mirabulus…when [he] published his first volume of poetry, called, appropriately, A Time 
to Change” (Chaudhuri Introduction 13).  
Since the time when such pronouncements were common, the value terms of the narrative 
have shifted somewhat (now the nineteenth century gets a modicum of respect), but the basic 
divisions of the timeline remain the same. Ezekiel changed the game, and the 1970s is when 
Indian poetry in English really got going on its new, modern terms, in Bombay. Those 70s 
Bombay poets, whose multilingual scene Anjali Nerlekar has beautifully described in her 
Bombay Modern, crucially saw themselves as overcoming that dusty old poetry of the pre-
Independence days. I will take Mehrotra as my paradigm for the moment, but I stress his 
inclusion in the Bombay scene described by Nerlekar—a scene that had broader echoes across 
India and abroad, where key features of the narrative I will describe would repeat. I will return to 
this claim, to give it some textual depth, but for now I focus in on Mehrotra. 
Not only is Mehrotra himself a major poet within the Bombay scene, he has recently 
become one of the most ardent voices seeking to place it within a larger tradition of Indian 
poetry in English. As an editor, he has published, in addition to the aforementioned Twelve 
Modern Indian Poets, a valuable essay collection, History of Indian Literature in English (2003). 
His own essays on Indian literary history, collected in Partial Recall (2012), attest poignantly to 
                                                 




one of the motivations behind all this extra-poetic effort. For Mehrotra, the lack of tradition and 
community in the Indian English literary scene is deplorable: “If there are any productive 
intellectual [especially literary-critical] communities living in the scrub, whether nomadic or 
settled, freelancers or attached to universities, they’ve kept themselves well hidden from view” 
(Partial 2). He imagines a scene where poets pop up, write a few books to be published and read 
only by their friends, then die, leaving another poet to pop up elsewhere without so much as ever 
hearing the name of her predecessors—“the dead writer is now twice dead” (2). In many ways, 
such bleakness marks an optimistic turn. Written as it is well into Mehrotra’s established 
maturity in 2012, the essay believes at least that there are good poets out there, just that nobody 
is hearing about them or connecting their work to the rest of the Indian literary field and its 
history. As you move back into the early days of the supposed rebirth of Indian poetry in 
English, remarks get darker and more dismissive. I quoted above from Adil Jusawalla’s remarks 
on pre-Independence poetry, written in a 1968 issue of the Journal of Commonwealth Literature. 
Although I said he saw Nissim Ezekiel as a breath of fresh air to the new poetry, the truth is that 
even that air was only relatively fresh, “[c]ompared to the loose horrors of our early Romantics” 
(60).  
The rhetoric and attitude of the 60s and 70s often veers in the direction of Mehrotra’s 
image of the wasteland “scrub” of Indian literature in English, particularly poetry. (That things 
on the ground, in the thick of on-going projects and poetic exchange could look much more 
vibrant is attested by Nerlekar’s book, however.) These concerns were important in shaping the 
poetry that was produced during that era. Looking back on the time from the publication of his 
Collected Poems 1969-2014, Mehrotra comments on an “awful contradiction between the world 
I wanted to write about, the world of dentists and chemist shops, and the language, English, I 
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wanted to write in. How do you write about an uncle in a wheelchair in the language of skylarks 
and nightingales?” (xv-xvi). While not everyone would use those terms, the generational interest 
in things like dentists (Mehrotra), banks (Ramanujan), and buses (Kolatkar) is notable, as is the 
turn each made quite consciously from “skylarks and nightingales.”40 
 My argument in this chapter concerns how a generation of poets writing at least 
sometimes in English but often multilingually (and nearly always translating from some other 
language to English) came to see English as “the language of skylarks and nightingales” and 
what they did to recover the earth-bound use of that language from those airy dream-creatures. It 
is worth, therefore making clear what I mean by “generation” at this point. I must confess I 
intend it somewhat fuzzily. At the definitional center I locate what Nerlekar calls, borrowing a 
Marathi term to name the period, the “sathottari” poets, i.e., the Bombay poets of the 1960s and 
70s who published each other in short-lived “little magazines” and eventually started their own 
small book-publishing houses, for which they provided their own cover art (Kolatkar, being an 
ad man and graphic designer, produced some marvelous editions).41 Key figures in this 
movement include Arun Kolatkar (1932-2004), Arvind Krishna Mehrotra (born 1947), Eunice de 
Souza (1940-2017), Gieve Patel (born 1940), and Dilip Chitre (1938-2009), among others. 
Among these writers, many became translators of, especially, non-contemporary but also non-
classical poetry from the bhashas or so-called “regional languages” (where “classical” here 
means Sanskrit, Persian, and other languages favored by early Orientalists). Most notably, these 
                                                 
40 Mehrotra, in saying this, is recalling his mood at the beginning of his career. Now, he 
emphasizes, he sees things differently, such as the “irony” of the uncle he previously felt he 
“couldn’t” talk about in English being himself Oxford-educated (xvi).  
41 Nerlekar names the dates of the period as “approximately 1955-1980,” but the early end of this 
period falls outside the developments that concern me. 
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poets would translate works from the medieval devotional “movement” called bhakti.42  
It is that link with bhakti poetry and its translation which expands my sense of the 
“generation” at issue out of the narrow confines of Bombay to include much of India as well as 
its diaspora. A. K. Ramanujan (1929-1993) thus fits the bill (despite being a bit older than the 
other poets, he did not begin publishing poetry until the late 1960’s); so does Jayanta Mahapatra 
(born 1928) in Orissa and Agha Shahid Ali (1949-2001) in Kashmir/Delhi/USA. These writers 
almost all had enormous impact on the next generation, some of whom follow similar patterns as 
those I will be discussing, albeit with the “meaning” of those actions changed, since the contexts 
for doing them have also changed. An example would be Ranjit Hoskote (born 1968), who has 
translated the Kashmiri mystic (and arguably bhakti) poet Lal Ded and shows influence from 
Agha Shahid Ali (who prominently praised Hoskote’s first volume when it was released in India 
Today). 
My explicit characterization of the generation therefore leaves out a number of prominent 
figures writing in similar circles at the same time. Most notably, Nissim Ezekiel will play little to 
no role in my account. As Mehrotra once commented in a moment of passionate polemic, “A 
hundred Indo-Anglian years, which is an eternity, should have separated Ezekiel (b. 1924) and 
Kolatkar (b. 1931). Tragically for us, they belong to the same generation” (Partial 155). I take 
this as a valid excuse for acknowledging the separateness of what we might call either the 
“translingual nostalgia” or the “counter-nostalgia” generation from even some of its seeming 
contemporaries. At the very least, the two groups found different solutions to the aesthetic 
                                                 
42 The idea of the bhakti movement now has widespread purchase in the cultural imagination of 
South Asia, but the extent to which it was unified or even diffusely a “movement” remains a 
point of contention. John Stratton Hawley has written a major intellectual history of the bhakti-
movement idea in his Storm of Songs: India and the Idea of the Bhakti Movement.  
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problems facing them, the ones who interest us chose a more or less nostalgic route that we shall 
delineate. 
Before detailing what their generation did to jump-start a new poetic aesthetics, however, 
I want to explore in a bit more detail the tradition they inherited. Why did pre-Independence 
poetry in English seem so “truly dead,” and what even does that mean? Answering that question 
will require a flash survey of an admittedly under-studied century.43 Thankfully, what matters is 
less the minutiae of the literary history than the over-arching story of how that body of literature 
came to be read and received by young would-be poets like Mehrotra.  
2.2 ORIENTALIST POETRY AND ITS NEIGHBORING NOSTALGIAS 
The development of Indian English poetry and its genres is inseparable from the arrival of 
Orientalist-inflected nostalgia for India’s civilizational “golden age.” Early Indian poets writing 
in English were, unsurprisingly, active interlocutors of Orientalist scholars and poets. Indeed, the 
development of Indian English poetry is inseparable from Orientalist aesthetics in general, as 
well as from the incipient proto-nationalisms that drew on those aesthetics, such as in the case of 
the so-called “Bengal Renaissance.” 
Consider Henry Louis Vivian Derozio (1809-1831), “the one early Indian-English writer 
to grow up monolingual in English” and the “first to call India ‘Mother’” (Dharwadker 
“Historical Formation” 224, 226). An enormously influential and controversial figure, Derozio is 
famous for the students he inspired, a group of radical anti-traditional rationalists called “Young 
                                                 
43 Rosinka Chaudhuri has been leading the charge in equipping us with a better picture of those 
times. Her books in the field include Gentlemen Poets in Colonial Bengal: Emergent 
Nationalism and the Orientalist Project (2002), Freedom and Beef-Steaks: Colonial Calcutta 
Culture (2012) and The Literary Thing: History, Poetry and the Making of a Modern Literary 
Culture (2014). She has also edited the tremendously useful recent Cambridge History of Indian 
Poetry in English. For a valuable anthology of primary source material, see Eunice de Souza’s 
Early Indian Poetry in English, An Anthology: 1829-1947. 
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Bengal.” His most famous literary achievement is a “seemingly dreary” 1828 sonnet titled, “To 
India, My Native Land.” As Rosinka Chaudhuri notes, the poem is one of the few “concessions” 
to Independence made in the English literature curricula of India and has therefore gained 
considerable prominence in the immediate post-colonial cultural imagination of India’s 
schoolchildren.  The first four lines give a sense of its tenor:  
My country! in thy day of glory past 
A beauteous halo circled round thy brow, 
And worshipped as a deity thou wast. 
Where is that glory, where that reverence now? 
As Chaudhuri also notes, the title came not from the poet but Francis Bradley-Birt, Derozio’s 
1923 anthologist (Introduction 3). The name fits the simple theme well enough, except that it 
retroactively specifies what precisely Derozio considered his “native land,” his “country.” Those 
are the words the poet himself used, in keeping with Romantic conventions, and their ambiguity 
is suggestive of alternative nationalisms prior to the specifically “Indian” (e.g.., Bengali or 
Hindu, terms which were not so stably separate in the early to mid-nineteenth century as they are 
today).  With language thus inspired by the Romantics and an underlying conceit inspired by 
Calcutta Orientalists, the poem helps inaugurate the patriotic tropes that would be taken up, 
recycled, and retooled throughout the Bengal Renaissance.  
Rosinka Chaudhuri has spoken of these tropes and their cousins as forming “a distinct 
strand of ‘Orientalist’ verse in the nineteenth century” within Indian writing in English 
(Gentlemen Poets 37). It is a strand that she has meticulously laid out in her book Gentleman 
Poets in Colonial Bengal. As she notes there, not only Derozio but “[e]very poet in the 
nineteenth century attempting to express a new-found concern with India read William Jones” 
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(40). His influence was all over their works—in the myths referred to and the phrases used, as 
well as in their penchant for extensive didactic footnotes, explaining, for example, the Latin 
names of local flora and referring, naturally, to the works of Sir William Jones. The power to 
influence was not limited to Jones, however. Derozio was an admirer of the Sanskritist H. H. 
Wilson, who was also working in Calcutta at the time and to whom Derozio even dedicated his 
second publication (31). It was in fact through Jones and Wilson that Derozio came to learn of 
and understand his country’s “day of glory past.” Chaudhuri goes so far as to say that “the 
depiction of the East in Derozio’s poems derived entirely from his reading” of the Calcutta 
Orientalists and from Orientalist-inspired poetry from England, such as that “of Campbell, Byron 
or Moore” (37, emphasis added). 
The point is not (only) that Derozio and his ilk were derivative (though certainly that is 
how a young Mehrotra would receive them). Everyone borrows from somewhere, and the British 
writers Derozio borrows from were certainly borrowing from India (and elsewhere in the 
“Orient”) in turn as they elaborated their aesthetic fantasies of the exotic elsewhere. However 
highly unequal the dialogue, it was still a dialogue. What we must understand rather is the 
intellectual and aesthetic frameworks Derozio participated in, even helped create. As noted 
above, the question of nationalism at this point was still but dimly posed. The Calcutta 
Orientalists were shedding light on the ancient heritage of Sanskrit, which the British used to 
narrate a local history favorable to them. Meanwhile, figures like Derozio came along in 
ambivalent response, accepting the Orientalists’ terms but seeing them from another side.  
A good example of what resulted is Derozio’s “The Enchantress of the Cave: A Tale,” an 
“oriental tale” in the vein of Byron’s The Giaour or Moore’s Lalla Rookh, both of which Derozio 
quotes in epigraph. The poem takes place the night before a decisive battle between “Bramah’s 
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[sic] children” and “[t]heir fell, invading, Moslem foes” (Derozio 130). As Chaudhuri notes, the 
text seems pulled in two directions simultaneously—toward the European exoticizing and 
sympathetic fascination with Muslim culture and toward demonizing them for their presence in 
South Asia (Freedom Chapter 2). The former would largely wane as the century passed and 
tastes for the exotic shift, both at home and abroad. The latter, however, remained decisive. As 
Chaudhuri also notes, “The Enchantress of the Cave” is thus “one of the earliest examples…of 
the self-conscious expression of a ‘Hindu point of view’ in a literary work in English” in his 
“Enchantress of the Cave” (Gentlemen 44). The innovation came at a massive cost even as it 
promised a boon. Part of the inspiration for the text seems to have come from Scottish poet 
Thomas Campbell, whose “Pleasures of Hope” likewise refers to the violent invasion of India by 
Muslims. In Campbell’s poem, however, the conceit is used for explicit criticism of the British: 
Children of Brama! then was mercy nigh 
To wash the stain of blood's eternal dye? 
Did Peace descend, to triumph and to save,  
When free-born Britons cross'd the Indian wave? 
Ah, no! to more than Rome's ambition true, 
The Nurse of Freedom gave it not to you! (lines 553-557) 
For perhaps obvious reasons of censorship, such forthrightness would not work for Derozio, so 
he had to avoid mention of the British entirely. Instead, he lets the “proud Mussulman” stand in 
for foreign dominance in general, tacitly implicating the British as well. He interpellates his 
fellow countrymen, rousing them to opposition: “O! for the spirit of the past, / Ere exiled 
Freedom looked her last, / On this delicious orient clime,” it begins; 
 O! for the heroic hearts of old 
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To fire the souls that now are cold 
To lead them on to deeds of worth, 
And raise their glory yet on earth 
’Tis vain to wish—it will not be:— 
But since the spark of liberty 
Is quenced, that once did warmly glow, 
In daring bosoms, long ago, 
O! for a life-inspiring strain 
To fan it to light again! (131) 
In gaining a covert way to oppose domination, the poem scapegoats Muslims as foreigners to 
South Asia, a conflation that lives on, according to scholars like Christophe Jaffrelot, in more or 
less identical terms in contemporary Hindu nationalism—well after both Mughal and British rule 
have ceased (Jaffrelot Chapter 1). The Romantic-Orientalist verse of the mid-nineteenth century 
thus comes not only with predictable aesthetics but also with predictable identity politics. The 
two, in fact, are intertwined.  
The specific genre of “Orientalist verse” to which Derozio contributes ends, Chaudhuri 
tells us, by 1875 (at least as a dominant aesthetic trend; more directly imitative verse continued 
sporadically). The genre’s influence, however, lives on in a number of ways that eventually 
shape the post-Independence generation of poets. One part of this generic afterlife lies in the fact 
that people did not stop reading the earlier Orientalist verse just because it fell out of fashion. 
New poetic torch-bearers such as Sarojini Naidu and Rabindranath Tagore certainly continued 
to. Tagore’s auto-translations are particularly telling. When he translated his “Where the mind is 
without fear,” for example, Tagore echoes almost verbatim certain phrases and images of the 
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earlier  Madhusudan’s (obviously Anglophilic) “heavenly Britain,” albeit now with the 
references turned, as Chaudhuri points out, towards India (Gentlemen 103). Furthermore, as 
Mahasweta Sengupta has famously argued, Tagore in general orientalized himself in translation, 
particularly the work that helped earn him his Nobel prize, Gitanjali. Thanks to such maneuvers, 
his work slid right into “the stereotypical role that was familiar to the colonizer, a voice that not 
only spoke of the peace and tranquillity of a distant world, but also offered an escape from the 
materialism of the contemporary Western world” (Sengupta 58). Aside from the mystical 
posturing Sengupta attributes to these translations, she also notes the quite obvious Romantic 
tinge to the language. It is the stuff, one might say, of nightingales and skylarks.  
An additional afterlife of Orientalist verse would be in Orientalist translations, in 
particular, translations of Sanskrit. To this day, Sanskrit translation remains very conservative, 
with many a phrase still carrying the scent of the nineteenth century. “Creepers” appear where 
one would expect vines; (erotic) horripilation where one would hope at least for goosebumps. 
Regardless of which translations from Sanskrit Mehrotra and his generation were exposed to, 
they would almost certainly have shared the orientalizing techniques of Jones and Tagore. The 
impact of this fact—that “Indian tradition” (by which was meant Sanskrit tradition, by which 
was meant especially Brahminical Sanskrit tradition) was mediated through an initial reception 
in English—on the idea and aesthetics of English in India has so far received too little attention 
by scholars. The Derozian genre of Orientalist verse already illustrated one facet of this 
influence, i.e., the shaping of specific aesthetic tendencies in English by Sanskrit and Persian 
translations. But Sanskrit literature’s continued pressure on English via the on-going reception of 
works in translation carries its own force, hardly worth dismissing.  
The final way in which Orientalist verse continued to impact later expectations of Indian 
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poetry in English is perhaps the simplest. We have already seen that readers in the immediate 
aftermath of Independence (and for some time afterward) tended to lump the entire nineteenth 
century into one ball of tired “Romantic” aesthetics. Indeed, their idea of the nineteenth century 
in poetry extended all the way to 1947, as it still does in, e.g., Eunice de Souza’s recent (and 
excellent) anthology of “early Indian poetry in English.”  
Accordingly, by the time Mehrotra bemoans the stifling predictability of English as “the 
language of skylarks and nightingales,” he is not just talking about Keats. He is talking about an 
entire subcontinental aesthetics and politics that ties to Keats. That knot of associations includes 
a variety of Orientalist stereotypes, a particular flavor of (often identitarian) nationalism, a sense 
of proximity not only to the colonizer but also to Brahminical authority and Sanskrit 
traditionalism, as well as the usual clichés about nineteenth-century literature—with its inverted 
syntax and muddy thought shot through with thees and thous. It is also worth pointing out that 
some of Mehrotra’s reaction against the Romantic-Orientalist aesthetics of the past concerned the 
usual shame of colonial belatedness. He marks his disappointment, for example, in Sarojini 
Naidu on the first page of his introduction to Twelve Modern Indian Poets. Naidu had, it seemed, 
once hosted Ezra Pound at her London home, introducing him to Mrs. Mary Fenollosa, a woman 
who would eventually give him her husband’s literary remains, thereby lighting one of the major 
modernist fuses, which would culminate in Pound’s (in)famous translations from Chinese. 
Despite this near-encounter with the avant garde, though, Naidu went on writing the late-
Romantic verse that so disappointed the young Mehrotra (and fascinates him now that he is 
older).  
With all of this background laid out before us, we can see the danger now that would lie 
in assuming that Mehrotra and company were simply indulging in a school-boyish sense of 
94 
 
rebellion against their dreary lessons in English poetry. Even were we to push that claim 
politically and note, as Peter D. McDonald does, that school training at that time meant 
“colonial” training, it would hardly suffice (275).44 Mehrotra and his poetic allies were not, by 
and large, “writing back,” as the postcolonial slogan has it.45 Their audience and efforts were 
much more local. That is one of the main differences between Indian poetry in English and its 
prose cousins. The former has remained much more firmly embedded in local coterie-like 
scenes, tied intimately across linguistic lines through multilingual writing and passionate 
translation. In any case, as two recent monographs on Arun Kolatkar suggest, a more prominent 
foil for his generation is not the imperialist but the linguistic chauvinist or the militant (Hindu) 
nationalist.46 
2.3 TRANSLINGUAL NOSTALGIAS 
As we saw in the first chapter, A.K. Ramanujan felt that his future needed a new, less Sanskritic 
past. His co-generationists seem, in large part, to have agreed. To that consensus, I want to add 
that, for most of that generation, Sanskrit and a particular style of English were thoroughly 
intertwined. To move past Sanskrit was also to move past that English. The project these poets 
found before them thus required that they find, in English, a new local (and hence non-English) 
past that somehow also breaks free of what they feel to be the (most obvious, colonially 
                                                 
44 Strictly speaking, since Mehrotra was born in independent India, the training would only have 
been colonial in legacy, not a colonial education per se.   
45 For the origins of that term, now ubiquitous, see Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin. I should stress 
that when I say that they did not have “the international audience” necessary, I mean a kind of 
audience or an aspiration toward it. They did indeed connect internationally, but not in the way 
that would allow for writing back per se.  
46 See Nerlekar’s Bombay Modern and Zecchini’s Arun Kolatkar and Literary Modernism, both 
of which stress the rise of Marathi nationalism that led, e.g., to the changing of the name 
Bombay to Mumbai. Both authors continued to use the earlier, English name even after the 
change (when writing in English, that is).  
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inherited) past of English itself. That is no easy task.  
In practice, what that most often entailed was translating medieval devotional (bhakti) 
poetry into an Americanizing (and often vulgar) register of English, while simultaneously 
blurring the lines between translation and original writing. These poets’ relationship to such 
translation work was not, however, cynical; they did not set out, knowing nothing of what lay out 
there, to find a subversive non-Sanskritic past and then translate willfully into the opposite of 
what Orientalist translation aesthetics would dictate. They simply read in the original through a 
lens that knew this American English. The appeal of the bhakti poets was in large part that they 
felt like people facing the same problem—trying to find immediacy in the vernacular when the 
only available literary language was classical. In the process of discovering this and conveying it 
into English, Mehrotra’s generation evinced a kind of nostalgia for what they saw as earlier 
moments of vital, disruptive language. They rejected one nostalgia and embraced another. They 
were, I will say, counter-nostalgic.  
Before proceeding further we need a better sense of what bhakti is. As with most 
interesting questions, the answer is far from simple. Here, however, is how John Stratton Hawley 
introduces it in his engaging intellectual history, A Storm of Songs,  
“Bhakti,” as usually translated, is devotion, but if that word connotes something 
entirely private and quiet, we are in need of other words. Bhakti is heart religion, 
sometimes cool and quiescent but sometimes hot—the religion of participation, 
community, enthusiasm, song, and often of personal challenge, the sort of thing 
that coursed through the Protestant Great Awakenings in the history of the United 
States. It evokes the idea of a widely shared religiosity for which institutional 
superstructures weren’t all that relevant, and which, once activated, could be 
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historically contagious—a glorious disease of the collective heart. It implied 
direct divine encounter, experienced in the lives of individual people. These 
people, moved by that encounter, turn to poetry, which is the natural vehicle of 
bhakti, and poetry expresses itself just as naturally in song. There is a whole 
galaxy of bhakti poets who have been moved to song in the course of Indian 
history, and their songs are still sung today, everywhere across the subcontinent 
and in all its major languages.…They come from both sexes and all social 
stations. They are understood to be the voice of the people’s religion, broadly, and 
they are held up to have had a distinctive history. (2) 
If there is a lot there, it is because the concept is so resonant. I call it a concept because, as 
Hawley stresses, it is one. The “idea of the bhakti movement coalesces” only in the twentieth 
century (2). Hence the slightly evasive phrasing throughout Hawley’s description. Bhakti 
“evokes,” “implie[s],” is “understood,” and “held up” as these things at least as much as it “is” 
any of them, or rather the “is” and the “as” coincide in the bhakti idea as it calls into being a 
powerful image that only a quibbler could fail to call real.  
For different groups, however, the movement means quite distinct things. For some, it 
displays a kind of nationalist Geist, pan-Indian cultural phenomenon that it is. For others, it 
reveals the essence underlying the various named religions of the world. It can even mean 
opposing things to opposing groups. Much hinges on whether you take as your paradigm case, 
say, Tulsīdās’s Rāmcaritmānas, an orthodox retelling of the classical Rāmāyaṇa, as your 
paradigm case, or whether you prefer the fieriest poems by Ravidās or Kabīr. Much also depends 
on who and where you are when you pick your paradigm case. For a Brahmin like Rabindranath 
Tagore, as Hawley notes, “bhakti was liberation—a genre of performed self-knowledge that 
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enabled [him] to situate [himself] in the broader social and political fabric” in progressive new 
ways (7). Bhakti would be a different kind of liberation for a low caste woman. And in its 
modern guise as desh-bhakti (patriotism or, a bit more literally, homeland-devotion), it may not 
warrant the liberatory epithet at all. We need, then, a vocabulary for thinking of bhakti not in the 
singular—as a movement or an idea—but rather, as Christian Novetzki suggests in his study of 
the bhakti saint Namdev, “an ongoing effort to construct publics of belief [or, say, poetry], 
maintained through intricate systems of memory” (xi). In our case, however, memory will mean 
primarily translation. The issue is not what bhakti poets mean in the original, nor what they mean 
for the culture at large, but what memory is proposed by the translations of this new generation 
of poets. 
What does it mean, then, that so many Indian poets in English turned to bhakti poetry for 
inspiration, imitation, and translation? Part of their motivation was undoubtedly the same, 
broadly speaking, as Tagore’s—a freeing rebellion against what seemed the most regressive and 
pernicious aspects of the culture. For the most part, however, these poets were and are not 
activists, except in displays of solidarity and other rather attenuated ways. Their bhakti poetry 
meant something else. For them, the essence of the tradition was “formal,” aesthetic (Nerlekar 
116). Or maybe it would be better to say that they saw the form and aesthetic of bhakti as the real 
site of its subversiveness and social power.  
What, then, is the form or aesthetic of a bhakti poem? It may be tempting to answer by 
describing the “originals,” but it is not obvious how that should be done. The originals 
themselves can seem to change whether you are reading them from the perspective of personal 
devotion, social upheaval, or otherwise. What we are trying to figure out is precisely what it 
means to read them for their form. It seems we have found a vicious circle. How can we read the 
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texts “for” something before we have specified what that is? The solution is to look at the 
translations, where we find the very distinctive “alchemy of the colloquial” that Nerlekar has 
identified. As many have noted, it blends Beat influences with the diction of American gangster 
films and the rhythm of the blues. Here is Arun Kolatkar translating Janabai: 
god my darling 
do me a favor and kill my mother-in-law 
 
i will feel lonely when she is gone 
but you will be a good god won’t you 
and kill my father-in-law 
 
i will be glad when he is gone 
but you will be a good god won’t you 
and kill my sister-in-law 
 
i will be free when she is gone 
i will pick up my begging bow 
and be on my way 
 
let them drop dead says jani 
then we will be left alone 
just you and me (301) 
The lower-case letters and lack of punctuation show the influence of e. e. cummings clearly 
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enough. Nonetheless, the poem feels immediate, not filtered through an American influence. The 
American style of speech in general, perhaps less obvious here than elsewhere, allows Kolatkar 
and others to present the starkest alternative to British English they have, without sounding 
defensive or nativist. (Within Indian poetry in English, the use of specifically Indian English is 
less common than in novelistic prose, and often comes with humor rather than any sincere sense 
that such English is more authentic—an obvious example would be Nissim Ezekiel’s “Very 
Indian Poem in English.”) As Nerlekar observes, the sathotthari poets sought “a new way of 
knowing the urban space—not nativist, not internationalist, not global, not national” (3). So how 
does borrowing American poetic stylings (from cummings), a bluesy three-line stanza, and a 
generally American street vocabulary help avoid internationalism and globalism? Partly by 
speaking to a local audience. This translation, like most of Kolatkar’s work in English, remained 
unpublished until he knew he would die soon and handed over his work for editing and 
publication by Mehrotra. Until then it was only shared with friends, and it retains that feeling of 
intimacy, of not needing to explain itself.  
What all this is in service of, within a broader culture of poetry, is, according to Nerlekar, 
“the revival of linguistic realism through the frank language and imagery of the everyday 
practices used by the saint-poets” (Bombay Modern 116). For these poets, “linguistic realism” 
was something lost to the past, perhaps lost to English as well, but there in bhakti and other 
subversive vernacular poets. They had a whole lineage that they built up through translation, 
which they explicitly contrasted with the lineage (notably not in translation) they were trying to 
erase or move past; the Tagore-Aurobindo-Naidu lineage was to be displaced by “Kapilar, 
Paranar, Bassavanna, Allama Prabhu, Kabir, Tukaram, Nirala, [and] Faiz” (Mehrotra 
Introduction 2). It hardly takes a sustained look at that list to realize how dominated it is by 
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bhakti poets. The list is, in fact, a list of major translations by the postcolonial generation of 
poets in English. Kapilar, Paranar, Bassavanna, and Allama Prabhu were translated by 
Ramanuan. Kabir and Nirala were translated by Mehrotra. Tukaram was translated by Kolatkar 
and Dilip Chitre. Faiz was also translated by Agha Shahid Ali. Only the modern Hindi poet 
Nirala (1896-1961) falls into the non-canonical among these translations, included as his poems 
are only in book-form within Mehrotra’s Collected Poems. (I mean that the translations are non-
canonical; the originals are of course canonical in Hindi.) 
One of the notable achievements of this generation’s translation efforts is the more or less 
complete assimilation of the bhakti movement and its poets to an image of rebelliousness, anti-
Brahminical agitation, and fresh subversiveness among its readers. This is so much so that Bruce 
King, in a recent review, can claim that to invoke Sanskrit in one’s writing is to pander to 
parochial chauvinism and Brahmanism whereas to translate bhakti poets is to get a charge of 
subversion (“From the Sublime”). Likewise, recent Indian novels in English have drawn on the 
clash between bhakti and Sanskrit (or at least communalism) played out in the translations we 
have been discussing. Githa Hariharan’s In Times of Siege, for example, is about the clash 
between a history professor (writing on Basavanna) and Hindu fundamentalists who wish him 
silenced. The novel is explicitly inspired by Ramanujan’s translations, quoting them liberally 
throughout and expressing, in the Acknowledgments, gratitude to Ramanujan’s book for having 
introduced Basavanna to her (although she notes she has learned much from other books on 
Basavanna too). Likewise, M. G. Vassanji’s The Assassin’s Song likewise puts the poetry and 
songs of bhakti at the narrative and moral center of novel about the ravages of communalism.  
That is not at all the only available interpretation of the bhakti movement. Writers in 
Sanskrit, for example, have no problem assimilating Kolatkar’s and Chitre’s beloved Tukaram to 
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“Sanskritic” and “Brahminical” values (see, e.g., Kṣamā Rao’s verse biography). And the bhakti 
movement remains central (as the bhakti āndolan) to Hindi education and the nationalist vision it 
attempts to instill (Hawley 37). Indian nationalism in general is quite fond of the bhakti 
movement, despite King’s image of the two as conflictual. The “connections between languages 
and periods, between religious communities both Muslim and Hindu, and between sacred 
registers and secular—all served to enhance the value of bhakti as a resource in the cause of 
national integration, and to suggest that it had been doing that work for centuries (Hawley 19). 
For some nationalists (wishing to oppose the capacious nation to the more limiting Brahmanism) 
the vernacular, local aspects of bhakti were quite appealing.  
In the context of her argument about the sathottari movement, Nerlekar is quite aware of 
these facts (114). And as Hawley points out, the eminent scholar of the long history of Sanskrit-
vernacular relationships, Sheldon Pollock, “is often at pains to show how the religious register 
has been over-emphasized in earlier treatments of vernacularization, and he does not fail to point 
out that even when the vernacular option was there, some bhakti authors continued to choose 
Sanskrit as their medium” (9). Still, these poets have done a good job of selling the image. 
Perhaps more important than their role in  shaping cultural memory of the bhakti period (which 
is something admittedly that scholars and activists have also taken part in) is the sense of style 
and energy associated with the movement, that is something worth being attached to, yearning 
for, and getting excited about recreating. The inspiration to keep translating these poets attests to 
some of that energy, as does new novelistic interest in them. 
As we will see in the next section, however, it is not only the bhakti poets who mattered 
to this generation.  As Ramanujan’s classical Tamil and Mehrotra’s Prakrit translations suggest, 
“Sanskrit” as a dominating monolith could be countered in many ways. What is important is that 
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in each case, the language being translated from be imagined as immediate, direct, and 
“vernacular”—an image that allowed for the seizing and creating of a new English that, the poets 
hope, will likewise contain those values, allowing for the subversiveness that they attach to the 
poems they are translating, with their iconoclasm, impropriety, and passion.  
I hope at this point that my argument is gaining enough force that I can claim that 
“nostalgia” and its attachments do a better job of accounting for these translations than does the 
shame and defensiveness about being insufficiently Indian that critics such as Akshaya Kumar 
attribute to the whole project. But it may be useful to turn to a closer reading of some of the texts 
in order to see in greater detail what I mean.  
2.4 CASE STUDY: MEHROTRA’S TRANSLATIONS 
Mehrotra has produced two book-length works of translation. One is of the songs of the medieval 
North-Indian bhakti saint, Kabir. The other is an anthology of short poems, called gāthā-s, of 
largely erotic subject matter written in Mahārāṣṭrī Prakrit, the ostensibly vernacular but really 
quite codified and classical language that followed Sanskrit. The anthology, called the 
Gāthāsattasaï (The Seven Hundred Gāthā-s), is “by most accounts the oldest extant anthology of 
poetry from South Asia, containing our very earliest examples of secular verse” (Selby 81). Both 
choices, the iconoclastic Kabir and the early secular anthology, are revealing, as are the choices 
he made in selecting particular poems to choose from each. This section will explore examples 
from each set of translations to clarify some of what is revealed.  
In Mehrotra’s Kabīr translations, there are willful anachronisms, epigraphs that belong to 
wholly other contexts, and a general irreverence that bleeds the line between then and now. A 
poem that opens with a Leadbelly quote, “It take a man that have the blues so to sing the blues,” 
opens in a way that makes that quote seem not just culturally and historically out of place, but 
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topically too:  
O pundit, your hairsplitting’s 
So much bullshit. I’m surprised 
You still get away with it. 
 
I parroting the name 
of Rama brought salvation, 
Then saying sugarcane 
Should sweet the mouth. 
A short while later, the poem ends, “You’ll be delivered to Deathville” (26). What are we to 
make of these slaps in the face of translational propriety, of making a “poet-saint” who lived, as 
Mehrotra puts it in the introduction, a “half millennium” ago, talk like a street-wise smart-ass 
with a penchant for intentional cheesiness (vii)?  
As Mehrotra points out in the introduction, he is doing nothing new. The “Kabir corpus” 
is not a fixed entity, and various poems are added to it through today. “Seen in this way,” 
Mehrotra says, “the Songs of Kabir is both a work of translation based on the best available 
critical editions and…a further elaboration of the Kabir corpus” (xxxii). He gives a great 
example to justify his practice: 
A Kabir song recorded in Rajasthan in the mid-1990s compares the body to an 
anjan (engine), the soul to a passenger, who, his taim (time) on earth being short, 
is advised not to lose his tikat (ticket). One lain (line) will take the passenger to 
Immortal City; the other to the City of Death. When asked how Kabir could be 
familiar with the railways, to say nothing of English words like “engine,” “time,” 
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“ticket,” and “line,” the singer, Bhikaramji Sharma, looked “most hurt” and 
replied that Kabir, being a seer, knew everything. (xxxi-xxxii) 
The attitude is hardly unique to Kabir, or indeed to Mehrotra. Much of the appeal of the bhakti 
poets for this generation lie in how fluid the corpuses were and how open they were to fresh 
intervention. In an unfinished work called “Making Love to a Poem,” Kolatkar speaks to his 
favorite poet to translate, Tukaram: 
I’m not going to pan off your poems as mine 
 
Salo Malo tried that 
 Salo Malo tried to pass off  your poems as his 
 that didn’t work 
 I’ll try to pass of mine as yours 
 
I’ll create such confusion 
that nobody can be sure about what you wrote and what I did (353) 
This line-blurring is a commonplace among the poets of translingual nostalgia. And we can gain 
some sense of what their nostalgia is for by seeing the directness, the freedom, and the 
casualness of all of these poems. Mehrotra’s Kabir voices any fed-up outsider from any 
generation, but he is not timeless. A corpse “smelling of aftershave / And deodorants” is hardly 
timeless (72). 
 
Let us turn now to Mehrotra’s foray into Prakrit poetry. Before beginning a discussion of 
the translation itself, it is worth noting that Mehrotra was introduced to the Gāthāsattasaï by 
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Kolatkar, reminding us again how interconnected and in dialogue these poets nostalgias are. 
Unlike with Kabīr, the Prakrit poetry tradition can be said safely to be well and truly dead. Even 
by the time Sanskrit writers began commenting on the text, which they did at great length 
beginning several hundred years after its compilation, it seems they may already have been 
working on a confusing set of texts that no longer fit the model of any still-living genres.47 The 
anthology is associated with the reign of Hala, who lived in the first century CE, but the 
ascription is uncertain, the manuscript history is complex, and the anthology in any case 
contained previously written poems.  
Mehrotra says of the anthology itself and of his translation:  
The Gāthāsaptaśatī [he uses the Sanskrit title] speaks the minute you open it, and 
as its translator I felt that at times I did little more than repeat in another language 
what it said. This indicates something about the communicability of the poems, 
rather than about any method of translation.The script of their images is common 
to the race and as old: cupped hands, a pregnant woman, a man staring. Like 
international signs that are understood everywhere, they hardly seem to need 
translators. (Translator’s Note x) 
It is, of course, a gross distortion of reality, or a playful refusal of it. Predictably, his translations 
exhibit a wide range of relationships to their originals (which in this edition are printed alongside 
their translations for anyone daring enough to try to parse the Prakrit without so much as the 
usual Sanskrit chāyā, or shadow-translation that usually accompanies the text). That alone does 
not disqualify his claim. But even in translation, they remain often quite puzzling works—
                                                 
47 Martha Ann Selby has written an article, “Desire for Meaning: Providing Contexts for Prakrit 
Gathas,” on precisely this topic. 
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immediate in some ways and impossible in others. As I mentioned above, Sanskrit literary 
theorists found them a source of endless fascination and some difficulty themselves. 
Nonetheless, Mehrotra’s claim does hint at his reasons for choosing this work and for a sense of 
what he hoped his translations would do. As with Kabīr, he wants to break free of classicism, 
stuffiness, and aesthetic hierarchy in favor of immediacy and vibrancy.  
Consider poem 396: 
In whispers, 
 Like two seditionists,  
A traveller 
 To his companion: 
‘S-s-sh! The mango’s 
 F-l-o-r-e-s-c-e-n-t.’ 
The immediacy of the poem is clear enough, as is the typographical experimentation that 
obviously betrays the claim to be merely “repeating in another language” the original that sits 
right above it on the page, looking like this: 
राअ-िव�� ंव कह ंपिहओ पिहअस्स साहइ ससङ्कं। 
ज�ो अम्वाण दलं त�ो दर-िणग्गअं �कं िप ।। 
But what the poem means is another matter entirely. It is hardly the stuff of international signage. 
Granting that there is no such thing as simply repeating in another language, a much closer effort 
to follow the words of the original might read along these lines: “As if speaking against the king, 
traveller says to traveller, anxiously: / where there is a mango leaf, there must be something 
else.” The distance from Mehrotra’s translation is glaring. Where Mehrotra has no verb in the 
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first half, my translation follows the Prakrit and admits that the traveller “says” (sāhaï) the 
second line. But that second line is where the real changes are. There is no shushing in the 
original, no typographical cleverness, and a much more syntactically elaborate sentence 
culminating in an ambiguous “something.” Upon closer inspection, however, one sees some of 
the cleverness of Mehrotra’s handiwork. The shushing seems to want to echo semantically what 
the second half of the first line does phonetically. Transliterated, it reads: pathikassa sāhaï 
sasaṅkaṃ (says to the traveller anxiously). Four sibilant s’s give at least “whispers” some 
justification, if not the “S-s-sh!” For that matter, Mehrotra’s own translation has its share of 
hissing: whispers…seditionists.  
A reader versed in the tradition is “supposed” to know that what lies behind the leaf is a 
flower-bud, the sign of spring being sprung. Mehrotra’s “f-l-o-r-e-s-c-e-n-t” is thus intended to 
skip right to that insight (although I must confess, I had never seen that word before and mistook 
it initially for fluorescent). In an endnote, Mehrotra does not tell us this, but cryptically observes, 
“An instance of gallows humour of homebound travellers; for the woman’s response to the 
mango buds, see Poem 499” (91). That poem reads, 
How am I? Can’t you see? 
 Evil crowns the prodigious 
Mango in the yard. 
Aside from the fact that this may or may not answer our questions, we notice immediately how 
different this poem looks on the page than the first, despite seeming more or less identical in 
Prakrit (where the meters are indeed the same). More than the first translation at least, this gets 
close to the talkiness of the original (although “evil crowns the prodigious mango” hardly 
qualifies as that).  
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Assuming that the reader catches that “mango” here means mango tree, and from there 
follows all the clues that Mehrotra gives, she is left with two poems, one with two traveling men 
pointing out anxiously a mango bud and another with a woman complaining about a mango bud 
in her yard. Maybe this is enough to suggest to her that she is dealing with a husband and a wife 
(typologically, that is—the poems are not so individuated as to specify one husband over 
another), and that each is dreading their imminent reunion after spending the winter apart while 
the husband was away on business. I suspect no reader without the Prakrit original would get all 
that, even with a general familiarity with the culture, but it is nonetheless conceivable.  
What though can this tell us about Mehrotra’s desire to translate these poems? A few 
observations present themselves. First, the coy quasi-didacticism of the endnotes seems a parody 
of more scholarly translations, such as were popularized by Jones, the early Orientalists, and the 
early Indian poets in English who joined them in the vogue. Second, Mehrotra cares about 
something other than the precise cultural embeddedness of texts, exactly what and how they 
mean. If anything, he seems to revel in the semi-obscurity of the poems—that they seem so 
obviously to mean something fairly simple and yet they remain just out of reach. Third, the 
translations cannot hide their modernism. “Evil crowns the prodigious mango” could be a line 
from Baudelaire, and we have already twice noted the typographical experiments. Finally, 
if/when the meaning is discerned, the sassiness of it (in a book that claims in its subtitle to 
contain “love poems”) is a swift, rejuvenating kick to the cliché about whatever Oriental love 
poetry is supposed to look like. Finally the translations are tight and tense, nary a wasted word, 
like any “good” English poem.  
A reader who has some access to the Prakrit can object all day to these choices. Take that 
last observation, for example, about how well the poems conform to expectations of syntactic 
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and verbal density in English poetry. Both originals refuse to name the ominous sign they point 
to (the mango bud). Both call it “something.” The ordinariness of such words is something 
Mehrotra seems unwilling to confront. Take another example, poem 705: 
Village-born,  
 Among rustics raised, 
To towns unused 
 To city-men attractive: 
I am what I am.48 
Aside from “to,” “I,” and “am,” this poem repeats no words. The original, however, is far more 
repetitive. Here is a paraphrase that tries to preserve that: “I am village-raised, I live in a village, 
I don’t know city ways / I steal city-women’s husbands, I am what I am.” (The pronouns are all 
added in translation, but the verb-endings certainly repeat—as does the full-sentence, 
unvaryingly standard syntax.) Here in particular Mehrotra’s diversifying the vocabulary feels 
like a betrayal of the original, where the woman feels so comfortable in her own 
straightforwardness.  
One might also object to the touches of the surreal (Mehrotra cut his poetic teeth on 
French Surrealism) that sparkle in our ignorance of the meaning of evil in the mango crown or 
the magic of florescence. They give a false sense of a different kind of immediacy than the 
originals have, now an immediacy felt in the unconscious where before it was in 
plainspokenness. From a feminist standpoint, there may also be some misfortune in the fact that 
“against the king” (i.e., in fact, against the wife) gets translated simply as seditious, and that “I 
steal [or attract] the husbands of city-women” gets translated only as “to city-men attractive.” On 
                                                 
48 gāmāruha mhi, gāme vasāmi, ṇaaraṭṭhiïṃ ṇa āṇāmi / nāariāṇaṃ païno haremi, ja homi sa homi. 
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the other hand, Mehrotra calls it “essentially a woman’s book, a compendium of her gestures, 
utterances and silences…[with] only one side of the story,” when we have already seen that it 
also notes male voices (xi).  
These objections are valid as far as they go, but they do not necessarily go where they 
ought. Or rather, they mislead us if we only follow where they lead. For the project of counter-
nostalgia that Mehrotra is here pursuing is not one of fidelity to those goals. He is offering a past 
literature worth being nostalgic for, meaning (apparently) one that is consciously modernist 
where previous (i.e., Sanskrit) pasts had been (and remain) stifling. His choices for translation 
are striking in their rebuke to both classical and classicist decorum: “Ass-sniffer one day / And a 
slink the next / Who taught the cur-dog / His ways, brother-in-law?” (Poem 688) or “Lovers’ 
separation / makes what once / was pleasure / seem like vomit” (Poem 670). And as a phrase like 
“ass-sniffer” might invite the question of precise levels of propriety and sensibility in two 
cultures, Mehrotra breezes past those questions as irrelevant. This is what his generation gets out 
of the language of the bhakti poets and of the Prakrit poets.  
It is important to note that the translation initially came out from a local Indian publisher 
(the illustrious Ravi Dayal in 1991) and only seventeen years later came out internationally 
through Penguin in 2008. It was, therefore, not intended as anything like a scholarly edition 
(Mehrotra used various cribs and crutches to make sense of an original which he had no access to 
when he first started), nor as an introduction the Gāthās for foreigners. It was for his friends, 
fellow poets, and others in the larger “scene” that would appreciate a sense of this growing 
counter-nostalgic past that they were collectively building and out of which they were re-
fashioning their own language and poetry.  
In particular, the insistence on the present tense throughout the translations feels forceful 
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and important. That is in part a feature of this genre of poetry, but Mehrotra’s translations 
highlight it with the compression that cuts verbs like “say” and replaces them with colons, or 
opens space between letters in f-l-o-r-e-s-c-e-n-t as if to capture the intimacy of hearing a secret 
between children (spelling out the word for privacy or out of fear that speaking it makes it so), or 
(to take the typography in different direction) as if it to shatter the moment in a kind of stretching 
stillness, where the word stretches out in meaning to occupy the whole world.  The present tense, 
the “now,” as Nerlekar has shown, is a persistent obsession of the sathottari generation, focused 
as it is on ephemera, particularly trash (41). 
For Nerlekar, the focus on ephemera, the now, and, in the case of Kolatkar, the 
butterfly—which she considers his master trope (182)—is a sign of nostalgia rejected. In some 
ways, it obviously is that. But ephemerality is precisely the stuff of nostalgia. And nostalgia 
cares far more about trash than might be immediately apparent. We need only recall the nostalgic 
obsession with obsolete technology, all the throw-away stuff of childhood, etc. And, crucially, 
Kolatkar knows this and knows it as nostalgia, as we see in “The Rat-Poison Man’s Lunch 
Hour.” That poem features a rather odd encounter between a pest control advertisement and an 
old restaurant wall. It’s exactly the kind of strikingly vivified ephemera for which the poet is 
known—stuff ordinarily relegated to backgrounds and inattention. While the titular “Rat-Poison 
Man” goes about his lunch, we hear bits of the starkly different worldviews held by each of the 
two objects. The poster, usually carried by the Rat-Poison Man to proclaim his services, looks 
with disdain at everything around him. It is all so much filth to nurture the poster’s rodent 
enemies. The wall, by contrast, is full of memories of old patrons, past businesses, and 
neighborhood gossip. Overhearing these memories, the poster can only appreciate one: “an 
obscure poet munching on Welsh rabbit /and thinking of rats dying in a wet barrel.” 
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That’s the only bit the poster understands,  
dismissing everything else 
 
as so much bullshit mousse and sentimental custard. 
It even suspects that the wall, 
 
spongy with nostalgia,  
may actually have a soft spot for rats. (164-165) 
Here we see again the counter-nostalgic strain against propriety (cf. Ramanujan’s “pissing” 
sadhu, Mehrotra’s Prakrit “ass-sniffer,” and Shahid’s “fuck[ing] the sexless angels”), but it 
comes also with, literally, a “soft spot” for nostalgia. It turns out that counter-nostalgic 
offensiveness may entail, in part, a nostalgic look back on the forms of dirtiness we have lost to 




CHAPTER 3: FORM, AFFECT, ETHICS 
INTRODUCTION 
Nostalgia drives the poetry of Agha Shahid Ali from the start. Titling one of his books A 
Nostalgist’s Map of America, he practically demands to be read through the various lenses of his 
defining mood. The migrant nostalgia of “A Butcher,” the postcolonial nostalgia of “Dacca 
Gauzes,” and the exoticizing nostalgia of “Crucifixion” offer only the meagre beginnings of a 
rich and varied list of nostalgia’s intrusions. Any study of nostalgic art emerging from India in 
the years since its Independence has to reckon with this body of work. But the very ubiquity of 
his nostalgia threatens to shrink Shahid to a single word, or worse, a single definition of that 
word. It is tempting to acknowledge his nostalgia and let that be that. But Shahid’s nostalgia is 
restless and does not lend itself to summing up in trite definitions.  
This chapter seizes on that fact to introduce nostalgia as a critical problem. Tracing a 
broad narrative arc across Shahid’s career, I explore its two major trajectories: toward formalism 
and ethical/political concern. I argue that these developments are not coincidental and that when 
read through the lens of nostalgia, they illustrate much about the formal possibilities of literary 
nostalgia as well as the specific affective relationship it assumes between reader and text—a 
relationship of which epistemically-concerned cultural-studies approaches fail to give a robust 
account.  
I begin this chapter with a relatively early work, “Postcard from Kashmir” (1987), which 
provides an initial test-case against which to read prevailing accounts of literary nostalgia in 
general and Shahid’s in particular. Having established that each account fails to address 
significant facets of the poem, I develop my own reading that highlights the poem’s affective 
dimensions. In doing so, I draw on two theoretical resources: first, Steven Galt Crowell’s 
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phenomenology of nostalgia; and second, the “aesthetics of the affects” developed by Charles 
Altieri to highlight Shahid’s distinct engagement with non-narrative feeling over and against the 
more traditionally narrative emotion. Leaving emotion behind forces us to abandon belief-centric 
accounts of nostalgia and lays the groundwork for a different kind of attention to nostalgic self-
production.  
The following section (3.2) takes up “A Butcher,” another poem from the same volume, 
to specifically locate nostalgia as an experience that happens in particular places and times, not 
just as some vague condition that floats around constantly in the background of our lives. 
Fleshing out the phenomenological terminology and philosophy that the first section introduces, 
this section focuses on the ambiguity of nostalgic objects and how best to characterize them.  
Because “Postcard from Kashmir” and “A Butcher” are such brief, personal poems, they 
open a broad set of questions about sustaining nostalgic feeling across longer works and thereby 
engaging with more sophisticated and complex experiences of world than are entailed in a sparse 
lyric, particularly as Shahid turns away from specific-object nostalgias to more generalized 
sentiments. Turning to “A Nostalgist’s Map of America” (1991), Section 3.3 addresses those 
questions by exploring the generic features that enable Shahid’s nostalgic poetry and the formal 
experiments to which they give rise. “A Nostalgist’s Map of America” also introduces what I 
argue is the ethical thrust of Shahid’s poetry, namely the iterative, experimental search for a 
poetic form that enables a satisfying affective self-other relationship which the poet can affirm 
existentially as ethical. Shahid calls this relationship “fidelity.” 
Having introduced fidelity, “A Nostalgist’s Map of America” leaves many unanswered 
questions about its precise nature. Rather than immediately take on those questions at their most 
general and abstract, I turn first to the narrower question of how he uses the term with respect to 
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his translation work. Translation appears in his oeuvre as both act and figure, often in complex 
mutual implication. I look in Section 3.4 at one such instance, “Summers of Translation” (2000), 
a poem about the experience of translating Faiz Ahmed Faiz’s “Memory” from the Urdu. I argue 
that Shahid’s notion of fidelity differs from most traditional, “instrumental” accounts of 
translation (a term I borrow from Lawrence Venuti). His is a nostalgic-affective fidelity that is 
less concerned with semantic correspondence than responsibility, conceived as the capacity to 
respond both to the poem and to the position it holds in one’s world. I argue that Shahid’s 
concept of fidelity thus provides a useful intervention in a translation theory dominated by 
epistemic concerns.  
Able then to return to fidelity as a broad pursuit in Shahid’s poetry, Section 3.5 positions 
that project amid two opposing accounts of how a text can function ethically. The first sees texts 
as a form of exercise that inculcates and gives shape to certain modes of being. This line of 
thought borrows from Pierre Hadot’s notion of “spiritual exercises.” The second account of 
literary ethics extends from Charles Altieri’s Kantian take on texts as proposing new affective, 
ethical, or cognitive paradigms, rather than fitting into any pre-existing molds. My argument 
suggests that Shahid engages in a mixture of the two, but does so in a way that alters each 
slightly. 
This chapter’s sixth section examines Shahid’s non-poetic writing on form and formalism 
as well as examples of his use of it to better understand what it means for him to say that his 
“increasingly radical” ethics and politics entail a commitment to “form for form’s sake.” 
Specifically, I look at what Shahid calls the “demand” of an opening phrase the only appropriate 
response to which is to produce the work itself. My contention is that this demand is a form of 
nostalgic attention that seeks a return of the phrase’s form through further writing.  
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The Section 3.7 turns from the previous section’s broad discussion of form as such to a 
more detailed look at one particular form that is very important for Shahid, the ghazal. In this 
case study, I argue among other things that the aesthetics of return embodied in Shahid’s ghazals 
marks a culmination of one aspect of Shahid’s nostalgia (a formal or generic mode of feeling) 
while containing and subverting the other (a pained passion). I use this distinction to highlight a 
difference that many nostalgia theorists fail to notice between repetitive emotional experience 
(such as nostalgically returning to a favorite song) and a specific, emotional form of longing (that 
a particular song might try to express). At the same time, it establishes a firmer connection 
between the exercise/exemplification ethical distinction of Section 3.4 and the formal concerns 
of Section 3.6.  
3.1 AFFECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 
“Postcard from Kashmir” provides a neat introduction to Shahid’s nostalgia, not only because it 
is among his earliest and most oft-quoted poems but more importantly because it offers a 
relatively straightforward expression of nostalgia as an emotion. That is to say, the affect driving 
the poem leads to the formation of a definite “attitude” toward its object, an attitude which in 
turn “establish[es] a particular cause and so situate[s] the agent [here, the speaker] within a 
narrative and generate[s] some kind of action or identification” (Altieri Particulars 2).49 In short, 
it offers something of a best case for traditional nostalgia theories hoping to make sense of 
                                                 
49 My vocabulary here is indebted to Charles Altieri and his synthetic elucidation of many 
strands of contemporary thought on emotions. The lexicon of affects that he develops in The 
Particulars of Rapture undergirds much of the discussion to follow, even when my conclusions 
diverge from his. Worth noting is that he—and following him, I—use the term affect freely as an 
“umbrella term” to cover “the entire range of states that are bounded on one side by pure 
sensation and on the other by thoughts that have no visible or tangible impact on our bodies” (2). 
Thus, for example, emotions are examples or categories of affects, not something separately 
opposed to them. 
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Shahid’s work. By showing how those theories fall short even here (and how the emotion-
concept itself is ultimately insufficient to capture what is of greatest interest about the poem’s 
nostalgia), I intend to motivate the fundamental rethinking of nostalgia that is necessary to 
grapple with the rest of Shahid’s oeuvre, which often deviates much more significantly from the 
pat definition of “emotion” quoted above. Most crucially, I will argue, the tendency to frame 
nostalgia in terms of action, and hence narrative, is deeply misleading for attempts to read poetry 
such as Shahid’s. 
For the reader’s convenience, I begin my discussion by quoting the poem in full. 
Kashmir shrinks into my mailbox, 
my home a neat four by six inches. 
I always loved neatness. Now I hold 
the half-inch Himalayas in my hand. 
This is home. And this is the closest 
I’ll ever be to home. When I return, 
the colors won’t be so brilliant, 
the Jhelum’s waters so clean, 
so ultramarine. My love 
so overexposed.  
And my memory will be a little 
out of focus, in it 
a giant negative, black 
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and white, still undeveloped. (29)50 
Developing my reading of the poem will require me first to explore a handful of tempting, but 
telling misreadings, as they have been put forward by some of Shahid’s best readers. This route 
will allow us best to see the constraints of received thought about nostalgia.  
Bruce King—among the foremost of scholars of Indian poetry in English, having written 
perhaps the most comprehensive and sensitive history of the tradition in his Modern Indian 
Poetry in English— provides a convenient starting place. His work offers two ways of framing 
“Postcard” (as I shall hereafter abbreviate the poem’s title). The first puts the poem in a bigger 
picture, a move we should be grateful for on two counts: it expands our sense of context but 
reminds us of the dangers of fixing the meaning of that context. Specifically, King locates 
Shahid’s early verse within a tradition of “Indian Islamic writing since the mid-nineteenth 
century, when the British destroyed the social fabric of Delhi after the Mutiny” (Modern 262). 
Like others in the tradition, he says, Shahid “looks backward to a supposedly unified culture and 
nation he has lost and which he tries to recapture in his imagination, friendships and verse” 
(262). Herein lies both the insight and its pitfall. Nostalgia has indeed informed a tradition of 
Indian Islamic writing—in fact, one that extends further into the past than King’s claim allows.51 
But King goes too far when he specifies that it is for “a supposedly unified culture and nation.” 
Particularly when we include pre-“Mutiny” poets in this lineage, the appeal to “nation” and 
                                                 
50 All citations of Shahid’s poems are from his collected poems, The Veiled Suite, unless 
otherwise marked.  
51 The poet Mir Taqi Mir (1723-1810), for example, would surely need to be included in this 
lineage. As Russel and Islam have presented him, Mir is acutely aware of the declining Mughal 
court culture well before the mutiny: “This age is not like that which went before it / The times 
have changed,” they translate one couplet (246). As with Shahid and others, Delhi is at the heart 
of this nostalgia: “There was a city, famed throughout the world, / where dwelt the chosen spirits 
of the age: / Delhi its name, fairest among the fair. / Fate looted it and laid it desolate, / And to 
that ravaged city I belong” (quoted on 260). 
119 
 
national “culture” become obviously anachronistic. More importantly, however, even if these 
writers were to invoke such a unity in their poetry, we need not attribute the trope to personal 
belief any more than we assume that Ghalib (surely a premier figure in inaugurating this 
tradition) must have held, because he participates in a tradition that freely invokes it, that there 
exists literally a bird called Huma which feeds exclusively on bones.52 
As Aaron Santesso, a scholar of 18th century England, might remind us: nostalgia poetry 
has never been as autobiographical as popular imagination would have us believe. Santesso 
devotes a fair amount of attention, for example, to the popular use of Eton College as a nostalgic 
motif in the period, a period which he argues saw the birth of a new genre: the “nostalgia poem” 
proper. Thomas Gray’s “Ode on a Distant Prospect of Eton College” is typical. However, 
Santesso points out that despite centuries of critics assuming that Gray must himself have missed 
his days at Eton, “it is plainly not true that for Gray at Eton, ‘everything was harmonious and 
delightful,’ as one critic states” (65). Gray’s personal letters, for example, evince deep skepticism 
about the place. His poetic work uses Eton for reasons entirely separate from confessional 
autobiography. Granted, Shahid invites a certain amount of autobiographical connection with his 
poetry. We need not assume, however, that the line between conviction and trope is clear, nor 
particularly important or useful. Assuming so leads all to easily, as it does for King in a moment 
of particular ungraciousness, to facile comparisons between Shahid’s longing and its object: “as a 
gay, pork-eating, beer drinker,” chides King, “it is unlikely he could ever have been at ease in the 
culture for which he was nostalgic” (Rewriting 211).  
                                                 
52 See Pritchett 112-114 for a discussion of this bird in several ghazals, including one by Ghalib. 
Pritchet’s book in general affords a nice introduction to the sharp change in Urdu literary 
sensibility after British backlash against Mutiny, as well as a robust defense of the 
“unnaturalness”  of the poetry that preceded it. This is very much the tradition of poetry in which 
Shahid will place himself as his career develops. 
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Gratefully, King is not always so ornery. He may have become increasingly skeptical of 
Shahid’s work as it grew more ghazal-indebted, political, and pro-Kashmir, but at least initially 
King heard in “Postcard” a fairly universal experience shared with consummate craft and 
ingenuity. The universalism of the reading, while apt enough, is worth highlighting for what it 
forecloses on interpretively, which it turns out is precisely what interests me in this chapter. King 
invites readers to recognize in the poem one of those those moments when you find that “you 
cannot go home again as you and it have both changed” (263). Most readers can undoubtedly 
oblige him; such moments are familiar. Indeed, if our goal is to gain critical insight into nostalgia 
itself, they may be too familiar. Our quick recognition threatens to answer our questions before 
we have even gotten around to asking the most interesting ones—why, for example, we come at 
particular moments to regard as home a place where we no longer live, as a place in fact that no 
longer exists; why, in other words, the past comes to be thought of as holding a home that the 
present could never offer.  The appeal of the universal reading lies in its ability to avoid 
confronting and differentiating the profusion of answers to that question. Because the experience 
is universal, it needs no explanation. 
Many critics have admittedly brought a more situated and political set of concerns to the 
text, but King’s universalizing reveals a more common tendency within nostalgia criticism than 
may at first be obvious. He, like many others, assumes that the cause of the poem’s nostalgia is 
straightforwardly available to reader and poet alike. Critics commonly imagine that nostalgia is a 
kind of symptomatic response to some particular condition: the postcolonial, the diasporic, the 
modern, or even just the human, as for King. Whether one sees Shahid “under the impossible 
nostalgia specific to postcolonial migrancy” (Tageldin 234) or “portray[ing] a Muslim’s exile as 
a kind of Sisyphean enterprise” (Mattawa 1594), the assumption remains clear: it is “as” 
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representative of some identity, the sufferer of some condition, that Shahid speaks. That “as” is 
all over criticism of Shahid’s work. In an article linking him and Salman Rushdie, Jennie Chiu 
exemplifies the stylistic tic, beginning clause after clause with a qualifying “as”: “[a]s immigrant 
postcolonial writers” (25), “[a]s expatriate writers,” “as emigrant intellectuals” (36). To read 
Shahid in this way, and in particular so to read his nostalgia, is to restore identity- and belief-
centric assumptions precisely at the moment when—I will argue later in the chapter—his turn 
from emotion to feeling seeks to complicate them. For now, I stress only that, however obvious 
the proximate cause of the speaker’s nostalgia may be in the figure of the postcard, there is no 
corresponding obviousness about ultimate causes. It is my larger contention that such haziness 
arises not from artifice—e.g., the strategic suppression of context by a poet striving for wider 
resonance—but from nostalgia’s own porousness and uncertainty.  
Taking this insight to heart will require that we bear in mind that nostalgia is not itself a 
condition stably sitting in the background of one’s life, leaving one simply to fall into and out of 
awareness of it at random. Nostalgia is produced and elicited at particular moments, and in those 
moments the world looks differently than otherwise. Look again at “Postcard.” We likely 
remember enough of its sophistication to expect two layers of home: the fantasy and the 
(anticipated) disappointment of reality. There are, however, three—and an explosively 
ambiguous three at that. First, there is the home that Shahid hides by pointing at—a private 
“this”—which could be variously the place with the mailbox (which we might call, not 
inconsequentially, either “America” or “abroad”), the place-concept evoked by the postcard, the 
postcard, or even the poem itself. Second, there is the home to which that first home is merely 
“closest.” Finally, there is the home to which he not only can but will return. The postcard 
occasions the discovery of some unbridgeable distance between all three. Why? And what if we 
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do not imagine this as the discovery of some neutral matter of fact (e.g., as a structural claim 
about existence in general); what if we focus instead on how nostalgia opens up this space, 
disrupts on-goingness of life for Shahid in this particular way at this particular time? This section 
will flirt with these questions—raising, for example, the strangeness of receiving a postcard from 
home, a strangeness Shahid heightened in revision—but the core philosophical questions I leave 
for the following section and a poem, “A Butcher,” where context means so much more.53 For 
now, I return to the insights left by prior readers of “Postcard.” 
My claim is not that nostalgia is independent from such things as postcoloniality, 
modernity, or migrancy, simply that it is not a knee-jerk response to them, nor is it exhausted by 
their framing. Nostalgia may not have such built-in frames, but scholars have wanted with good 
reason to discuss the ways specific instances plug into those frames. At the most ambitious end 
of the spectrum, some scholars posit a larger homology between these conditions when refracted 
through nostalgia. If that is the case, it may seem like quibbling to problematize frames; what 
matters is that nostalgia, like other emotions, “situate[s] the agent within a narrative and 
generate[s] some kind of action” (Altieri Particulars 2). What might that narrative be? How does 
it map onto the world and what action therefore flows from it?  
Take Jahan Ramazani, for example. He approaches “Postcard” from the perspective of 
“postcolonial poetry,” the subject of his path-breaking book, The Hybrid Muse. According to his 
account there, “The postcolonial poem, like a postcard, risks miniaturizing, idealizing, and 
ultimately displacing the remembered native landscape” (12). We can push this claim in either of 
two directions, depending on how emphatically we pronounce its final modifier, “remembered.” 
As Ramazani’s comment observes, Shahid’s is a canny poem. The question is whether its 
                                                 
53 See below for a discussion of the draft history of the poem. 
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canniness lies in merely ironic disillusionment or whether it opens a space for nostalgia outside 
the dangerous dynamic of postcards and their displaced landscapes. If the former, i.e., if we 
believe that nostalgia fatally distorts memory and its authentic purchase on the world and that 
Shahid simply acknowledges this, we are in good—if unsympathetic—company within nostalgia 
criticism. Susan Stewart’s On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, 
the Collection exemplifies this strand of thought, which focuses on the oft-noted nostalgia 
industry and its tendency to commodify memory in “neat” packages like postcards. For Stewart, 
infamously, nostalgia is a “social disease” (23). To read Shahid alongside Stewart’s work is 
therefore to see him indicting the fetishizing power of the postcard. There may be some truth in 
that—“Postcard”’s speaker does invoke the rather pessimistic-sounding metaphor, “out of 
focus,” for the future of his memory—but the immense body of Shahid’s consistently nostalgic 
poetry suggests that its concern is less with the postcard than with the nostalgic reflection it 
prompts.54   
Part of what makes Stewart’s approach unsatisfying is that it presumes a privileged 
access to truth (or, what amounts to the same thing, a special freedom from ideology). 
“Nostalgia, like any form of narrative,” Stewart claims, “is always ideological: the past it seeks 
has never existed except as narrative, and hence, always absent, that past continually threatens to 
reproduce itself as a felt absence” (23). The postcard becomes an emblem of that absence. Other 
critics are less categorical—perhaps the past was real, but nostalgia has “exaggerated” and 
                                                 
54 A more productive way to utilize Stewart’s and other Marxian analyses would be to approach 
Shahid’s reception within the communities that circulate his poems as nostalgic tokens, much 
like postcards. On the other side of the poem-token divide, Ananya Kabir has also done useful 
work drawing out Shahid’s relationship to Kashmiri craftwork and the commodified circuits it 
travels (see especially pages 109-113). Both approaches, though useful in their own way, miss 
what interests me here: the nuances of Shahid’s negotiation of nostalgia. 
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“idealiz[ed]” it (Gross 425). Truth, however, is not so simple a matter, as several decades of 
poststructuralist thought have taught us. Memory studies in particular has founded a rich 
discipline on the insight that all memory is constructed:  
Despite the unavoidable heterogeneity of the terminology, there are two generally 
agreed-upon central characteristics of (conscious) remembering: its relationship to 
the present and its constructed nature. Memories are not objective images of past 
perceptions, even less of a past reality. They are subjective, highly selective 
reconstructions, dependent on the situation in which they are recalled. (Erll 
Memory 8)  
We must therefore be wary of fixating on the falsity, or even the exaggeration, of nostalgia. 
While it is true that nostalgia constructs the past (though not, I shall argue, necessarily or even 
for the most part narratively), constructedness per se is not where its limitations lie. Moreover, 
exaggeration can be thought in less epistemic terms as salience production or as intensity. That 
said, nostalgia’s constructions do not sever it from concerns with the past. We cannot throw out 
the past entirely and look only at memory’s interaction with and symptomatic relationship to the 
present. At the very least, in doing so we must be sensitive the ways in which nostalgia 
remembers the past as past. The tenuous relationship between the three “homes” of the postcard, 
the poet’s relating to it, and his eventual return are all part of his nostalgia. It cannot be reduced 
to one or two of the three. Shahid in this poem finds himself involved in a postcard in a capacity 
that is far larger and more complex than fantasy plain and simple. It is that complex involvement 
to which critics and readers are called to respond. 
A more popular way of taking the canniness of Shahid’s poem, however, sees it as 
acknowledging the structural unachievability of nostalgic desire. Here we might emphasize that 
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not only is “Postcard” about nostalgia, it is itself nostalgic. The meditation recorded by the poem 
is what produces the distance between the poem’s three homes. That distance does not neutrally 
preexist the poem, waiting for the nostalgic attempt to erase it by looking at a postcard. As Aaron 
Santesso further observes, nostalgia is one of those emotions that only grow stronger the more 
aware one is of feeling them (21). (Hence its tendency when registered as an epistemic problem 
to look like skepticism—another famously self-strengthening position—as we saw in Chapter 1).  
One version of the “impossible nostalgia” line of thought would see it not as false, but as 
perverse. It is not because the past never existed that the nostalgic finds herself in the bind of 
impossible desire, but because it exists no longer. Insofar as it “orient[s] our attention toward that 
which we can no longer have” (Bennett 64), nostalgia is thus sometimes held to produce a 
structural impossibility that is unrelated to the truth-status of the remembered past. Nostalgia 
would then be less a delusion than “a kind of necrophilia” (Bennett 79). There may be an 
element of truth to the claim that nostalgia sometimes threatens to turn into fixation, “libidinally 
bind[ing] us to the story” of our beloved object’s loss (Bennet 64), preventing us thereby from 
finding other perhaps more productive ways of engaging the world. Whether nostalgia seizes 
Shahid’s imagination in such a pathological way, however, is a narrowly biographical question of 
little specific interest to this study. It seems unlikely. One can point to non-nostalgic poems or to 
anecdotes from his life, but the larger picture is better served by asking not whether we are 
bound to the story of loss (our affective involvement requires it, albeit it does not require that we 
believe it), but rather what that binding enables. 
A slightly more situated and political version of the above position belongs to Ramazani. 
While “Postcard” is far from overtly political, Ramazani’s framing suggests an urgent need for 
figures like Shahid to acknowledge the dangers of their desire. Shahid “suggests that memory 
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and artifice transform the very past he pursues” and so recognizes that the nostalgic poem is a 
self-defeating endeavor (Hybrid 12). The poem’s seductions—the fact that it is not only about 
nostalgia, but is nostalgic—then become mere symptom, attesting to the trauma of postcolonial 
rupture; the poem in no way endorses its nostalgia. This distancing is crucial, for there is a 
standing temptation for the postcolonial subject to deny that the precolonial “past has been 
transformed irrevocably by colonialism and modernity” (Hybrid 10). Most obviously this means 
that, as things stand, we can no longer simply return to the way things were. It also means, 
though, that our understanding of “the way things were” is inescapably shaped by our present 
situation. The threat of a false sense of home (read: investment in the nation’s supposedly pure 
and glorious past) is a standing danger for postcolonial thought, and we can applaud Shahid’s 
general avoidance of it. In this regard, one particularly apt anecdote has Shahid responding to the 
suggestion by Amitav Ghosh that he is “the closest Kashmir ha[s] to a national poet” by 
exclaiming, “A national poet may be. But not a nationalist one—please, not that” (Ghosh 209). 
Nonetheless, the achievement of avoiding nationalist dogmatism is relatively minor, and I find 
myself still wondering, what else might investing himself in impossible returns enable for 
Shahid? 
Still, before turning squarely to face my own reading of the text, there remain two other 
theories of impossible nostalgia to work through, both accounting for nostalgia’s self-reflexivity 
by separating nostalgia’s cognitive-epistemic from its affective dimensions. The first is more 
personal, the second more social. To grasp the former, let us consider the text in light of a simple 
distinction between first-order dramatic content and the second-order form it takes as a poem. 
We can assume that there are identifications taking place at both levels: the speaker-character 
who holds the postcard and the poet who presents him to us, perhaps ironically. The postcard 
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holder might affirm the desired object (an ideal home), while the poet ironizes the desire and 
empties it of its force to impel action. This distinction is something along the lines of a 
feeling/thought opposition, where the poet affirms the emotional pull of nostalgia without 
committing himself to any of the beliefs that it ought to entail. Put more unsympathetically, we 
have a conflict between feeling and identification, where the desire persists without the speaker 
believing himself to be the kind of person who naively desires such things. Although I have 
phrased it rather unfavorably, the basic distinction recalls a variety of critical formulations that 
attempt to salvage nostalgia, such as what Svetlana Boym calls “reflective nostalgia” (41) or 
Shaden Tageldin calls “being longing” (261). In all these cases, however, there remains much 
theoretical work to be done to clarify what exactly these affective stances open up. Why would 
reflection unconnected to attitude-formation and consequent action be useful? I find the initial 
opposition between ironic poet and committed speaker and the attendant opposition of thought to 
feeling quite unhelpful in answering such questions. What we need is not to strip feeling of its 
beliefs (which assumes that it had them to begin with), but rather to explore how feeling 
organizes the world, produces salience, and gives value to its own endeavors. 
There is, however, one notable way in which scholars have put the feeling/thought 
opposition to specific use. That is on the more social end of the scale mentioned above. On this 
view, the poem does two things simultaneously. It immunizes against overhasty epistemic or 
practical commitments by acknowledging that nostalgia cannot really get what it wants. (So 
much we have already seen.) But it also enables new affective communities, drawn around a now 
defanged nostalgia.55 At least two academic readers of Shahid’s work have held this view, one 
                                                 
55 Cf. John Su’s analysis of the ethics of nostalgia in novels, containing “fantasies of lost or 




emphasizing how nostalgia can open authors to new “horizons of solidarity” (Chakraborty 55) 
and another focusing more on readers to observe that nostalgia can “evoke empathy” (Chiu 25). 
It is hard to disagree with either observation, but they have relatively little to say about the 
specificity of nostalgia—except to observe, crucially, that a nostalgic community shorn of 
confidence in its desired home is a non-dogmatic community, because it is aware that there is 
nothing natural or inevitable about what brings it together. Still, we have arrived at a point where 
we no longer have anything to say about nostalgia’s content; no longer does nostalgia have 
anything to say about the standing of the world or the way it should be. This is too great a loss to 
countenance, particularly in the case of Shahid’s work. 
Let us turn for a moment to the draft history of “Postcard.” We have been reading the 
poem as presented in its final form, in 1987’s The Half-Inch Himalayas. As it turns out, the 
various versions that preceded ours reveal much about how the poem came to be as reflective as 
scholars have praised it for being. The earliest typed draft, dated October 12, 1979, puts much of 
the text on the back of the postcard itself, as a voice from Kashmir to the poet.56 “Kashmir 
shrinks into your mailbox,” it reads now (emphasis added). “You always loved neatness, so take 
/ it out and hold your home.” The voice here is one of affectionate sympathy, offering a token of 
home and then gently admonishing him for taking it with too straight a face, as if Shahid’s last 
letter had expressed such romanticized longing for home that the only sensible response was to 
lessen his pain with a playfully self-deflating souvenir—its written message reminding him that 
                                                                                                                                                             
diverse groups who have in common only a longing for a past that never was” (3). His novelistic 
focus, however, takes him into territory quite different from that before us. 
56 The various early drafts of the poem are available on The Beloved Witness Project website, a 
partial online archive of Shahid’s life and work. Two distinct final versions exist of “Postcard”—
the published one under discussion in this section and one submitted as part of Shahid’s MFA 
thesis, which is also available in its entirety on the aforementioned website. 
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home is also a place of drab colors and routine boredom: “Things here are as usual.” The next 
draft, dated the same day, adds the words that will become the crux of the final version’s 
nostalgia: “This / is home. Be sure from that distance, / this is home.” Here, however, they are 
not nostalgic but hortatory. The migrant is in danger of losing his roots, may already have lost 
them: “this is the closest / you’ll ever be to home” now.  
Hand-written edits to the third typed draft, dated the following day, begin the gradual 
shift from the dialogic to the monologic. Slowly in subsequent drafts lines that were in the voice 
of the postcard sender are given to the receiver until no voices remain but that of the receiver 
himself. As this happens, the tone of the poem shifts ever toward that reflective ideal of nostalgia 
prized by many readers of Svetlana Boym. First the voice of the sender is bracketed off as part of 
the Kashmir that has been shrunken to fit the poet’s mailbox, made as much a lyrical token of the 
poet’s feelings as real words from afar worth responding to. The reference to “things” being “as 
usual” is moved to the end, a tagged on stanza destined partly for the trash heap and partly for 
inclusion in much later poem. Insofar as the poem is typically or even ideally reflective—insofar 
as it acknowledges the traps set by nostalgia—it gets there in the drafting process by editing out 
its engagement with the world. The finality of loss lies in part in no longer acknowledging that 
there are real voices emerging from it—a point that will reemerge in his published writing a 
decade later when he takes on the Kashmir crisis and reintegrates the scrapped lines from this 
poem into the new context of “Dear Shahid.” 
The final version is beautifully, poignantly solipsistic and cut off from the world of 
Kashmir. Note how it must feel to receive a postcard from home. The initial drafts motivate the 
strangeness of the gesture, but now we are left to wonder. Who sent it? Surely not his family—if 
so, why not send something more personal, a substantial letter or, if a photo, one taken 
130 
 
personally or of something more personal than the landscape writ large. It is as if he can no 
longer receive intimate exchanges with the land, only touristy tokens. Of course, the usual person 
from whom to receive a postcard, a tourist, would be even harder to bear, as if Shahid has 
become estranged enough from the place that a mere tourist feels that he has a closer relationship 
with the landscape than Shahid to warrant sharing it. 
This larger context of sending and receiving postcards informs what I take to be the force 
of the poem’s suggestion that some of the postcard’s disappointment lies in its showing the poet 
his “love / so overexposed.” The obvious meaning of these words is that his beloved (Kashmir) 
is blown out in the image, details lost amid the all-too-vivid brilliance; but also that his 
beloved—or perhaps his love for it—is too exposed, too tawdrily on display. That can be taken 
in a proprietary sense, but need not be so. Also available is the suggestion that home is 
something known properly only in intimacy, to see it on display is for it to cease being home.57 
That is to say that nostalgia misses familiarity and wants so much more than an image of 
familiarity or a view onto the familiar (voyeuristically, as if from outside a window looking in). 
Given in negation as it is, however, we can note the connection with the generic possibilities of 
poetry, indeed of literature in general. The poem cannot share a unique memory, but it can deny 
its commonness and hence get us to sympathize with the felt inadequacy of substitutes like 
postcards. This fact suggests that the ostensibly liberatory “being longing” that readers like 
Tageldin uphold may be more an artifact of genre and medium than of political commitment or 
ethical enlightenment.  
                                                 
57 Compare the overexposure here, for example, to other images of harsh brilliance elsewhere 
The Half-Inch Himalayas (e.g., “Vacating an Apartment” and “The Other Occupant”), associated 
with the sanitizing destruction of memory and with ethnic cleansing: “the cleaners wipe my 
smile / with Comet fingers” and “whitewash my voicestains / make everything new / clean as 
Death” (38).  
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By emphasizing the surrounding context implicit in the scene of meditation as well as the 
affective shifts of the poem, I hope to draw attention to what so much discussion of “Postcard” 
misses—that Shahid’s involvement with the postcard is crucially affective. That is to say, it is 
not the monologue of a self-contained subject that seizes the postcard as an objective opportunity 
to express an attitude entirely immanent to the speaker’s agency. I intimated as much at the start 
of this section when I noted that “emotion” was only imperfectly available to capture what the 
poem does. Now we are in a position to clarify and expand on that claim and its attendant stakes.  
Consider the uncertainties and instabilities in the display of the poem’s emotion. In his 
sensitive formal reading of the poem, Bruce King traces the ironic wit of “I always loved 
neatness” in the unravelling structure of the poem as it mirrors the unravelling of the “I” itself. 
As the poem begins, 
Decision, purpose, control and neatness are reinforced by the careful balance of 
syllables. The eight or nine syllables in each line of the first couplet and the way 
the first four lines are visually of equal length establishes a pattern which is varied 
as disturbed emotions are brought forth. (263)  
King appeals to the language of “emotional disturbance” to convey the postcard’s affective 
intrusion. Bringing to bear a more precise vocabulary, we can see this as the moment when the 
poem shifts interest from “emotion” to “feeling.” Emotions, to remind ourselves of Charles 
Altieri’s above-cited definition, “are affects involving the construction of attitudes that typically 
establish a particular cause and so situate the agent within a narrative and generate some kind of 
action or identification” (Particulars 2). Talk of emotions, however, is heavily colored by Anglo-
American analytic philosophy and its cognitive framing of emotion within a broader theory of 
agency. Feelings, by contrast, are much less developed and thus also less readily subsumed 
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within the agentive model. They are more primary. Feelings are “characterized by an imaginative 
engagement in the immediate processes of sensation” (Altieri 2). Caution must be taken here lest 
we assume “immediate process of sensation” refers to the immediate availability of sense data 
for reflection. That is not the claim. Immediacy refers here to the idea of involvement, process, 
and action. Feelings disturb emotions because they remain intimately bound to objects’ interface 
with the feeling subject before that subject can “make sense” of them. They thus resist 
articulation, trouble ready-made interpretations, and provide an ever-renewing site for the 
contestation of what agency and identity can mean. 
Because the poem is attentive to the process of feeling and responding to that feeling, it 
does not offer any claims. It does not even operate on the level of claims. If emotions confidently 
“establish a cause…and generate some kind of action,” they do open themselves to counter-
claims (that is not the cause). But as a negotiation of feeling, the poem is more interested in the 
space of ambiguous becoming and sensation opened up by nostalgia than in any consequent 
claims that are retroactively narrated back onto it. When Kashmiri journalist Basharat Peer writes 
in his memoir, “Kashmir! There she was: the bluest of skies over the browns, greens, and blues 
of the million-inch Himalayas” (99), it is precisely to reclaim the literalness of identity Shahid 
takes away in this poem, with its “half-inch Himalayas.” 
I have written much of this section from the perspective of the usual theorists of nostalgia 
and their attention to what home means and how people claim it. Responding to those who 
conceive of nostalgia as attitude-formation has obliged me to attend to what home can mean as 
an intentional object. Doing so, I honed in on the intentionally ambiguous reference of the term 
in “Postcard.” But the word “home” in the poem does not really bear the weight of that analysis. 
Of the three senses I noted, one does not even attach to the word “home” in the poem at all, but 
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rather to another: “return.” As we read the poem, nostalgia is introduced much more stealthily. 
First, there is the seeming satisfaction of an “always” affirmed in a “now.” But the affirmation is 
off-kilter. Rather than confirming the “always”—I’ve always wanted this, and now I have it!—
the “now” threatens instead to overturn it—I had always wanted it, but now… Of course, the 
poem does not choose either of my paraphrases. Neither “and” nor “but” conjoin “always” and 
“now.” The tense ambiguity keeps the nostalgia incipient and us unsure of its status. 
When nostalgia announces itself to the poem with full force, it is not in the distance 
between two “homes,” but in the abyss between the referents of “this.” “This is home,” and yet 
“this is the closest / I’ll ever be to home.” The superficial contradiction forces us to infer that 
something has changed. To my knowledge, all so-far published interpretations of the poem keep 
the two pronouns as close together as possible in terms of meaning. First Shahid refers to the 
postcard as container, then as object: the postcard shows home and holding it is as close as I will 
ever get to that place it shows. “Home” is forced to do the moving, from idea to fact. But “home” 
might instead remain an idea. The poem seems, in fact, to require it, with its reference to return.  
In my reading, by contrast, what shifts is the plane of reflection. Whereas previously Shahid had 
been talking of objects—this postcard is home—now he writes of relations—this relationship 
I’m having is the closest one possible. This reading allows the kind of metapoetic gesture often 
associated with lyric poetry. Instead of his physical stance with respect to the postcard-object, it 
is his affective-poetic engagement with it that comes into focus. Whether we take the prior 
interpretation, favored by critics, or as I am proposing is hardly inconsequential. For while the 
former interpretation leaves us mourning the referential emptiness of the home-concept, the latter 
redirects our attention to what the poem accomplishes and where it leaves its speaker.   
To see that, we must return to the poem’s last stanza, which brings the greatest intrusion 
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of feeling into what often at least seems a straightforwardly emotional poem. This intrusion 
comes tied to an aspect too often neglected by scholars citing the poem: it ends not with the 
postcard but with memory. The two are not the same. Curiously, memory is futural—it will be, 
and even then there will remain something undeveloped. That something, moreover, is only 
contained in memory; it is not the memory itself. The insistently (and persistingly) inchoate 
black-and-white negative is, I argue, the nostalgic core of Shahid’s poetry. By calling it a core, 
however, I do not want to suggest that it is stable or even substantive. It is a feeling or, more 
properly, a tendency in feeling to which Shahid’s nostalgia responds and for which he cultivates 
it. Nostalgia thus continues for “Postcard” at least to name something more agentive, personal, 
and therefore emotional. But it does so in the service of a tendency of feeling that cannot be 
subsumed into those categories, remaining rather outside and continuing to exert pressure on and 
to disturb them. Because it lies out of reach, it can structure and impel the poetry, but it cannot 
define or contain it.  
We can put this in other terms by looking to the phenomenology of nostalgia. According 
to Steven Galt Crowell, “nostalgic yearning is not a function of the difference between past and 
present worlds, but arises from a radical disruption in the time of the I, a noncoincidence that 
thwarts every attempt to figure one’s ‘own’ past as narratively continuous with the present” (96). 
Taking this point up, Jeff Malpas places nostalgia in productive conflict with Heidegger’s 
emphasis on the capacity of moods to dissolve (or absorb) the self into the world. By contrast, 
Malpas argues, “in the case of nostalgia, it is the relation between self and world that is brought 
to the fore as problematic—and together with that, the very relation of the self to itself. What is 
at issue in nostalgia is our own self-identity” (Malpas chapter 8).  But we must not understand 
Shahid’s (or, more broadly, nostalgia’s) concern with “relation of the self to itself” to be 
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primarily self-ish or self-centered in the usual senses of these words. Malpas’ understanding of 
nostalgia, like Crowell’s, emphasizes the rupture at the core of the self that breaks down ready-
made narratives. Malpas helpfully notes that this is the reason why nostalgia generally seems to 
inhabit fragments: images, smells, flashes of memory, rather than more elaborated forms of 
narrative. Whereas both Crowell and Malpas, however, turn immediately to ask how we find or 
make a “reconstituted narrative” (Malpas Chapter 8) after we realize our old one has broken 
down, Shahid does not bother returning to narrative at all. Instead, he inhabits the nostalgic mode 
for as long as he can, using it to open new ethical horizons. Shahid’s poetry thus plays with those 
fragments and flashes that Malpas has identified as quintessentially nostalgic in order to deepen 
(in complexity and intensity) and broaden (in narrative potential and implicative reach) their 
resonance. The poem is thus a kind of self-making that does not presuppose narrative continuity 
(or its philosophical corollary, “identity”). Its ending intentionally leaves open the narrative 
break that so many theorists imagine we immediately repair. 
 
Jahan Ramazani’s off-hand (but astute) reference to “Postcard from Kashmir” quoted 
above would suggest a different reading of the ending. Memory’s recession into darkness signals 
our prospective mourning of memory’s eventual eclipse by the postcard. What this interpretation 
fails to observe, however, is the open-ended potential of the poem’s close. The photo is “still”—
not forever—undeveloped. Nor is it damaged by exposure. Its gigantic size, moreover, suggests a 
power and plenitude not readily captured by the displacement interpretation. We may be tempted 
to follow a line of willful anachronism, to see “Postcard” as an anticipation of Shahid’s exile 
after the crisis in Kashmir begins in earnest, reading the poem’s looming blur as a figure for what 
John J. Su calls the “haunting irony of nostalgia” (87). Unlike Susan Stewart, Su sees nostalgia 
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as concerned not with what was, but rather what “could have been” (12). The undeveloped photo 
thus becomes a sign of what Kashmir’s fortune could have been, were it not shortly to devolve 
into such grave misfortune. While Shahid himself might have loved this resonance (it certainly 
fits with his later poetics, as we shall see), there is little sign in the poem to suggest that Shahid 
feels that Kashmir’s future is particularly bleak or that his prospects of return are poor. The 
nostalgia of the poem is much more banal, and much less “exilic” in the strong sense of the term. 
Instead, it is the frayed fissure of nostalgic selfhood alone that concerns the poem’s final blurred 
potential. 
Here it is useful to draw a contrast with perhaps the most famous case of literary 
nostalgia associated with postcolonial South Asia: Salman Rushdie’s story of how he came to 
write Midnight’s Children. That story begins with a photograph of the home in which he was 
born (albeit taken before that particular event had transpired), which sits with him while he 
works as a passive reminder that “the past is home,” until one day he actually returns to that 
home in the flesh. The effect the return has on him is immense. He comments: 
The photograph had naturally been taken in black and white; and my memory, 
feeding on such images as this, had begun to see my childhood in the same way, 
monochromatically. The colours of my history had seeped out of my mind’s eye; 
now my other two eyes were assaulted by colours, by the vividness of the red 
tiles, the yellow-edged green of cactus-leaves, the brilliance of bougainvillaea 
creeper. It is probably not too romantic to say that that was when my novel 
Midnight’s Children was really born; when I realized how much I wanted to 
restore the past to myself, not in the faded greys of old family-album snapshots, 
but whole, in CinemaScope and glorious Technicolor. (“Imaginary Homelands”) 
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Immediately we see the contrast to Shahid’s work. His approach is thus exactly opposite of 
Rushdie’s. Rushdie begins bored by a black-and-white image, gets excited by an encounter with 
the color of the real thing and then returns home to restore color to his image. Shahid, by 
contrast, sees the past in vivid color only to anticipate the reality being more drab. His solution is 
to look further into the dark, the black-and-white undeveloped potential within his memory 
(distinct from the memory-surrogate photo). This is an affective solution. Rushdie’s, by contrast, 
is epistemic. He becomes concerned with the process of “filtration” of the past, and becomes 
enamored of errors and quirks of remembrance. Shahid, as we will see especially in later 
sections, loses all but the most attenuated interest in the factuality of memory. 
Receding into the inchoate, “Postcard” ends by dissolving identity and leaving us open to 
the de-subjectified possibilities nostalgia offers. Memory is dissociated from identity, and the one 
looms as the other recedes away. To play with the visual imagery of the poem, we might observe 
that closing stanza enacts a sort of “dolly zoom,” i.e., the film technique whereby perspective 
distortion is continuously highlighted as the camera zooms while moving backwards or forwards. 
The effect can overwhelm and displace background details with the foreground, without actually 
changing the size and presence of the foregrounded object. Here, a photographic negative 
remains “in” the picture, but the “gigantic” size of its presence is finally felt. We pull away from 
the image, but our attention is ever more focused on that detail as we do so. In this way, an 
impressive mimetic effect replicates nostalgia’s increased focus on a receding object. But this 
effect does not put blinders on us or emphasize our distraction from truth. Instead, we are only 
now accessing the memory that remained obscured so long as we remained distracted by the 
surface features of the nostalgic token.   
Nonetheless, the poem remains in many ways quite personal. It does not articulate any 
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broad historical connections. It does not even address the existence of others. Identity is troubled, 
as in all nostalgia, and tossed aside in favor of a richer set of connections to the world. But where 
those connections lead and what kind of being-in-the-world they enable remain open questions. 
Shahid’s later poetry will address both the possibilities opened for a self that acknowledges the 
gaps in its identity, as well as how those possibilities can lead to a structure of feeling that does 
not presuppose a neat identity to be disrupted. The dualistic structure of the “this” of home and 
the “this” of relating to it in the “closest” way possible need not found nostalgia, Shahid will 
discover.  
The question, though, is, how does one move forward to explore the possibilities opened 
by nostalgia without falling into the trap of being a “nostalgic,” that is, the person staring 
wistfully at the postcard? How does one choose instead to be what Shahid will come to refer to 
as a “nostalgist?” The key lies in finding a way to sustain nostalgia, to pursue lines of its 
resonance without losing sight of the contrast. In the terminology this chapter will propose, it is a 
matter of making an exercise of nostalgia. But to exercise nostalgia, to create new identifications 
with it, is to do more than to wait for it to come. It is to produce emotion. And that requires a 
reliable method. For Shahid, generic nostalgia provides one point of entrance. Nostalgic tropes 
give access to the emotion, which he can then finesse to his heart’s content. Even then, however, 
he will find himself facing a second problem: how to find more than a momentary burst of 
passion that fades as soon as one re-enters the world. That problem, too, has its solutions, but for 
now he poses merely the first, generic question. 
3.2 PHENOMENOLOGIES OF NOSTALGIA 
Our reading of “Postcard from Kashmir” has raised some important issues. My hope is that they 
have sufficiently problematized received ways of reading nostalgia to warrant revisiting the topic 
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on the level of theoretical elaboration. This section, therefore, will turn first to phenomenological 
accounts of nostalgia, which are disappointingly under-utilized within literary studies. Then, with 
some new terminological and theoretical tool under our belts, we can turn to a second poem from  
the same volume as “Postcard,” The Half-Inch Himalayas, namely “A Butcher.” “A Butcher,” 
although obviously nostalgic (and brilliantly read as such by Shaden Tageldin), is likely to 
confuse those looking for the predictable markers generally used to orient critics in discussing 
nostalgia, such as references to the past, a desire to return, or any of nostalgia’s standard-issue 
imagery. 
We saw in the last section that nostalgia is not a generalized condition that people live. 
They fall in and out of it, inadvertently. A postcard prompts Shahid’s reverie, while for Steven 
Crowell, it is the way the light hits a certain bedpost (91-92). Unfortunately, few 
phenomenological (or, for that matter, any other theoretical) accounts take this moment of 
external prompting very seriously, but they do notice a sort of internal corollary. Nostalgic 
reverie tends to focus on “a moment or an image” from the past, a “little vignette” (Malpas 172, 
Crowell 85). These objects of focus—Crowell calls them “presentational contents”—are still, 
however, not the “proper object” requested by the question that guides phenomenological 
accounts: “To begin with, what are we nostalgic about—what is the proper object of nostalgia? 
Indeed is there a definite object?” (Casey 361). The answer to the latter formulation of the 
question, as we know from the last section, will be no, or at least not simply so. That is why we 
are turning to phenomenology in the first place. No, nostalgia “sees through” its presentational 
contents to something much broader, which is merely “localized” in the world through “traces” 
that invite nostalgic attention (Crowell 92, Casey 379). Each philosopher characterizes that 
broader something differently, wishing to stress some specific facet of it. For our part, let us call 
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it, in deference to nostalgia’s etymology and our habit so far, “home”—bearing in mind the 
rather technical spin we are giving the term. 
Home, in this sense, is crucially something that was never present to us, however much 
we may have lived in it. To make sense of this seeming paradox, we must recall a familiar 
phenomenological insight about worldhood and involvement. So long as we are involved in our 
day-to-day lives, most of the world—indeed, the world as such—does not become “present” to 
us, remains rather a kind of stable background. Consequently, we can say that 
we never once, at any exactly designatable time, experienced the world of our 
childhood as an isolable entity or event: not because it was before our time or out 
of time altogether but because it was never, and could not be, the proper content, 
the “object,” of any experience or total set of experiences. Such a world, the 
world-under-nostalgement, has a past of another type, another ontic order, from 
that of the recollected past—even if it is often cued in by remembrances of things 
past. (Casey 366) 
World-under-nostalgement may be a bit of a mouthful (whose clunkiness encourages my simply 
referring to it as home), but a number of important consequences follow from Casey’s locating 
nostalgia’s investment in a “world in the mode of absolute, irreversible pastness” (377). Each 
will help us re-describe an attribute of nostalgia that has become perhaps too familiar.   
Recall nostalgia’s notoriously tenuous hold on its truth claims. The editors of a recent 
special issue of Memory Studies—“Nostalgia and the Shapes of History”—note how readily the 
mood can be seen as “a betrayal of [not only history but] memory itself” (Atia and Davies 181). 
This (mis)perception stems—according to these phenomenological accounts—from a category 
mistake. Recollection targets things that were, or can be said to have been, present. The worlds 
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targeted by nostalgia therefore cannot be recalled in the form of a discrete memory. Nostalgia 
thus does not fail or betray memory; it simply does something different (which is not to say that 
it cannot distract from memory, but that is another matter). Casey welcomes this news, saying 
that nostalgia “liberates us from a preoccupation with the rigors of recollection” (366).58 
Whether and to what extent we agree will depend on our ability to find value in being liberated 
from epistemic rigor.  
Getting to that question requires going through another. I mentioned earlier nostalgia’s 
presentational contents, which are what would ostensibly ground what claims to truth it has. And 
they do indeed have a “nonfictive” aspect, which is a form of memory. These presentational 
contents, however, are not really situated in historical time, the time of interpersonal verifiability 
in the “world of work,” as Crowell notes (92). They are instead located in “aeonic” time. 
Nostalgia longs for “eras, seasons, or aeons,” not historical events (Hart 406). And nostalgia’s 
seasons are not just fuzzy points in time (merely imprecisely located in the world of work), 
however much they may appear to be. They draw the world of work into question. Put otherwise, 
nostalgic memories do not tend toward historical specificity only to miss it, whereas memories in 
their own way do and do in ways that are indefinitely specifiable. One might correctly say, “I 
remember you once told me X, when we were kids,” without knowing either date or time, and in 
so saying the possibility remains open for it to be specified at some later date. What I miss about 
our childhood friendship, by contrast, is not so locatable. That tends toward timelessness, 
“atemporality” as Trigg puts it. Memories can (grammatically, as Wittgenstein would say) be 
located, specified, and generally made more precise. Nostalgia can only be elaborated and made 
                                                 
58 For other accounts of the distinction between nostalgia and recollective memory, see Hart 
(402) and, especially, Crowell, who thinks his colleagues have been too generous in referring 
even (oxymoronically in his view) to “nostalgic memory” (92-93). 
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more diffuse, however much I may appeal to specific memories to elicit it (“Remember that time 
when…” looks different when said nostalgically than when said with a practical interest in fact). 
There are a number of clues to this effect. First is that the seasons of nostalgia seem to be 
intrinsically meaningful in a way that events are not. This is Crowell’s argument. According to 
Crowell, an event—and hence a cognitive memory that recalls it—gains its meaning in relation 
to other events (narrated into a history). A nostalgic memory, by contrast, is much more self-
sufficient. We might say that it is valuable in spite of the fact that the world goes on in 
indifferent ignorance of it. Here comes the unshakeableness of nostalgia, the fact that it persists 
despite being told its past is a fiction.  
Another clue lies in the preference of nostalgia for backgrounds and stability. That 
preference is not a matter of avoiding change altogether, but of signaling that something essential 
is missing from the world, something necessary to the world’s being a world—a sign that the 
world is not itself. That is why within a nostalgic frame of mind it can make sense both to say 
“this is home” and “this is [only] as close as I’ll ever be to home,” despite the logical and to 
some extent factual contradiction. The preference for backgrounds also explains nostalgia’s 
tendency to prefer the punctual and stable image to the flux of narrative, which must draw 
connections from point to point.   
Now that we have some sense of what nostalgia’s quasi-object is, we can ask what it 
means that nostalgia turns to them in the first place. At this point, admittedly, the 
phenomenologists’ lack of interest in historical context becomes more of a handicap. 
Nonetheless, what they have to say is suggestive. Drawing on Heideggerian discussions of 




Although one of the characteristic features of moods is indeed a certain 
dissolution of the distinction between self and world, in the case of nostalgia, it is 
the relation between self and world that is brought to the fore as problematic—
and together with that, the very relation of the self to itself. What is at issue in 
nostalgia is our own self-identity. (Malpas 167) 
Malpas here drifts toward an existentializing approach, naturally enough given his source 
material, but I want to stress the availability of these insights for a more historically sensitive 
mind. The fixation on “our own self-identity” need not be taken to mean the assertion or even 
preservation of that self at the expense of openness to the world. “The discontinuity that is 
encountered in nostalgia, and that gives rise to its pain, is a discontinuity that exists between the 
self and the world in which it finds itself,” Malpas says elsewhere, in perhaps a slightly more 
felicitous formulation (170).  Again, of course, Malpas attributes this to our existential condition, 
as an “essential feature of our mode of being-in-the-world…even though it is in the experience 
of nostalgia that it becomes most clearly evident” (316, note 34). My own critical investments, 
by contrast, lead me to take the self/world discontinuity in more situated terms. To say that there 
is a discontinuity revealed between self and world in nostalgia can be true even if it is not 
ontologized as essentially true always, simply waiting to be revealed from time to time in 
nostalgia. That is, we can observe that nostalgia throws into question whether we are in fact a 
part of this world, whether our involvement and attunement with it is assured, historically or at 
least contextually. Nostalgia involves the coming-into-issue of our way of being in the world our 
world’s way of having us in it.  
To clarify this point, let us turn to a close reading of Shahid’s “A Butcher,” which quite 
evidently remains troubled and unresolved at its end, but in ways that are interesting not so much 
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existentially as politically, personally, and historically. Since this is the second text to come from 
Shahid’s 1987 The Half-Inch Himalayas, it may be worth pausing to reflect on how the two texts 
fit into a larger nostalgic whole before proceeding further. The collection is, in fact, structured to 
follow a nostalgic line of thought. We have already read the book’s opening poem, “Postcard 
from Kashmir,” a standalone introduction before the main sequence of four sections, which 
follow a loose arc of longed-for homecoming. The first section jumps back in time to observe (as 
a barred outsider) Shahid’s ancestors, from his parents’ meeting in Delhi to precolonial Kashmir 
and India more generally. The second section fast-forwards to a more recent Delhi, now the city 
of Shahid’s young adulthood. Third we come to the United States and scenes of departure, 
erasure, and loneliness. Finally, the book closes with a series of looks back toward Kashmir, now 
with images of present distance everywhere coming between the poet and his home. 
So the nostalgia of “A Butcher” is assured, not only from internal evidence, but from its 
position in that arc, located as it is in the second section, pertaining to Delhi. “A Butcher” offers 
a vignette of disappointment and communion disrupted. Shahid (again we clearly hear the poet’s 
persona speaking) is in Delhi, buying meat “near Jama Masjid.” He and the butcher share a 
moment, or seem to, as they exchange poetic banter, each one quoting a couplet for the other to 
complete. In one of the poem’s several moments of resonant ambiguity, the butcher “wraps 
[Shahid’s] kilo of ribs,” as if not only to package his purchase but also to bandage his emigrant 
body (which may or may not have also been the meat butchered in the exchange). The wholeness 
of the scene—their “moment of courtesy,” as Shahid calls it—is immediately broken when 
money is exchanged. “Ghalib’s ghazals go unrhymed,” the poem ends, mimicking formally the 
interruption it describes. The phrase constitutes the only one-line stanza in a poem otherwise 
made up of (free-verse, unrhymed) couplets. 
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As I noted above, “A Butcher” never refers explicitly to the past. The text insistently 
locates itself in the here and now, from its opening deixis—“In this lane”—through each of its 
present tense verbs. (Echoes of the nostalgic deixis of “Postcard” are naturally relevant). 
Granted, there are whiffs of history. Urdu is “still fine on [the butcher’s] lips” (emphasis added). 
And the poem’s closing image, of “change / clutter[ing] our moment of courtesy,” cashes in on a 
brilliant pun, where change not only rounds out the economic transaction, but names the force of 
history itself. Nonetheless, a conventional approach to nostalgia might feel somewhat bereft in 
the face of such a vague image of the lost home. On the other hand, it might feel vindicated by 
the vagueness, seeing that as strong evidence of nostalgia’s idealizing haze.  
At the opening of the last section, we noted that Bruce King positions these poems within 
a larger tradition of Indo-Islamic poetry that yearns for a “supposedly unified nation and 
culture.” This poem, of course, names that culture a bit more forcefully, via the poets Ghalib and 
Mir, than does “Postcard.” So we might wonder here about a problem raised by that claim, 
tabling at least for the moment our earlier concerns about too literal a reading of nostalgic 
tropology. If Delhi’s “social fabric” could indeed be “destroyed,” as King concedes, why hedge 
Shahid’s nostalgia with a pejorative “supposedly”? It would seem that King imagines there to be 
a category mistake in the “unity” that nostalgics (King believes) attribute to the past in the form 
of a world-historical claim. An echo and a clarification of this idea can be found in Shaden 
Tageldin’s noting how “illusory” the nostalgic’s remembrance of feeling “at home” (i.e., whole, 
participating in the “unity” before its loss) can be (233). The world-historical claim of unity thus 
comes with a built-in claim that misrepresents one’s position in that unity. The phenomenology 
we are now familiar with would point out that the relevant unity comes not in the form of a 
disguised claim, but instead from the desired “object’s” being a world and not properly an object 
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at all.  
Shaden Tageldin’s deft and generative reading of “A Butcher” provides a helpful foil and 
eventual baseline against which to measure my own. On her reading, the poem leads us through a 
scene of frustrated fantasy. Our guide is an émigré, returned with high hopes to celebrate Eid al-
Adha. He wants desperately to feel at home, a comfort denied him by history and his adoptive 
country. So when he meets his rooted counterpart—a butcher—he cleaves to the chance at 
communion, hoping to purchase not meat alone, but also a seat at the nation’s table. “As native,” 
though, the butcher “decides how much ‘home’ the émigré will get,” and his decision is bound to 
disappoint (Tageldin 255). With divergent investments in the nation and its past, the two figures 
meet on unequal terrain. Economic as well as geographic disparity keeps enough space between 
them for the threat of violence to echo. According to Tageldin, we can hear that echo being 
actualized on the metaphorical plane. The clue lies in the ambiguity noted above, where the 
customer is given “his” ribs from among those of the festival goats “hacked” up. Like the festival 
goats, who also “show up in Delhi mainly on holidays,” the émigré is sacrificed, albeit to 
confirm not “the believer’s submission to God,” but “the native’s pact of country” (Tageldin 
259-260).  
The text is not, however, the lament of the sacrificed. Nor is it a bitter account of 
rejection. It is, Tageldin says, the story of the poet’s escape from “the prison of impossible 
nostalgia.” If previously his nostalgia had tended toward the inaccessible and the absolute, his 
disappointed attempt at belonging has at least educated him on this point. Now he knows that 
belonging is not his lot, accepts that he will always “be longing” (Tageldin 260). Tageldin 
approves of this acceptance, leaving us squarely back in the land of Boym’s reflective nostalgia. 
Tageldin’s suggestion to read the poem as an expression of perennial longing is 
147 
 
nevertheless compelling. Indeed, I can think of at least one direction in which her reading can be 
pushed even further (admittedly departing from Tageldin’s conclusion in doing so). Given the 
centrality of the Urdu literary tradition to the poem’s “moment of courtesy,” it is suggestive that 
unrequited longing for a cruel and indifferent beloved is the thematic staple of the ghazal genre. 
Granted, “A Butcher” is a far cry stylistically from the traditional ghazal, but its playful 
references, both structural and overt, suggest that we might not be too far afield to see the 
butcher as a species of beloved. The ghazal lover, of course, yearns to be sacrificed. For the poet 
of “A Butcher” to imagine himself as the hacked up goat thus becomes both accusation and 
masochistic thrill. If this seems too far afield from the stuff of romantic poetry, it may be worth 
recalling how grotesque the ghazals of Ghalib, which the customer quotes, can get.59  
By pushing the reading in this direction, however, we confront the problem of content 
anew. The content of this longing matters, while the very impossibility of union with the generic 
ghazal beloved suggests an irrelevance of content. However fuzzy and uncommitted nostalgia 
may be about its objects, however, it is not without content, as “A Butcher” illustrates itself with 
its attentiveness to politics. Consider, e.g., the figure Shahid has chosen for what Tageldin calls 
his “rooted counterpart.” A Muslim butcher would at any time be a surprising figure for stable 
nativity in postcolonial India, let alone one in which Urdu lies “bloodied” in his hands. (But is 
the butcher the brutalizer or the hapless bystander, holding a dying body in his hands? The word 
itself smells of slaughter—“he butchered it.”)60 The image suggests the loss of writing in Urdu in 
postcolonial India. But it perhaps also suggests, if the butcher is the perpetrator, his 
                                                 
59 Consider, for example, a verse in which the lover offers his liver as a kind of kebab, skewered 
by the beloved’s eyelashes (Ghalib 50). 
60 An earlier version, published as “The Jama Masjid Butcher” in In Memory of Begum Akhtar 
(1979), is far less richly ambiguous. The butcher “hacks the rib of History,” and he seems 
generally more intimidating and exotic to the speaker (45). 
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subordination of the written word to economic need. Nostalgia, on my view, opens these 
questions, these possibilities. It registers something once had and something changed or lost. 
What we infer about the meaning of that loss or change is up to us. Sometimes, of course, poets 
or writers infer for us. But Shahid generally does not. At most, we can confidently say that he 
believes Urdu to be in a bad way. But Urdu is in a bad way in postcolonial India. He certainly 
does not offer any convenient idea of what return would look like: even if the butcher now said 
another couplet, the awkwardness has happened. And in any case, the poem does not seem 
particularly to blame the butcher for, say, ignoring the speaker’s attempt at friendliness. 
Let us return for aid to our phenomenology of the poem’s nostalgia. When the émigré 
arrives on the scene, he carries not a determinate desire in his mind, but the whole of an 
indeterminate past in his body. Because it is carried in the body, the past irrupts into 
consciousness only unpredictably. Any disappointment, it seems, can turn into a nostalgic 
disappointment—say, an awkwardly terminated exchange of ribs and poetry. When that happens, 
“a double world is at stake…a world at once phenomenally present but at the same time spooked 
by the world superimposed upon those appearances” (Trigg 183). There is, on the one hand, the 
mundane pleasantries of a polite sale, and, on the other hand, some broader sense of bygone 
courtesy. These worlds are not sharply distinct. They bleed together. “The movement of 
nostalgia is one of a seeping orientation” (Trigg 185).  
But the seeping of past into present comes at a cost: the body through which the past 
seeps recedes from any shareable present. The butcher, in principle, shares the mundane 
pleasantries, but “courtesy” is a secondary frame, brought by the customer. As Tageldin’s 
reading shows, the butcher is unlikely to care much about that frame (an apathy which, arguably, 
brings the frame about in the first place). The customer’s retreat from involvement in the world 
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is signaled most clearly by the poem’s culminating lack of closure. With that open-ended break 
in continuity, we enter more or less unambiguously “the atemporality of the nostalgic object” 
(Trigg 176). We find ourselves dealing not with this or that moment, but with eras, as per Hart’s 
observation that nostalgic time is “aeonic” (406).  
The customer’s recession from involvement, moreover, entails not just forgetting the 
present, but rejecting it, or at least some aspect of it. It seems that a world where courtesy is 
disrupted is not a world where the customer can really live—Tageldin would say “belong.” The 
task of nostalgia criticism, as I understand it, requires examining this rejection (and the “aeonic” 
sense of the past that shapes it). Crucially, it does not entirely evade the present. The doubled 
world of nostalgia requires that the present provoke the body’s sense of the past, which means 
that what is at issue is as much a matter of similarity as dissimilarity. A wholly dissimilar world 
might provoke despair, but not nostalgia.  
What, though, is similar, and what dissimilar? More importantly, to what? To this last 
question, Tageldin would say that belonging and being at home provide the relevant contrast. For 
his part, Bruce King suggests an imagined Muslim cultural unity in Mughal Delhi. To make 
things yet more complicated, I appended above an even earlier yearning to the list of options. 
Deciding which, if any, of them to affirm requires returning to the text. 
So we arrive at the point where “change” clutters the present. The polysemy of change 
explodes in any number of directions. Perhaps the economics of material exchange clutters an 
aesthete’s idealization or postcolonial forms of life supersede precolonial ones. Maybe capitalist 
modes of exchange disrupt less alienated forms of commerce or, as Tageldin suggests, migration 
uproots native. Or perhaps the distinctive temporalities of elite Indo-Muslim cultural life have 
been subordinated to the “homogeneous, empty time” of the nation (B. Anderson 26). The image 
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of a “clutter[ed]…moment of courtesy” might even suggest the need for housekeeping in the 
realm of politeness, as if Shahid just wants clean courtesies. It might also suggest the desire for 
an eternal such moment. If we are inclined to ask which one Shahid means, and find ourselves 
concluding, say, that he refuses to choose, we should ask why we assume he means anything at 
all on that front. Refusals only exist in the context of a demand. But who made the demand if not 
we? Did Shahid invite the demand and then refuse it, as for example John Ashbery invites 
readers to find meaning only to thwart their attempts?  
Nostalgia is ambiguous. Dylan Trigg points to “the elusive quality of the nostalgic object: 
not reducible to a single thing, yet able to permeate singular things” (200). Trigg, though, is 
writing a book on place. We are reading a poem, and that draws attention to a new nostalgic 
dimension. Not only is nostalgia ambiguous with respect to the “things” it desires, but also with 
respect to the frames that bring them into focus. Our bodies do not just know the past from direct 
experience, but also from inculcated cultural memory; there are ways that poetry, for example, 
can train us in our longing and our belonging. Hence the overlapping of Tageldin’s migrant 
memory, King’s precolonial memory, and my suggested ghazal-generic memory. Hence also the 
proliferation of interpretive frames mentioned in the last paragraph. These arrive when we try to 
make sense of nostalgia after the fact, to narrativize it into a kind of historiography.  
We can also note that to want to remember something is to find a hole in the past that 
needs filling. To be nostalgic, however, is generally to find the past a plenitude. The figure of the 
Ghalib couplet is not the figure of something that needs remembering (or even something 
remembered—the force of the poem and its nostalgia does not require that Ghalib couplets have 
been rhymed in the past—the poem says no such thing). It is the figure of a kind of familiarity 
that feels broken, which it is. What nostalgia offers writer and reader of “A Butcher” is a chance 
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to raise that brokenness to view without needing to commit to any particular mode of action that 
immediately rectifies it or explains it away. Tageldin does no justice to her own reading when 
she suggests that what the nostalgic wants is “a return to a pre-colonial past in a postcolonial 
future” (255). What is at issue in the poem is precisely what we could mean when we name the 
“precolonial past,” as well as whether and to what extent we might ever have something worth 
calling “the same” in the future. Sameness, outside of metaphysics and absolutist commands, 
remains indefinitely open to questioning, particularly when it is something we are learning or 
seeking (the foreign language learner, for example, can never say ahead of time when her 
pronunciation will be met with by the instructor as acceptably the same). The nostalgic too may 
not know which roads lead out of nostalgia, some by going what may look like forward others 
back.  
The rest of this chapter will explore how Shahid’s later poetry begins to take less and less 
seriously the certainty of the direction of its nostalgia. That is to say, it leaves behind these 
particular scenes of postcards and disappointed exchanges, which remain concerned at least 
nominally with what the past looked like. As time goes on, Shahid instead begins to take 
nostalgia as an end in itself, as an aesthetic practice to be refined and practiced, still with its eyes 
on the ethical and political possibilities opened up in these early poems, but now of broader and 
at the same time more urgent scope. 
3.3 GENERIC NOSTALGIA 
As a poem like “Postcard from Kashmir” recedes into black and white obscurity, it leaves us 
with a problem: how to sustain this feeling long enough to do something with it. It sets the mood, 
but it hardly sets the scene. Its world is stripped bare, leaving little beyond a self abstractly 
engaging the fissure that gives it feeling. The distance between two identical words—“this” and 
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“this”—leaves Shahid with relatively little space in which to work if he wants to continue to 
explore this poetic avenue. But, as we see in “A Butcher” and throughout The Half-Inch 
Himalayas, the feeling nags with an ethical demand that cannot be tossed aside as an 
accomplished fact.  
“A Nostalgist’s Map of America” sits at the center of Shahid’s next volume, giving it its 
title and him a chance to expand the sentiment of his earlier poems on a grander scale, both 
geographically and thematically. It also introduces a formal innovation that will become a central 
feature of his subsequent poetry: deeply interwoven allusion. Equally important for my 
argument, it illustrates key generic features of traditionally nostalgic poems that will help situate 
later innovations in Shahid’s career within a broad history of nostalgic techniques. I use the word 
“traditional” advisedly here. Shahid’s poems are not quaint, nor are they particularly reminiscent 
of some other body of poetry. But they do participate in a tradition of nostalgic trope-formation 
that extends back to an 18th century development in English poetry that Aaron Santesso describes 
as the rise of the “nostalgia poem.” Although they were not called such, these poems were the 
first to deploy a set of now-cliché images, such as the childhood home, the countryside, and 
schooldays to evoke a particular feeling of shared longing. The specifics of that development 
interest me little here, but the insights and vocabulary Santesso develops to characterize those 
works will prove useful in understanding aspects of Shahid’s poetry which are at the fore in “A 
Nostalgists’s Map of America.”   
Santesso first reminds us of a useful distinction between an “intimately personal longing 
for the past” and “an impersonal, highly literary mode of idealization responding first and 
foremost to concerns of the present” (13). The latter, generic nostalgia is what literature and the 
arts generally give us. I have already discussed how self-conscious and abstracted “Postcard 
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from Kashmir” is, but with “A Nostalgist’s Map of America,” we reach a new level of 
traditionalism that must be accounted for in its own right. According to Santesso, to deal with 
nostalgia poetry we must shift from the search for nostalgia in “the images within the poem” to 
“the actual process of composing nostalgic poetry” (23). Eighteenth century nostalgia was 
inchoate and uncertain, open to definitional contestation. The word nostalgia itself was not yet 
well-codified, known only within medical circles and likely not on the minds of the poets 
inventing what would become its genre. Even were one to agree about what this emotion was, 
the variability of its object would prove troublesome. As Santesso asks on behalf of his poets, 
“How does one work with ‘nostalgia’ when one reader’s nostalgia might center around a 
childhood in the country, another around an early adulthood in the city, and a third’s around a 
nobly primitive way of life he has never directly experienced?” (24). Eighteenth-century poets 
attempted to navigate this dilemma by developing a new genre (the nostalgia poem) through a 
process of “tropic change” that begins with elements of the recently worn-out genres of pastoral 
and elegy and makes them its own, turning nostalgia into “a kind of trope machine” (26).  
What I want to borrow from this conception of generic nostalgia is the idea that nostalgia 
is something primarily worked through and realized in a pre-existing language. Bringing the 
discussion to the poetry emerging out of post-Independence India, I argue that we find a new 
form of nostalgia that is generic in precisely the above sense even as it leaves behind the 
eighteenth-century poet’s reader-centered concern with impersonal universality. This nostalgia 
poetry, of which Shahid’s is paradigmatic, works within existing generic and tropic frameworks, 
but is not satisfied with their adequacy. It responds to personal and social concerns, but it is not a 
mere expression of those concerns. These poets are unsatisfied with any “realistic” description of 
their world or their emotions, for they cannot take for granted which languages or generic 
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traditions are available for their use. Their peculiar situation in postcolonial modernity brings the 
questions of language and tradition to the foreground and they make them foundational for their 
poetry. All of them make use of a poetics of return that locates in concrete linguistic form the 
affective and memorial material that will allow them to realize their nostalgia and attend to the 
various crises they find in the world around them. 
Shahid, however, is less interested in “formulat[ing] a theory about the workings of the 
human mind” than Gray and his peers were (Santesso 65). Instead, he takes a more 
experiential/experimental route that presupposes a loose version of such a theory as its starting 
point. What he does is use tropes to create an emotional space for experimenting with various 
ways of connecting with the world. He can use even a set of trite images, by latching onto the 
received emotional impetus behind them, to array an affective world that then gives him enough 
poetic room to work in without presupposing a direct correspondence with the world. That is to 
say, in evading realist engagement with the world, he forces himself to create a new domain in 
which to experiment. That domain is nostalgia, and it arises at least initially within the frame that 
gave him nostalgia in the first place: received cliché and generic constraint.  
To say that his nostalgia trades in tradition, however, is not to say that it works in only 
one. As we shall see throughout this chapter, he is especially fond of two: a “desperate” strain of 
big emotions in American poetry exemplified by Emily Dickinson and Walt Whitman, and the 
yearning melancholy of the Persian and Urdu ghazal. But his work also draws from such diverse 
founts as Hindu devotionalism and Greek mythology. My reference to tradition, however, is not 
meant to name this latter aspect of Shahid’s work. By tradition I mean something closer to an 
overlapping set of genres, what Shahid refers to in the context of the ghazal as its “profound and 
complex cultural unity” (Ravishing DisUnities 2). That is to say, the horizon within which an 
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image or phrase, simply by virtue of its utterance, can evoke a mood, without the need for 
discursive elaboration or narrative development. Unlike the poets in Chapter 2, Shahid is not 
particularly interested in subverting or disrupting traditions, but rather mobilizing, translating, 
and exploring them. Kashmiriyat, an aesthetic ethos of being Kashmiri that draws heavily on 
images of despoilation, loss, and past communal harmony, is perhaps the largest and most 
politically relevant tradition within which Shahid’s poetry might be read.61 But we are in danger 
of getting ahead of ourselves. 
Let us turn to “A Nostalgist’s Map of America” to ground this discussion. Its conceit is 
reminiscence—a road trip remembered between two friends. The season is summer, a time of 
rich nostalgic resonance in the American imagination, especially when framed, as in “A 
Nostalgist’s Map of America,” by the end of school. The trip leads naturally enough “back to … 
// your boyhood town.” And the radio plays the very paradigm of nostalgia: “It must have been a 
disco hit, / one whose singer no one recalls” (36). What could be more fittingly American and 
nostalgic than a one-hit wonder—that staple of generational knowledge62—from the most 
stereotypically dated genre of American music, played while on a summer road trip of male 
bonding, after the last year of school, on a return to a boyhood home?  
It is incredible that the poem succeeds, not despite its clichés, but because of them. What 
Shahid wants to engage in writing the poem is something quite specific and personal: his friend’s 
death from AIDS at the height of its crisis in the 1980’s and what his own poetry has to offer in 
                                                 
61 For an in-depth discussion of Kashmiriyat, see Chitralekha Zutshi’s two books, Languages of 
Belonging (particularly the second chapter, “Mulk-i-Kashmir: History, Memory, and 
Representation”) and Kashmir’s Contested Pasts 




response.63 What the poem actually mentions, though, is far less topical and certainly not 
“engaged” in some political sense of the word à la Sartre. Arguably, the poem gains from the 
contextual information something it could have supplied more directly, but what interests me is 
not how successful the poem is as a testimony to its time or topic, but how Shahid uses it to 
experiment with techniques for engaging, managing, and inhabiting nostalgic affect formally.  
My cue in reading this poem comes from its final image. After priming himself and his 
readers in the generically nostalgic first half, the poem turns to a resonant moment after Shahid 
hangs up the phone, having just been informed of his friend’s imminent death. After the 
conversation ends, Shahid continues talking to his friend. “I kept speaking to you / after I hung 
up, my voice the quickest / mail, a cracked disc with many endings, // each false.” We are given 
three such endings, each a play on a search for Evanescence introduced in the flashback that 
opened the poem. The last ending, “the least false,” is also the most meta-poetic, 
   “You said each month you need 
new blood. Please forgive me, Phil, but I thought 
of your pain as a formal feeling, one 
useful for the letting go, your transfusions 
 
mere wings to me, the push of numerous 
hummingbirds, souvenirs of Evanescence 
seen disappearing down a route of veins 
in an electric rush of cochineal.” 
The phrase “formal feeling” is telling. On the one hand, it refers superficially to the distant 
                                                 
63 Shahid discusses the background of the poem in “Agha Shahid Ali: Calligraphy of Coils.” 
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stance Shahid takes toward the pain. But it also refers, on the other hand, to the fact that feeling 
has form. It does not exist independently in some Cartesian theater. Nor does it emerge purely 
out of raw sensation in unmediated contact with objects themselves. Feeling is modal.64 It is a 
process. And as such it requires routes of habituation, forms for it to enter mental life and 
conscious reflection. Each of these endings are ways for Shahid to test out affective forms and 
the qualities that they enable him to pursue. Just as in “Postcard from Kashmir,” here too the 
poem ends with disappearance, an image receding away. But unlike in the former poem, the 
image is one that Shahid has built up throughout the poem as durationally inhabitable. To 
understand this, we must return to its beginning.  
The clichés of “A Nostalgist’s Map of America” are generic enough to establish nostalgia 
as the poem’s “mood,” i.e., as a feeling that has come unmoored from any particular site of 
sensation and seems to pervade the world at hand.65 It is precisely their generic quality that 
allows such unmooring to act in the background as Shahid’s foregrounded manipulation of new 
tropes establishes the poem’s distinctive patterns of thought and feeling. The most prominent of 
those patterns come from the echoes of Emily Dickinson throughout the poem. She first appears 
in the opening lines, “The trees were soon hushed in the resonance of darkest emerald” (118), 
which echo the “Resonance of Emerald—/ A Rush of Cochineal—” from Dickinson’s “A Route 
of Evanescence.”66 But what draws her into focus and marks her full entrance into the affective 
                                                 
64 For further discussion of how feelings are best captured not in terms of stasis, but of process, 
see Altieri’s discussion of “adverbial” approaches to affect (especially pages 9-14). 
65 Heidegger is the most famous of the early theorists of mood (see, for example, Being and Time 
126-133), but Altieri’s discussion of it (53-71) offers a specifically aesthetic approach that 
influences my discussion here.  
66 Dickinson’s “A Route of Evanescence” is included as epigraph to the poem in Shahid’s 




terrain of the poem is a coincidence of world and image:  
    “A hummingbird,” 
I said, after a sharp turn, then pointed 
to the wheel, still revolving in your hand. 
 
I gave Emily Dickinson to you then, 
line after line, complete from heart. (118) 
On a dramatic level, this image is immanent to the scene. Shahid does not go searching for an 
image, nor is there any objective reason that would suffice to explain the image’s arrival. It is 
simply part and parcel of this world’s disclosure.  The image itself is reversed. Where the 
“revolving Wheel” evokes for Dickinson a hummingbird’s whirl of color, the hummingbird here 
emerges from the steering wheel’s revolutions. But out of the image is born a line of possibility. 
Not only can he recite Dickinson “complete from heart,” but he can and does go “further.” He 
invites Phil—the friend at the center of the poem—to join him in an extension of the poetic 
fancy. “Let’s pretend your city // is Evanescence—There has to be one— / in Pennsylvania—
And that some day— / the Bird will carry—my letters—to you— / from Tunis—or Casablanca—
the mail // an easy night’s ride—from North Africa.”  
This would be interesting in itself for its suggestion that an unconscious association, born 
of a fleeting mood, could give rise to patterns of thought made available by direct quotation, 
which then condition new possibilities for improvisation.67 But “A Nostalgist’s Map of America” 
                                                                                                                                                             
epigraph to the second section of the volume, of which “A Nostalgist’s Map of America” is the 
first poem. 
67 Shahid himself appeals to the metaphor of musical improvisation in introducing the ghazal 
form and his relationship to it. See his Introduction to Ravishing DisUnities (13).  
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is not content with such a banal observation about form, tradition, and thought. For it turns out 
that none of this may have happened. “I’m making this up,” Shahid admits; “but since you / were 
there, none of it’s a lie.” The admission alone is curious enough, but he follows it up with a 
remarkable, now seemingly non-sensical question, “How did I / go on?” This of course reorients 
us and forces us to consider important second-order identifications involved in this telling of the 
story. But it also reasserts the proliferating power of the poetic form. Not only was the image 
enough to start the conversation going in the first place, but it is enough to carry it forward and 
keep it meaningfully “true” well past the point where it has confronted its complete lack of 
direct, factual connection to the world. Although it can certainly be described as a fantastic flight 
from reality in light of the sad news to come later in the poem, the symptomatic reading seems 
reductive. Shahid has not abandoned truth entirely, just a certain understanding of it as the 
factual correspondence of propositions to the world.  
His continued commitment to truth and, for that matter, to ethics comes to the fore in the 
second half of the poem. We have already seen that Shahid’s reaction to the fateful phone call 
telling him of Phil’s condition turns his voice into a “cracked disc with many endings, / each 
false.” We are now prepared to wrestle more directly with that “falsity.” As the music metaphor 
implies, to speak falsely is not to lie. Lying requires intentionality, but Shahid speaks unwittingly. 
His voice skips, repeats, and fragments itself despite the fact that its reason for speaking—the 
conversation—has long since passed. What it continues, however, is not a matter of random 
chance. It repeats the patterns of the (false) memory with which the poem opens, each end 
speaking to the continued vitality of Evanescence, both as subject and form of conversation. The 
first two endings place Shahid himself “in” Evanescence, whether constructed or found. The 
third, the “least false,” sees the return of the hummingbirds, now coming from Evanescence and 
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pushing forth into the poet’s future.  
At this point, we confront the ethical problem of the poem. Shahid himself apologizes for 
thinking this way. And the elaboration of a fantastic relationship to a dying man, “one useful for 
the letting go,” does not immediately reassure his readers. It is a problem that will recur in more 
self-conscious ways later in his poetry (and in this chapter), but for now I want to stress two 
things. First, ethics remains a structuring feature of the poem. “A Nostalgist’s Map of America” 
is not simply solipsistic self-address. It projects Phil as its hearer, and it does so to apologize and 
explain. Second, that ethical endeavor, whatever we make of its success, is a matter of finding 
the right form. Shahid does not already possess responsibility (as a capacity to respond) or the 
knowledge how to respond as some inherent feature in his subjectivity. He must test them out, 
experimentally, by tracing lines of nostalgic flight that, as Charles Altieri reminds us regarding 
feelings in general, establish values as satisfying or not in themselves, quite independently of 
rationalist accounts of ethical reasoning.   
His experiments, moreover, do not begin ex nihilo. They engage forms of feeling, such as 
Dickinson’s poetry of Evanescence, that emerge in the resonance of the feeling itself, a feeling 
that Shahid is able to found initially by calling up a web of generically nostalgic references. The 
form serves almost as an echo chamber, amplifying resonances and encouraging further lines of 
thought. But this tells us relatively little about any second-order evaluations Shahid might bring 
to bear on this project. To observe that there are satisfactions immanent to the pursuit of feelings 
and their “expressions” is not to suggest that there are no other value considerations. Shahid’s 
poetry by and large is quite committed to the pursuit of an ideal that, while emerging out of his 
experiments with nostalgia, is not reducible to them. He often calls this ideal “fidelity.” It is to 
fidelity that I now turn. 
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3.4 TRANSLATIONAL FIDELITY 
“Fidelity” enters Shahid’s poetry in a number of ways, but the most accessible theoretically is 
translation. Translation theory has a rich history of terminological rigor around the concept of 
fidelity. That history will enable me to tease out some of the specificity of Shahid’s translational 
use of the term before listening for the broader resonances he gives it elsewhere in his oeuvre. 
Rather than tackle the largest questions of ethics and form directly, then, I propose in this section 
to approach those issues a bit more circumspectly by examining translation as both literary figure 
and literal act. The starting point for my analysis will be a curious remark Shahid makes in a 
poem about translation, namely that “liberty…was [his] only way of being loyal” (257). This 
quotation, and the context that surrounds it, grounds Shahid’s understanding of fidelity—here 
called “loyalty”—in nostalgia, as we have come to expect. It also opens up, through its 
paradoxically free notion of fidelity, a non-semantic focus for translation theory. These insights 
will then prove useful when I return in the next section to my inquiry into (poetic) forms of 
nostalgia and the ethics they enable. First, though, I must put this moment of free fidelity in 
context.  
Shahid’s career undergoes a shift with Country without a Post Office, a 1997 volume that 
inaugurates the Kashmir crisis as a central theme of his work. This shift brings with it a more 
sustained reflection on global historical patterns, politics, and injustice. No longer can his poetry 
be as neatly personal as “Postcard from Kashmir.” That is not to say, however, that he abandons 
lyricism or its ties to the personal dimensions of experience. His next volume in particular, 
Rooms Are Never Finished (2000), reintroduces his personal battles with grief as part of the 
frame for Kashmir in general. Now, rather than Shahid’s friendship with Phil, it is his late mother 
that dominates the emotional landscape. Having just died of the same brain cancer that would 
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shortly take Shahid’s life, Shahid’s mother looms over the poems in this volume even more than 
did Phil before. “My mother / is my poem,” says Shahid in exasperation (248, emphasis original). 
Such a sentiment brings into sharp focus the existential import of his poetry. In the last section, I 
argued that “A Nostalgist’s Map of America” provided a similar outlet for Shahid to work 
through his relationship to another, but with Rooms Are Never Finished, the process enters his 
poetry on a much more explicit, figural level. And in “Summers of Translation,” Shahid turns to 
translation as a new way of figuring that relationship.   
“Summers of Translation” is the third poem in a sequence dedicated to his mother’s 
memory, imagining grief on a grand cosmic scale as he bears her body back from Amherst, 
where she died, to Kashmir; hence the title of the sequence: “From Amherst to Kashmir.” In 
“Summers of Translation,” Shahid recalls translating Urdu poems by Faiz Ahmad Faiz into 
English with her. Summers past come rushing back as he picks up a poem—aptly titled 
“Memory”—which they had read but failed to translate.  He decides to tackle it afresh. The result 
provides the fifth poem of “From Amherst to Kashmir.” Before we get there, however, Shahid 
contextualizes and introduces his queer notion of fidelity, 
It was ’89, the stones were not far, signs of change 
everywhere (Kashmir would soon be in literal 
flames). Well, our dawns were so perfectly set to arrange 
 
our evenings in color that liberty with each ghazal 
was my only way of being loyal to any original . . .  (257, ellipsis original) 
Translation thus enters the picture through nostalgia, which is to say, under the guise of a larger 
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history and ethics.68 Because it is figured in translation, though, Shahid can avoid committing 
himself (or my reading of him) to immediately explicating what that history and ethics are. Let 
us attend, instead, to the specific loyalties and liberties of the translation at hand. 
Even before comparing it to the original, we are faced with one obvious liberty that 
Shahid has taken with the material: he has appropriated it to a new context. By plopping it down 
in the middle of his own poem sequence, he has radically altered the possibilities of its reception. 
In particular, the last stanza takes on an entirely new valence when juxtaposed with Shahid’s 
remarks on fidelity: 
Memory’s placed its hand so on Time’s face, touched it 
so caressingly that although it’s still our 
parting’s morning, it’s as if night’s come, bringing 
you to my bare arms. (263) 
One cannot help but see the parallel between this stanza’s morning anticipation of night and the 
sunrise anticipation of sunset in “Summers of Memory.” Yet the values are reversed. Whereas in 
“Summers of Translation” the sunset is disastrous, the night for Faiz is a time of hope. 
The reversal results from a change in the poem’s temporality. Faiz’s poem, as translated 
by Shahid, takes place in the present. Rather than remembering what it was like when loss was 
only a possibility, here the poet has already lost; he finds himself in “[d]esolation’s desert.”  For 
Shahid, his mother has died, and this poem speaks to her. “Memory” offers some solace in a 
world where grief is no longer a future anterior, but a present reality. That is to say, both his 
memory and the poem called “Memory” give him hope. Such appropriation is the first liberty. 
                                                 
68 Peter Fritzsche offers a particularly succinct treatment of the historical development of 
nostalgia and its unique manner of bridging the personal/social and memory/history divides.  
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The second liberty follows almost immediately from the first. The elaborate wordplay at the end 
of “Summers of Translation” weaves the poem into Shahid’s own life’s text: “On Memory’s 
mantle—where summers may truly shine—/ all, as never before, is nothing but translation” 
(259). Beyond simply recontextualizing the poem, therefore, Shahid weaves “Memory” into 
ontology itself—all is “nothing but translation.”  
Before parsing what may seem to be the nihilism of this last statement, I want to address 
one more set of liberties in Shahid’s “Memory”: its simultaneous personalization and abstraction. 
A simple gesture—giving the speaker an “I” with which to speak—makes the poem more 
personal and concrete. But even as it concretizes, the translation also abstracts. Whereas Faiz 
only describes the location of some blooming roses—i.e., beneath the grass and dust of distance 
(“dūrī ke khas-o-khāk tale,” emphasis added)—Shahid gives agency to the landscape; the “grass 
and dust of distance have let this / desert bloom with your roses” (emphasis added).69 Likewise, 
in the stanza I quoted above, Shahid personifies not only Memory, but also Time (capitalized, 
despite Urdu’s lack of such typographical distinction). In fact, time only appears in the Urdu in 
the form a straightforward adverb (or, more precisely, adverbial phrase): “is waqt,” i.e., “at this 
time,” “now.” Another translation of the same lines might run, “your memory now has touched 
[my] heart’s cheek” (“rakhā hai / dil ke rukhsār pe is waqt teri yād ne hāth”). For Faiz, Time has 
no face. Memory is specific. And the dust just sits there. But Shahid, by bringing these features 
to life, takes the poem to new heights of philosophical abstraction and away from the specificity 
of an isolated night of loneliness. 
What do these four liberties—recontextualizing, ontologizing, personalizing, and 
                                                 
69 For the original and an alternative to Shahid’s translation and my own ad hoc renderings, see 
Faiz 57-58.  
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abstracting—tell us about Shahid’s fidelity? They tell us first of all that it is situated. Shahid is 
uninterested in the abstract principles of correspondence that would determine whether or not a 
translation is “faithful.” That is to say that his translation theory is not “instrumental,” as 
Lawrence Venuti would put it.70 Venuti distinguishes between two basic models of translation: 
instrumental and hermeneutic. The former assumes that there exists an “invariant” in original 
texts that translators can instrumentalize the receiving language to preserve and convey. The 
latter model, by contrast, de-emphasizes invariance and draws attention to the interpretive work 
inherent in translation. Valid possibilities for translation explode in the hermeneutic model where 
the instrumental model pares down available strategies until there is only a particular ideal, 
which would best convey the invariant.  That does not mean that the hermeneutic model eschews 
value judgments. On the contrary. The criteria for judgment simply shift from preservation of 
invariance to other modes of valuation, such as political or other consequentialisms wherein 
judgment is based on the effects translations have on the receiving culture. Shahid’s chosen 
terminology—including words like “faithful” and “free”—hews most closely to the instrumental 
model, focusing on the degree to which a translation has strayed from the invariant core of the 
original. But when Shahid says that “liberty…was [his] only way of being loyal,” it throws a 
wrench in that system.  
 I want to emphasize that it is not simply that Shahid believes in two kinds of invariant—
one toward which his loyalty strives and one away from which his liberty moves. Such 
distinctions are familiar enough in the history of Western translation theory with its share of 
binary fidelities. St. Jerome, for example, initiates one such tradition, still popular today, of 
                                                 
70 For Venuti’s discussion of the development of an “intstrumental model” of language use, see 
his article on Saint Jerome’s translation theory, which guides the following discussion. 
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distinguishing between sense-for-sense and word-for-word translation. But Shahid’s freedoms 
are not deeper accuracies, nor do they claim, as Jerome does, to inform. In fact, Jerome’s entire 
binaristic premise proves quite unstable, so even if Shahid did want to claim it, it would do little 
explanatory good. My contention is that his fidelity is a particular mode of affective engagement, 
not an epistemic relationship between source and target text. That affective relationship, 
however, requires my paying a bit more attention to epistemic matters in order to elucidate, 
particularly with regard to the notion of cliché.  
For a poet who, as I argue above, uses cliché with such frequency (and ability), Shahid 
remarks curiously often in his critical writings of its danger, and of translation’s salvific role in 
evading it. He sells the (for him) Urdu ghazal form to American poets by emphasizing its 
inherent capacity for making new the trite rhyme: 
Through ghazals, English can again employ full rhymes, even the most cliché-
ridden, without apology or embarrassment because the radif [a refrain that 
immediately follows the rhyme] enables the rhyme to lose, through a transparent 
masking, its strained and clichéd element.; the qafia [the rhyme] is made 
transparently invisible. What an incredible gift: all those rhymes one thought 
could never be used again. (Ravishing DisUnities 11) 
And, in claiming that singer Begum Akhtar “translates” (Rebel’s Silhouette ix) poems by Faiz 
into song, he revels in how she does so “in a tantalizingly unclichéd Bhairavi” (xxv), which is to 
say a typical raga used un-stereotypically. Finally, he remarks of a problem he faced when he 
wrote a poem from Nostalgist’s Map of America, namely how to “translate” a singular moment 
of experience (xxiv). His solution: find another singular moment, and “in that untranslatable 
fraction of time, [he] did manage a translation by pointing out its impossibility” (xxv). The above 
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three examples share not only a concern with singularity and freedom from the mundane grips of 
cliché, but also a rather free use of the word translation. First, he offers a poetic form in 
translation; then, a sung poem; and finally, a moment captured in words. The context of the latter 
two examples is also crucial. They are included in his introduction to his own translation of Faiz, 
where ostensibly they elucidate the method and ideal of his translation, which, he reiterates, 
involves “moments (of fidelity, I insist) when I am unfaithful” (xxiii).  
Both the singularizing escape from cliché and the expansive sense of translation are 
crucial, I argue, to Shahid’s notion of fidelity. He does not make two “texts” correspond, but puts 
two experiences in dialogue. Shahid’s evasion of cliché is an escape from language conceived as 
code, so language means something quite different for him than it does for epistemically focused 
translation theories.71 The publicness of language is necessary, in general and for Shahid in 
particular. The availability Shahid seeks for his singular experience, however, is not the same as 
finding the right linguistic slot to slide his experience into. As with the neatness of the postcard 
that would make Kashmir “available,” there are linguistic trivialities that offer easy publication 
for a neat little version of his experience. That is not his goal. Partly this is an affective and 
aesthetic claim, of course. But there is also perhaps a political dimension. Those trivialities, those 
clichés are not too far from the colonial-bureaucratic emptiness of “English” as an imperial 
educational program—cf. what Gayatri Spivak calls “a sort of with-it translatese” that suppresses 
the “rhetoricity” of languages in favor of a standardized, insipid neutrality that makes the words 
of “a woman in Palestine…resemble, in the feel of its prose, something by a man in Taiwan” 
                                                 
71 Even when such translation theories focus on untranslatability because code conceptions of 
language are insufficient, the very idea of insufficiency presupposes that the ideal translation 
captures what can be known about the original. That is to say, they accept the terms of debate 




Chinua Achebe’s attack on the notion of the “native speaker” will help explicate this 
point. Achebe is concerned with how African writers use English and whether they can use it 
successfully for creative writing. They can, he says, but not by writing “like a native speaker” 
(62). The evidence he provides is initially rather strange. He quotes a passage from his own 
novel, Arrow of God, and then rewrites it “like a native speaker.” Needless to say, the latter is 
markedly less interesting than the former. For Achebe, the native speaker is not an artistic 
speaker, a creative writer. He is a caricature of colonial mimicry, deferential and towing as 
tightly as possible the party line of the “language.” Of course, at this point, the quotation marks 
become necessary, as actually existing language must necessarily exceed the bounds of such 
controlled banality in its everyday use, much less in the artistic work of a postcolonial writer. 
At first, it seems strange to equate a language (even a dialect or other linguistic subset) 
with bad writing. One should be able to blow such a straw man over with ease, simply by having 
any number of “actual” native speakers rewrite Achebe’s paragraph in more interesting prose. 
And yet, the theme comes up with such frequency, especially in ethically or politically aware 
translation theory, that it cannot be what it seems. I take a similar point to be entailed in Gayatri 
Spivak’s dismissal of the “with-it translatese” that makes a woman writer from Palestine 
indistinguishable from a Taiwanese man in the feel of their prose (315). Venuti’s remarks on the 
dangers of “domesticating” translations are even more in Achebe’s vein, since what they are 
being domesticated into is “the most invisible: the current standard dialect” (Scandals 20). Each 
of these thinkers has their own aim in naming such a language, and I am not suggesting that 
Shahid’s translation style is in perfect agreement with any of them. But he does, like them, find 
the problem rooted in deeper historical and political concerns, for he notes an awareness “that 
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subcontinental English needed renewal and reworking, translation even, before I and other poets 
could use it to meet the demands of a ‘hybrid’ cultural situation. But it was mine, ours” (Rebel’s 
Silhouette xii, emphasis original). Where I think Shahid has something to offer this conversation 
is in his refusal to name the other language, or more precisely in his thinking translation in terms 
that do not fit either epistemically driven code models of language or even as definable styles. 
This is why it is so significant that his list of what can be “translated” is so capacious.  
It is also no accident that Shahid’s list of translations involves both adaptation (for—but 
not between—mediums) and singularization. These two are actually related, insofar as the 
parenthetical distinction I made between adaptation “for” a medium and adaptation “between” 
mediums is related to the process of making something singularly suited to its context. To adapt 
one medium to another would perhaps be something like humming a poem, whereas adapting it 
to the medium is what Begum Akhtar does—instantiate the poem in song. Some translators view 
their work in the latter terms, as an adaptation from one language-medium to another. Shahid 
seems to think of his translation in different terms.  
What a poem is for him is not a well-defined text, but a sensuous movement, or rather a 
framework for enabling such movement. Translating it entails not recreating that movement as an 
“invariant,” but searching for a way that the movement itself opens onto another language. To 
some degree, this rather fanciful or mystical way of describing the phenomenon will have to do 
for now; it will be clarified somewhat by my attention to form—the ghazal form in particular—
in later sections. But I do want to observe that what he is being true to in each case is his own 
nostalgic relationship with the original. Even the Begum Akhtar example is crucially nostalgic, 
since she has died when he writes this, already becoming a resonant figure for the entire past that 
was lost with her.  Shahid thus must be positioned in opposition to Lawrence Venuti’s bracketing 
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of the source culture-receiving culture relationship in favor of attending more sensitively to the 
translation’s place in the receiving culture alone. Shahid resolutely sees the ethics emerging out 
of the original, not the translating language. Before moving on to a broader analysis of Shahid’s 
fidelity outside translation, two more thinkers can help clarify Shahid’s translational fidelity: 
Walter Benjamin and Jacques Derrida, both of whom try to break free from the epistemic grips of 
content-translation, but whose philosophies of translation differ from Shahid’s in telling ways.  
For Benjamin, as for Shahid, the literary work’s “essential quality is not statement or the 
imparting of information” (69). That would result, in Benjamin’s pithy phrasing, in an 
epistemically driven translation offering nothing more than an “inaccurate transmission of an 
inessential content” (70). Instead, translation should give a literal after-life to the text. While on 
the surface, this may seem compatible with my suggestion that Shahid wants to continue the 
movement of the original in his translation, in fact what interests Benjamin is quite different. 
Benjamin’s translation, unlike Shahid’s, is entirely impersonal, decidedly disinterested in its 
reader and presumably not too concerned with its translator either. What interests it is a mystical 
unity underlying any and all languages, “pure language” as Benjamin dubs it: “all suprahistorical 
kinship of languages rests in the intention underlying each language as a whole—an intention, 
however, which no single language can attain by itself but which is realized only by the totality 
of their intentions supplementing each other: pure language” (74). This may require that the 
translator abandon the oppressive standard dialect, as Shahid or Achebe wish. “The basic error of 
the translator is that he preserves the state in which his own language happens to be instead of 
allowing his language to be powerfully affected by the foreign tongue” (81). This, however, is 
for quite a different reason. Whereas Benjamin’s translation strives for the universal and 
“suprahistorical,” which for him is “vouchsafed to Holy Writ alone,” Shahid looks for the utterly 
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unrepeatable, something so singular that he can say of it, “I, Shahid, only am escaped to tell thee 
/ God sobs in my arms. Call me Ishmael tonight” (193). While a detailed analysis of the religious 
work of Benjamin’s and Shahid’s translation theories is beyond the scope of this chapter, the 
surface difference is striking. Shahid’s position makes sense, given his nostalgic poetics, since 
loss and unrepeatability would be basic requirements for nostalgic yearning. But beyond that 
obvious fact, it is worth stressing that when Shahid writes that “all, as never before, is nothing 
but translation” (Veiled Suite 259), he reminds us that translation is born of a what might seem a 
permanent loss and that there is no stable meaning—within, above or beyond language—that 
could be the target for or vital impetus behind translation. I want to stress that it only seems a 
loss, since it is not possible to pin down what is lost, the original against which the translation is 
a disappointment is created in the comparison. The consequence is that translation must live up 
not to originals or mysticisms, but to the relationship-in-loss that one experiences as the 
“original” through its translation.   
The always-already loss of translation immediately suggests Jacques Derrida, a 
philosopher who can insist paradoxically that “anyone should be able to declare under oath: I 
have only one language and it is not mine” (25). This includes so-called multilinguals. Derrida, a 
bit like Benjamin, works with a privileged concept of language-as-such over and against the 
banal multiplicity of languages in use. In his Monolingualism of the Other; or, the Prosthesis of 
Origin, Derrida begins with the premiss that distinctions between dialects, languages, and idioms 
are forced and artificial. Differentiation requires a fixed center around which a language (or 
dialect) is defined, a center that people can fight over and try to appropriate, but which, as center, 
can only ever remain the source of conflict not resolution. By contrast, Derrida believes, we can 
begin to have an ethical linguistic relationship with each other only by owning up to the fact that 
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we do not control language, that we only participate in it. In a sense, we must approach language 
as something we have always-already lost. For Derrida, this loss is literal and biographical—as 
an Algerian Jew, Derrida’s French citizenship was stolen, and for him this was also a loss of the 
French language, as well as a realization that he never had it; yet it is the language that he 
speaks. But his historical example signifies more than its context. One never has the language 
which one speaks, because it has always already been taken away.  
Now, how does Derrida’s loss differ from Shahid’s? Shahid, like Derrida is a “native 
speaker” of a language that seems unable to accept him as “native.” And yet, I have been 
discussing Shahid’s translation strategy as appropriative and recontextualizing. Derrida, by 
contrast, talks of “de-propriation” (64). This strikes me as more than a mere terminological 
difference. For Shahid, loss—rehearsed as nostalgia—is his personal connection to the universal. 
The universal arise precisely through its particular instantiation in loss. “All…is nothing but 
translation,” he discovers in translating. For Derrida, claiming the language as one’s own is 
always to reinstantiate the exclusionary logic that engendered the loss in the first place (which, as 
I have already noted, is not a historical “first place” but an always-already condition of human 
politics). Shahid might twist Derrida’s oath: “There is only one language; it is mine.” The great 
irony would be that Shahid would have believed he remained true to Derrida’s ethical impulse in 
thus inverting his claim. In order to clarify how that would work, we must turn to larger 
questions. What precisely does Shahid’s appropriation earn him ethically and why must he locate 
it in nostalgia broadly, rather than translation narrowly? 
3.5 AESTHETIC EXERCISES 
So far the argument I have been pursuing has attempted to establish, first, the insufficiency of 
prevailing nostalgia discourses for approaching Shahid and, second, the need to develop an 
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alternative approach centered around form and the manipulation of generic conventions. Both 
arguments entail a corollary claim that we need to account for the affective dimension of poetry 
in general, and Shahid’s nostalgia in particular. The motivation for this lies at least partly in 
Shahid’s frequent tying together of nostalgic affect, poetic production, and ethical wrestling. 
Noting the large size of the problem posed by this trio, the preceding section narrowed the 
domain of inquiry artificially (but productively and in a manner suggested by Shahid’s own 
vocabulary) to translational fidelity, a pursuit that exposes key features of Shahid’s ethics (such 
as a curious kind of appropriation) and their ties to a particular form of poetic nostalgia. But I 
have now reached a point in my argument where I must speak more generally about my use of 
the word “ethics” and the relationship I see it taking to Shahid’s work in general, not simply in 
translation. This brings the chapter to the core of its ethical theory. 
My conception of ethics here draws on two quite different ideas of how a text can 
function ethically.  The first is a strand of thought beginning with Pierre Hadot’s reading of 
ancient European philosophy, traveling through Michel Foucault, and arriving most recently in 
the work of literary scholars such as Gabriel Trop. This sees the text as what Hadot calls a 
“spiritual exercise.” The second comes out of the work of Charles Altieri, following Kant, who 
sees the text not as typical, but as exemplary expression, i.e., as proposing a new frame of 
understanding. My argument will be that we ought to read Shahid somewhere between these two 
extremes, or perhaps more accurately as exploring the tension between them.  
Michel Foucault’s engagement with the history of sexuality in Europe brought him to the 
realization that his broader goal, “a history of truth,” “was a matter of analyzing, not behaviors or 
ideas, nor societies and their ‘ideologies,’ but the problematizations through which being offers 
itself to be, necessarily, thought—and the practices on the basis of which these 
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problematizations are formed” (11). Put more concretely in the context of his work on sexuality, 
which it turns out is actually work on ethics, Foucault is not concerned with what he calls “moral 
codes” (25), nor with the “morality of behaviors,” i.e., society’s success in sticking to those 
codes (26); rather, he turns to “what might be called a history of ‘ethics’ and ‘ascetics,’ 
understood as a history of the forms of moral subjectivation and of the practices of the self that 
are meant to ensure it” (29). This is precisely the sense in which I wish to take “ethics,” i.e., as 
dually structured in a set of practices and the object toward which those practices are oriented: an 
ethical self.  For now I want to focus on the practices half of this structure, turning to what 
Foucault calls the “determination of the ethical substance” (26) and the “mode of subjection 
(mode d’assujettisement)” (27) only after we have a working sense of what kind of ethical work 
Shahid’s poetry attempts.  
The concept of ethical work, or “practices of the self,” that Foucault employs originates 
with Pierre Hadot’s work on ancient, particularly Stoic and Epicurean, philosophy. One of 
Hadot’s central arguments is that ancient philosophy was not so concerned with elaborating 
coherent, consistent, and organized theories as it was in practicing what he calls “spiritual 
exercises.” Hadot wrestles a bit with the term, and in so doing tells us quite a bit about the work 
he wants it to do. On the one hand, he notes that “it is no longer fashionable these days to use the 
word ‘spiritual’” (81). But that in itself is not enough to stop him from doing so, for no other 
term is satisfying. “Thought” does not work because it fails to capture the role played by 
“imagination and sensibility” (82). He even toys with the “rather tempting expression,” “ethical 
exercises,” but finds that, too, lacking, as the kind of exercise he intends actually transforms “our 
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vision of the world” and not merely the way we act in it (82).72 More precisely, the entire 
concept of ethics disappears in the exercise: “logic, physics, and ethics distinguish themselves 
from one another when one speaks of philosophy, but not when one lives it” (quoted in Davidson 
25). 
One of Hadot’s favorite examples, the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, will help 
illustrate why I find the concept so helpful for thinking about Shahid’s poetry. According to 
Hadot, a pernicious misreading of Marcus Aurelius focuses on his pessimism; that is, it draws 
conclusions about Marcus’ emotions and the beliefs they entail from the style of his writing, 
particularly in such moments as this: “These foods and dishes…are only dead fish, bids and pigs; 
this Falernian wine is a bit of grape juice…as for sex, it is the rubbing together of pieces of gut, 
followed by the spasmodic secretion of a little bit of slime” (quoted in Davidson 13). But Hadot 
notes that this is a generic convention—not of pessimism, but of Stoicism. It is a way not of 
expressing, but of exercising the self so as to see the world in a particular way and thereby 
transform the self so as find the “inner…peace and freedom” sought by Stoicism (Davidson 14). 
The parallel with my earlier points about Shahid is clear: we must not ignore the formal premiss 
of the work and its relation to a practice or exercise of the self, and in so doing jump hastily to 
judgments about authorial psychology or attitude.  
I am not the first to take up explicitly this notion of exercise for literary studies.73 Gabriel 
Trop, notably, has done this in a very systematic way in his Poetry as a Way of Life, a book 
                                                 
72 This, in fact, ends up being a source of disappointment for Hadot with respect to Foucault’s 
work with the term. For Hadot, Foucault’s notion of “care of the self” cedes ground and shrinks 
spiritual exercises back down to mere ethical exercises (206). 
73 Nor is the Hadot-Foucault lineage the only exercise-based approach to literature. Joshua 
Landy’s work on literature as a means for “training” our mental “capacities” falls quite naturally 
into this same vein of thought. 
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which finds in eighteenth-century German poetry an especially fertile period of experimenting 
with literature quite self-consciously as a form of exercise à la Hadot and Foucault. The context 
of that book’s inquiry necessarily limits its immediate applicability to a late-twentieth-century 
Kashmiri-American poet like Shahid. However, his work does help situate my argument within a 
broader literary-theoretical horizon, as well as providing useful suggestions for adapting the 
“spiritual exercise” concept to literary studies (to the extent  at least that it has not already been 
adapted sufficiently with the Marcus example above). First, Trop’s “aesthetic exercise” is 
particular rather than universal. Whereas Arnold I. Davidson sees Hadot philosophy of spiritual 
exercises as describing a series of “universal existential attitudes” that are embodied in different 
kinds of such exercise: Epicurean, Aristotelian, etc. (35), Trop finds in art’s open interpretability 
an absence of any “pretension to transparency or univocity of purpose.” Aesthetic reception (and 
hence aesthetic exercise) is “both culturally conditioned and particularized by any given 
individual” (11). This much seems true of Shahid.  
Where I diverge from Trop is, however, precisely in his perception of art as primarily an 
act of reception, which is highlighted in the above reasoning. The aesthetic exercise is “a way of 
reading” (11). But what I have been describing with regard to Shahid’s nostalgia is precisely a 
productive exercise that yields the poem rather than interprets it. (I believe there are reading 
practices that parallel this productive act, but that claim will have to wait for later). That is not to 
say that Shahid’s nostalgic exercise is not, like Trop’s aesthetic exercise, “an absorptive and 
attentive focus that probes, analyzes, gathers, and associates” (11). It is simply to insist that this 
is not in service of finding a response to the questions, “what sort of self does this text call into 
being, what practices of life does it invoke?” (Trop 11). Instead, Shahid’s self-work is a kind of 
active self-fashioning in the vein of Hadot’s “spiritual exercise” or Foucault’s “care of the self” 
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rather than the somewhat more passive allowing oneself to be exercised that Trop offers.  
What kind of exercise is Shahid’s nostalgia then? We can break this question into an 
inquiry into four aspects of practice, following Foucault: “determination of ethical substance,” 
“mode of subjection” (or “subjectivation”), “forms of elaboration,” and “telos” (26-28). The 
ethical substance is the stuff on which an exercise works. It is what Shahid wants to change or 
form through his poetry. Foucault takes the example of sexual fidelity: one can define it as a 
constraint on physical behavior, a focusing of desire away from distractions, or an intensifying of 
feeling, among other options. For Shahid, we have seen that it is something closer to this latter 
sense. To use terminology from one of his own poems—the celebrated title poem of The Country 
Without a Post Office (1997)—it is the “heart” upon which he works. A meditation on the 
Kashmir crisis from afar, that particular poem follows its speaker’s attempt to be “faithful” to the 
pain and suffering happening in a country to which he has no access (not even by mail, the title 
insists), especially that of a friend from whom he has not heard. The speaker apostrophizes his 
own heart throughout the poem: “Phantom heart, // pray he’s alive;” “Phantom heart, / this is 
your pain. Feel it;” “Feel it, / Heart, be faithful to his mad refrain;” ending with one final, “Mad 
heart, be brave” (203-6). The transition from “phantom heart” to “mad heart” is not trivial. The 
speaker believes his heart to have materialized and become substantial over the course of the 
poem. His embrace of the demand—“Feel it”—brings about his being as an ethical self, a 
“heart.” (That it is “mad” is a point to which we will return, but suffice it for the moment to 
remind ourselves of the de-narrativized self of “Postcard from Kashmir” and its rejection of neat 
identity).74 
                                                 
74 The term “heart” thus clarifies and narrows what I have been calling more vaguely a “self,” 




 Already with the term “heart” Shahid has answered our next question, pertaining to the 
“mode of subjectivation,” “that is, the way in which the individual establishes himself in relation 
to the rule and recognizes himself obliged to put it into practice” (Foucault 27). Foucault notes 
that one can obey a rule because one thinks it expedient (as in a social contract) or for any 
number of other reasons. Shahid’s apostrophizing to the “heart” above suggests that he perceives 
a virtuous circle between a felt demand and his feeling response. Insofar as he has determined 
the substance of his ethical work, then, Shahid has already subjected himself to it (or perhaps 
found himself already subject to it—I will say later in this chapter that finds himself “implicated” 
in it). I will call this mode of subjectivation an affirmation of nostalgia’s demanded return. 
Shahid must return to the feeling. He must return to Kashmir, literally or metaphorically. And in 
returning, the demand to return is increased, because the locus of return (the ethical substance) is 
internal and affective, not external and achieved.  
The “forms of elaboration” that enable Shahid to pursue this ethical project are precisely 
the forms of his poetry. More to the point, it is form as repetition that Shahid’s work most clearly 
evinces as the manner of his ethical work. We see this already in his “phantom heart” refrain, but 
it is more broadly visible in his increasing use of rhyme, refrain, and constraining structures in 
his poetry as his career develops, as well as in his tendency to return incessantly to the same 
                                                                                                                                                             
avoids some of the needless romantic connotations of the former. The clearest political and 
ethical significance given by Shahid to the term can be seen in an anecdote Amitav Ghosh 
shares, where Shahid is asked by Barcelona  airport security if he has anything dangerous on his 
person and he responds, “Only my heart” (64). I propose we take this more seriously than its 
joking tone might seem to invite. We might think also of Shahid’s favorite form, the ghazal, 
which requires the poet to include his (pen-)name (takhallus) in the final couplet, which evince 
in Shahid’s work an open interest poetic self-making, as seen in two of his most accomplished 
couplets: “And I, Shahid, only am escaped to tell thee— / God sobs in my arms. Call me Ishmael 
tonight” (375) and “They ask me to tell them what Shahid means: Listen, / It means ‘The 
Belovéd’ in Persian, ‘witness’ in Arabic” (373). 
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images, quotations, and even entire poems (as in his rewriting his ghazal on “Arabic”). 
Repetition has perhaps an inherently nostalgic tendency, and Shahid exploits that to great effect. 
But Shahid’s repetitions do not mark the reinstatement of an identity. I have already stressed this 
in my reading of Shahid’s translational ethics in the previous section, but now I can expand that 
account and give it a fuller meaning. When this poetry returns—whether through translation, 
refrain, or otherwise—it does so in the name of “fidelity,” which is to say of a sincere 
affirmation of the nostalgic demand to return.  
I spoke earlier of this affirmation as an “appropriation” and it may be helpful to clarify 
that term now. The term entered our conversation in noting that Shahid takes up Faiz’s voice as 
his own by translating it and inserting it into his own poem sequence. It gained breadth as we 
observed that Shahid recontextualizes in more ways than one, always drawing words (of other 
people, poems, languages) into the greatest possible intimacy. Specifically, I contextualized this 
appropriation within a postcolonial moment within which Shahid felt the need to “translate” 
English into something more suitable for his needs. But there is a risk in such talk of 
unknowingly rehearsing the “bad” side of a familiar postcolonial critique. As Laetitia Zecchini 
says in the context of Indian modernism in general, “There is no such thing as a category that 
would correspond to ‘our’ [e.g., Indian] culture divorced from ‘theirs,’ a ‘self’ that could be 
entirely retrievable from the ‘other’” (18). Good postcolonial poetry “challenges questions of 
ownership, propriety and property (in the sense of what is proper, what is mine, what language or 
tradition I am supposed to own or belong to)” (Zecchini 18). That is the sense of appropriation 
that rightly sent Derrida running (though wrongly, I suggest for Shahid, to talk of 
“depropriation”). But it is not so much a matter of being supposed to own or belong to something 
as it is of needing to own up to it. This sense of taking on responsibility, of appropriating not by 
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claiming an external thing as “mine” but of affirming and realizing a relationship that I already 
have, is often neglected in postcolonial discussions that focus on identity. One more word of 
caution, though, is necessary before letting the terminology rest. The sense I give to 
appropriation here must also not be taken to resonate with the corporate command that one “take 
ownership of” project. Such talk is predicated on an external authority that wants to disavow its 
own responsibility and keep the burden on those below. Rather appropriation, as I intend it here, 
suggests that what one owns up to is an immanent call. 
For clues to Shahid’s feeling such a call, we need look no further than his own extra-
poetic remarks scattered in various interviews. Shahid appeals, for example, to the poetic 
commonplace that writing is less deliberate than responsive: “A phrase will occur somewhere, 
either spontaneously or someone will say something, a chance thing, and I’ll say, ah, that can 
lead to a poem. Then I try to find some time when I can be alone and work on the poem” 
(Interview with Benvenuto 263). The basic metaphors are familiar: a muse-like inspiration and 
the need to “follow” where a poem leads. What they suggest, however, is made more explicit 
when repeated and given an ethical underlining. Later in the same interview, Shahid notes of his 
Holocaust poem, Eurydice, that it took him much longer to write than usual, an entire year in 
fact. Wanting to write a poem with a modern take on the familiar Greek myth, he remained 
disappointed by how “gimmicky” the conceits of his first experiments were (264). When finally 
a satisfying image arrived, it came in the form of a first line. For reference, the poem begins: “I 
am a woman / brought limping to Hell // under the Night / and Fog decree” (Nostalgist’s Map 
17). Of writing the poem, Shahid says, “It was willed willed and not quite willed because I 
couldn’t take it anywhere until I got that opening sentence. Then I wrote it the way I would write 
any poem, which is, the opening phrase has demands and I take it where I can” (264). Note the 
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quasi-ethical tinge of “demands.” Although the interview context allows a strictly aesthetic 
interpretation, I suggest that Shahid is blurring the lines quite intentionally here. The arrival of a 
poem overtly interested in the ethics of memory, itself a recurring theme for Shahid, is too great 
a coincidence to describe in terms of the merely aesthetic demand of the phrase.  
As we have already seen, phrases provide the bedrock for Shahid’s understanding of 
nostalgic inheritance, whether they are Ghalib’s incomplete couplets or Emily Dickinson 
“[given]…line after line, complete from heart” (Nostalgist’s Map 35). Any reader of Shahid’s 
poetry, however, can attest to an experience that confirms the aptness of what may seem at first 
in the above-cited interview only to be a cliché about the poetic process. Even if Shahid were just 
speaking platitudes there, we would still be left with the fact that key phrases and images echo so 
clearly and profoundly across his oeuvre. His is a poetry driven and haunted by repetition. 
Compare these two fragments, the first from “I See Kashmir from New Delhi at Midnight” and 
the second from “The Country Without a Post Office”: “One must wear jeweled ice in dry plains 
/ to will the distant mountains to glass” (178) and “so many fled, ran away, / and become 
refugees there, in the plains, / where they must now will a final dewfall / to turn the mountains to 
glass” (202). Both poems echo an earlier phrase from “I see Chile in the Rearview Mirror”: “I 
see Argentina and Paraguay / under a curfew of glass” (161). “The Country Without a Post 
Office,” moreover, also echoes clearly “A Dream of Glass Bangles” from a yet earlier collection, 
which came before the Kashmir crisis had even produced the need for “willing the mountains to 
glass.” Such blatant repetition marks more than recurrent fascination (such as, for example, 
Heaney’s for digging). It suggests the cultivation of a kind of mental habit or, as I am proposing 
here, aesthetic exercise, particularly in light of the broader formalism within which these 
repetitions gain a rhythmic force as well as an increasingly elaborate set of rules associated with 
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them. Before elaborating on this insight further, however, we must finish with the fourth of 
Foucault’s four aspects of ethical practice.  
I turn then, to the “telos” that Shahid’s exercise seeks. That, I argue, shifts as his work 
goes on, and in particular, as he tries out different poetic forms. Primarily, we can distinguish 
between the ever greater intensity of feeling exhibited in “Country without a Post Office” and the 
maximally differentiated feeling of his late ghazals. Both, however, can be characterized as 
efforts to become affectively engaged with the world in a consistently “faithful” way, whatever 
that may mean in each context. The fact that Shahid is able to change between (at least) two 
teleological horizons in his poetry points to an aspect of his work that is not so satisfyingly 
captured by the Foucault-Hadot model of exercise (a fact foreshadowed by Trop’s suggestion 
that aesthetic exercises are considerably less univocal and unidirectional than spiritual exercises). 
To understand that other aspect, I suggest a turn to Charles Altieri’s Kantian model of affective-
aesthetic exploration.  
Altieri, in developing his expressivist account of “the affects,” wants to avoid falling 
back on cognitivist and rationalist accounts of the emotions. This means that he must provide 
some source of impetus and order that is not strictly rational or “reasoned.” To do this, he turns 
to Kant’s Critique of Judgment, which contains a distinction between “determinative” and 
“reflective” forms of judgment. The former “make decisions by bringing a particular under the 
rubric provided by some kind of generalization…Reflective judgments are quite different 
because they do not depend on generalizations. Rather, they operate by bringing unity to 
particular cases even when we cannot know the relevant principle” (Altieri 185). This distinction 
allows Kant to approach the work of the artist, which engages our capacity for reflective 
judgment, “as if it were producing laws for nature rather than imitating them or instantiating 
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them” (Altieri 185). What is important for Altieri here, is that this gives an account of how 
aesthetic agency can explore and evaluate possibilities without bringing them under the rubric of 
a pre-existing law. That is to say, Altieri believes his Kantian account of expression provides a 
way for us to think of a poem as proffering an immanent value, rather than appealing to a value 
we may already have had (at least articulately).  
In Shahid’s case, this allows us to understand his exercise not only as refinement of a 
particular affective tendency, but also as a series of experiments that can surprise even their 
creator with their satisfactions or dissatisfactions. Shahid thus might discover, more or less “by 
accident,” that a particular poetic form (i.e., a particular kind of exercise) is ethically and 
aesthetically satisfying in a way that he did not consciously realize he was seeking. In my 
reading, for example, “Lennox Hill,” marks the exhaustion of a particular mode of exercise, the 
point where Shahid realizes it has become an ethical and aesthetic dead-end.  
In “Lennox Hill,” Shahid confronts the death of his mother. It is the first poem he wrote 
after her death (Ghosh 74), and it marks both the end and the fulfillment of a poetic hiatus he 
took after her passing.  “Lennox Hill” is obsessive. A canzone, it is more repetitive by design 
than any other poem he wrote, including even his two other canzones because of its greater rigor 
and tonal focus. A canzone contains 65 lines, each of which must end with one of only five 
words—in this case, elephants, die, Kashmir, universe, mother. One would think such a form 
would offer the fullest form of closure and stability, if any form could. And yet, Shahid can write 
in the middle of it that he is unable to write, and offer “My mother / is my poem” in response to 
the question, “So how’s the writing?” That is, he can turn directly to the world as poem, and 
insist that care of the mother is care of the poem. The ethical claim is inescapable here, but more 
than that, we are reminded that form (and poetry more generally) is for Shahid not something to 
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visit, a structure to retreat to and then emerge from when it is time to act once again. Form is part 
of one’s engagement with the world. That much accords with the discussion of exercises above. 
And yet if that were all there was to it, this poem would be more than a little anomalous, for it 
not only marks the beginning of a new period of productivity in Shahid’s career, but it ends on a 
note of complete ethical exhaustion: “I enter this: The Belovéd leaves one behind to die, / For 
compared to my grief for you, what are those of Kashmir? / And what (I close the ledger) are the 
griefs of the universe / When I remember you—beyond all accounting—O my mother?” (249). 
Left behind simply to die, Shahid closes the book in which he writes, and finds himself unable 
even to countenance the injustices of the world in the face of the grief his poem has formed 
around him.75 For a poet who thrives on the ethical call of nostalgia, the blotting out of both past 
and future can mark little more than the end of his poetic project so conceived. And yet it does 
not.  
That it does not can be explained partly by appealing to the trivial observation that 
exercises are not achieved states, but processes. Hence, we have no reason to imagine Shahid’s 
exhaustion in one poem would prove his exhaustion of the exercise more broadly. And, indeed, 
he continues to write poems in a similar vein, including another canzone, “The Veiled Suite” 
(with refrains night, sense, eyes, see, veil). But I believe that his concurrent experiments with 
ghazals mark an alternative exercise strategy that, whether consciously or not, answers to the 
concerns we see voiced in “Lennox Hill.” 
The ghazal, like the canzone, is characterized strongly by its use of refrain. Ghazals are 
poems written in self-contained, thematically distinct couplets that are united by a common 
                                                 
75 I realize that this sentence risks seeming to trivialize his grief by implying that it is just a 
function of his poetry, and not “genuine,” but I take his insistence that his poem “is” his mother 
as an invitation to see his life and poetry generally as thoroughly imbricated.  
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rhyme and refrain which closes each. Shahid became as his career progressed the foremost 
advocate for the form in the English language, editing an anthology of examples by American 
poets and writing his own collection, as well as delivering talks, translating examples, and 
generally selling the English-language poetry world on the virtues of this new form. I have 
already touched on one of those virtues (the renewal of clichéd rhymes) above. What interests 
me now is the particular spin Shahid puts on the thematics of the form and how it distinguishes 
him somewhat from other practitioners of the form who came before him in Urdu, Persian, and 
other traditions. For Shahid is enamored of the variability of the ghazal. Not only does he want 
each couplet to be self-contained, which is a standard feature of the form, but he becomes quite 
taken with the consequent idea that they should be as maximally so as possible. That is, as an 
affective exercise, one should exploit the ghazal’s variable thematics and mood so as to find 
unity among the greatest possible affective (and thematic) multiplicity.  
For the moment, I do not want to get caught up in the specifics of how Shahid deploys 
this principle. It is sufficient to note that it allows Shahid to escape the weight of nostalgic 
repetition without actually forgoing the repetition entirely. Whereas the canzone marked the 
culmination of a particular exercise of nostalgia, the ghazal marks a quite different one. In its 
case, Shahid can bring nostalgia to bear on a wide array of moods. As we shall see later in the 
chapter, this apparent contradiction is simply that: apparent. That does not mean that it is 
insignificant. In fact, it brings to light a distinctive trait of nostalgia that has so far gone 
untheorized among nostalgia critics. But what concerns me now is Altieri’s expressivist model 
and how it can contribute to understanding Shahid’s ethics.  
 The immanence of value that Altieri locates in aesthetic activity is crucial. Without it, we 
(along with Shahid) are left making only second-order judgments about the relative merit of one 
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practice over another. The problem with the latter position is that it shifts the domain of inquiry 
away from the literary. While that shift would perhaps be frustrating from a literary theorist’s 
point of view, theory would survive. From a poetic perspective, however, the shift loses 
everything. And this loss is not merely the loss of value-production (which, after all, is not really 
what we are describing anyway). Consider it from the perspective of literary emotion again, 
Altieri’s favorite whipping post. Altieri’s work carefully skirts around (qualitative emotional) 
taxonomy, not because he believes it to be useless, but because he believes there is a danger that 
attends taxonomy in our culture. Namely, “there is a strong temptation once we have named an 
emotion to ignore the agents who manifest it. What we know about the motion suffices to tell us 
what the agent is probably experiencing. All that matters then about the agent is how his or her 
formative beliefs shaping the emotion are or are not adequate to the situation” (Altieri, 
Particulars 107). In losing the agent, we of course lose the poet. But more crucially, we lose 
what drives the poet. What drives Shahid is not his motivation, or even his emotion. His pursuit 
takes place in and through nostalgia, and to a certain extent it takes feeling nostalgic as its goal. 
But that goal is not set ahead of time, and that is where Altieri’s crucial insight lies.  
When Shahid tells his “phantom heart” to “feel it,” it does not have a fixed referent. In 
that respect, it is like the undeveloped image of “Postcard from Kashmir” and “Evanescence” 
from “A Nostalgist’s Map of America.” What Shahid feels is a tendency or possibility in his 
feeling, the development of which is something he seeks to identify with. “Identification need 
not depend on classical forms of judgment,” as Altieri argues:  
We can endorse a state and treat it as continuous with our self of self simply 
because of the satisfactions that emerge as we carry out the activity. Even when 
the endorsement becomes the taking of responsibility, we need not derive the 
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responsibility from specific criteria. It is enough that we find ourselves wanting to 
be represented by our caring about a particular state and the social relations it 
entails. (Particulars 140) 
Thus Shahid’s nostalgic feeling can be pursued “in itself” even if it is clearly not for itself. But 
even referring to the feeling “itself” suggests too much, for as Altieri elsewhere insists, there is 
no definite concept unifying any given aesthetic creation, but rather “a series of felt rightnesses, 
without any need for an overall schema” (Reckoning 9). Shahid is “testing out what becomes 
valuable” as he engages a particular form of self (Altieri Particulars 140). What becomes 
valuable with the canzone and other “closed” forms that find in repetition and refrain an 
insistence is pure intensity. But intensity is burdensome. In the ghazal, by contrast, Shahid finds 
something more freeing, yet (perhaps) equally “faithful.” 
3.6 THE GIFT OF THE GHAZAL 
When Shahid writes of his growing fussiness over Americans’ use of the ghazal, he says that it 
was “[f]or a seemingly conservative, but to me increasingly radical reason—form for form’s 
sake” (Ravishing DisUnities 1). In this section, I want to take up this claim as a guiding 
sentiment in looking at the form about which Shahid showed the greatest self-reflexivity, specific 
dedication, and of which he produced the most examples. My contention has been that Shahid in 
general evinces increasing devotion to “form for form’s sake” across his career. I have so far 
developed this claim in primarily theoretical terms with a nod to sketching the interrelation 
between his various formal experiments and their place in a loosely progressive arc spanning his 
career.  Now I turn to the ghazal to develop a rich case study of what it means for a particular 
form (rather than form in general) to become the site of committed aesthetic and moral 
experimentation. This will entail looking at least as closely at Shahid’s theoretical discussion of 
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the form as at his examples themselves, since the former will help clarify the latter. 
First we need some general background. The ghazal form is a striking choice for Shahid, 
the self-proclaimed nostalgist, not only because his relationship to it is nostalgic (both in the 
personal sense that he attests to feeling nostalgia for and through it and in the discursive sense 
that he claims to want for Americans to return to the form’s origins). The ghazal form is also 
itself contiguous with realms inhabited by nostalgia. I mentioned earlier in the chapter that Urdu 
ghazal poets such as Mir and Ghalib are part of a long tradition that performatively mourns the 
fall of Delhi’s court life with its poetic vibrancy, but the ghazal genre more broadly, as practiced 
in Shahid’s beloved Urdu, is itself a genre of longing. Frances Pritchett describes some of the 
thematic fundamentals of the form: 
At the most basic thematic level, the ghazal is the first-person voice of a 
passionate male lover who laments his lack of access to his beloved [of 
ambiguous reference, including male, female, abstract, and divine levels of 
resonance]…The lover knows from the beginning that he is doomed. This genre 
thus has at its heart a mood of desperate, mystical, romantic love-as-death, pain-
as-pleasure. The beloved is irresistibly beautiful and always somehow 
unavailable. The lover’s passion is always transgressive, unstoppable, doomed. 
(Introduction11-12) 
We see then where the appeal might lie for someone interested in nostalgia. From the perspective 
of someone invested in the thematics of the ghazal universe, the past may become just another 
species of inaccessible beloved. Moreover, by adding in a few formal features of the genre, we 




composed of autonomous or semi-autonomous couplets that are united by a strict 
scheme of rhyme, refrain, and line length. The opening couplet sets up the scheme 
by having it in both lines, and then the scheme occurs only in the second line of 
every succeeding couplet— i.e., the first line (same length) of every succeeding 
couplet sets up a suspense, and the second line (same length but with the rhyme 
and refrain— the rhyme immediately preceding the refrain) delivers on that 
suspense by amplifying, dramatizing, imploding, exploding. (Call Me 18) 
There is much to unpack here, and it will help to look at some examples.  
Consider the opening poem in the posthumous volume that gathers together Shahid’s 
original ghazals, Call Me Ishmael Tonight (2003). “Ghazals traditionally do not have titles,” the 
volume notes, but for “convenience,” Shahid refers to each by its refrain (13). The poem before 
us, is therefore called “I have loved”:  
I must go back briefly to a place I have loved 
to tell you those you will efface I have loved. (23) 
Minor in both length and stature, it has not, to my knowledge, received much critical attention. 
As an inaugural work, however, it bears some scrutiny. Specifically, I find it hard to escape the 
sense that Shahid is announcing his ambitions for the collection, that the ghazals to follow bear 
this message that he needs to share, and that in each one he will be speaking from the place he 
has loved. “Giving” the ghazal, particularly to America, is a task I hold to be at the heart of 
Shahid’s poetic enterprise—and in a more profound sense than popularizing the genre—so I 
want to spend some time exploring the implications of the above lines.  
For readers familiar with Shahid’s work, the “place I have loved” is apt to sound like a 
name for Kashmir. Ravaged by war since the early 90s and hardly a symbol of peace before that, 
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Kashmir is one of the most enduring and potent figures across Shahid’s career. As Aamir Mufti 
has recently shown in a tour-de-force reading of Shahid’s oeuvre, Shahid’s Kashmir represents 
his (and our) desperate need to imagine a space outside the the logic of the modern nation-state 
(180-202). Given that interpretive horizon, the “you” who “will efface” Shahid’s loved ones 
resonates on a number of levels: not only does it invoke the Indian nation and its army effacing 
the people of Kashmir, but also anyone observing the on-going strife, even sympathetically to 
Kashmiris, from what Mufti would call an Orientalist perspective, i.e., one that tries to make 
sense of the peoples involved in terms of indigeneity, identity, and their respective claims to 
nationhood.  
Our Kashmir-centric reading need not end there; “I have loved” affords elaboration at 
some length on that front. There is, for example, a subtle pun in the speaker’s saying that he must 
go back “briefly,”—which is not just for a short while, but also by brief, i.e., by post, to the very 
place that an earlier book of Shahid’s called “The Country Without a Post Office.” Then, 
keeping in that vein, we could note that just as the letter cannot arrive, the poem cannot really 
end. The ghazal goes unfinished, stopping well before the requisite five couplets. 
However suggestive the above line of interpretation may prove, it keeps us on familiar 
terrain. Home is a place thematized as nostalgic site of return. If we add the metapoetic framing 
mentioned earlier into the mix, a layer of abstraction complicates the seeming obviousness of 
what nostalgia means here. Opening a collection of ghazals, “I have loved” points not only 
outward to the world but forward to the book that follows. Taking that book as Shahid’s “go[ing] 
back briefly to a place [he has] loved,” we find the ghazal form itself a site of return, love, and 
hence nostalgia. Still, what it means to go back to the ghazal is not necessarily cut and dry. Does 
it entail returning to where the ghazal “came from,” its “home”? If so, it is not clear whether that 
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would be a geographical site, a cultural milieu, or something else entirely. What is more, there is 
always the possibility that Shahid considers the ghazal itself—i.e., the form of the ghazal—to 
offer a kind of home to which to return. He was, notably, quite fond of the etymological trivia 
that locates our English “stanza” in an Italian “room,” or the even earlier “standing, stopping 
place.”76 
We need not choose among these options. The ghazal form, as Shahid offers it to us, is 
made to hold such echoing ambiguity, as I hope to show. From poetic-existential to the 
culturalist-nativist, to the anti-Orientalist, each resonance has its own claim to our attention. Each 
also has its own noteworthy impact on the word “must” in the first line: “I must go back…to tell 
you.” In less formally focused interpretations, it sounds rather contingent. I must go back to 
Kashmir, say, because you will listen only to someone of my international stature, not to the ones 
you would efface. Alternatively, I must go back to the home of the ghazal in order to claim the 
authority of native informant, without which you will ignore me and go on writing your ghazals 
wrongly. For both these readings, we might say that in a better world I would not have to go 
back, but the “must” runs deeper if we take Shahid to refer to the ghazal qua ghazal. Then it 
means something like: I must show you the form, telling you would never be sufficient. Why? 
Because I have loved it. Which is to say that form in this case is not simply a matter of rules, but 
of nostalgic affect. You will, by writing new ones, efface the ghazals as I have loved them. At 
least, though, you will do so knowing the love that enables the effacement in the first place. 
To give some contextual weight to the above reading, it is worth noting that by the time 
this poem was published, Shahid had been for many years a zealous advocate of the ghazal in 
English. Four years earlier, he had edited and published an anthology of poets, mostly American, 
                                                 
76 See, for example, his poem, “Rooms are Never Finished,” discussed below.  
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writing what its subtitle promised were “real ghazals in English.” It began with an introduction, 
explaining why the ghazal would be such a great thing for American poetry. That introduction 
began curiously enough with a refusal of the ghazal to America, Shahid noting that some years 
prior he had felt compelled to “take back the gift outright.” It is an odd opening, and the 
language of cultural exchange is familiar enough that we are apt to misinterpret it.  The problem 
for Shahid is not that Americans have appropriated a form that does not belong to them; it is that 
they never got hold of the thing in the first place to appropriate it.77 When we realize this, our 
realization also stands as a rebuke to a possible misunderstanding of the book’s subtitle: “real 
ghazals in English.” Here again we court confusion if we fall back on a familiar discourse of 
authenticity, imagining that “real” contrasts with “fake” or “inauthentic” ghazals. Shahid speaks 
with too much of a wink in his eye for us to pin him down that easily. 
To determine what he does mean, we must observe that Shahid’s “taking back” the gift 
coincides exactly with his giving it again. It is an action done entirely in mime. I imagine 
something like a man faking at fetch to get his dog to look where he throws. Only in our case, the 
poets had long been playing with an invisible ball; Shahid wanted them finally to see the “real 
thing.” He flaunts the artifice of the gesture. A few paragraphs into his introduction, he notes the 
pleasure of play-acting that came with his project, saying that he had “found it tantalizing to 
strike a playful pose of Third-World arrogance, laced with a Muslim snobbery.” And, lest we 
mistake that “playful” role for its somber cousin, he stresses immediately that he is not “playing 
                                                 
77 I take this sentiment to be hinted at in Shahid’s claim that at least free verse sonnets “have 
departed from somewhere,” while the free verse forms parading as ghazals come from, it would 
seem, nowhere. Although Shahid repeats the idea of “departures from a definite place” 
(Introduction to Ravishing 2), he never explicitly says the faux-ghazal comes from nowhere, so it 
might be more appropriate to say that the American faux-ghazals come from the same old place 
as any American poem, which with respect to the ghazal, might as well be nowhere. 
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some kind of wise sage from the East” (2).  
By focusing on these theatrics, we see something important. Although he speaks in 
familiar imperative and indicative forms, Shahid is neither asserting his authority, nor making 
propositional claims. He is offering a gift, albeit one that—as it turns out—had already been 
given.78 This is the kind of gesture I suggest is fruitful for understanding the home Shahid that 
sees in the ghazal. It is, first of all, something that can be shared. And it is shared not simply by 
listing rules or describing, but by miming the giving and the withholding of it, by showing it (and 
insisting it must be shown) in the “I have loved” couplet. The nostalgic refuge Shahid holds out, 
then, is a kind of know-how quite different from the forms of “knowing that” that underly 
thematic takes on nostalgia, where the nostalgic either knows or does not know that she cannot 
really return home. 
Let us return to the metaphorics of Shahid’s introduction. The ghazal is, as we have seen, 
a “gift,” one to be taken back, given, and—crucially—accepted: “Perhaps one way to welcome 
the shackles of the form and be in emotional tune with them is to remember one definition of the 
word ghazal: It is the cry of the gazelle when it is cornered in the hunt and knows it will die” 
(Introduction 3). What are we to make of a gift whose giving and receiving remain so uncertain, 
in need of instruction? Note that he does not give the gift, at least initially. It was already given, 
surely not by anyone in particular. Cultures are already standing in a posture of generosity 
towards each other, on this view, but it always remains in question whether or not something has 
been actually received or merely claimed. After all, America had already been producing many 
“ghazals.” That was what spurred Shahid to write edit his anthology and to introduce it so 
                                                 
78 Here it may be instructive to consider a parallel metaphor he uses elsewhere, finding that each of his 
“two [cultural] loyalties, on loan to each other, are now so one that the loan has been forgiven. No, 
forgotten” (Introduction to Rebel’s xxv). It is a metaphor that invites the question of agency: who has the 
authority to give and forgive such loans?  
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provocatively; he had been reading “so many monthlies and quarterlies,” out of which came 
“floating” disappointment—ghazals in nothing but name, written predominately by Americans 
with no substantial education in the tradition. Still, Shahid confesses to liking many of them (11), 
so we might wonder why he nonetheless felt irked. He alludes to both politics and aesthetics by 
way of answer. 
In a mood of sly grandiosity, he climactically closes his introduction with the claim, “If 
one writes in free verse—and one should—to subvert Western civilization, surely one should 
write in forms to save oneself from Western civilization” (13). And yet, he stresses, he is no 
“rheumatic formalist…certainly not the kind who wishes to save Western civilization—with 
meters and rhymes!” What is more, there is “no such thing” as the West, or for that matter the 
East (12). Still, the claim stands. Saving oneself from Western civilization is, according to 
Shahid, a non-trivial possibility, perhaps only by allowing one to step outside the fiction. The 
question then is how the ghazal form opens up any such space. Let us consider the pedagogical 
techniques Shahid uses to get us to see it: where he offers incentive, where he discourages, why 
he chooses this mistake to correct and not that, etc. 
One thing Shahid names as a boon of our taking up the ghazal is its ability to disrupt the 
“thirst for unity that haunts the ‘Westerner,’ even in these fussingly nonlinear days” (5). In 
saying so, he both invokes a fact about the ghazal—in comparison to European poetic forms, it 
has no thematic unity, in fact no permanent unity of any kind as it can always be added to or 
excerpted from—and betrays his own curious exaggeration of the form’s potentials. Shahid does 
not simply write thematically unlinked couplets, he positively revels in the difference between 
them, at times even seeming to maximize it. Thus Shahid can open a ghazal with desolation and 
hopelessness—“The pure pain with which he recognizes angels / has left him without cures 
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among the dreamless angels”—and close that same ghazal with the winking braggadocio of 
“You play innocence so will, with such precision, Shahid: / You could seduce god himself and 
fuck the sexless angels” (341, 342). The liberating autonomy of couplets is his greatest 
insistence. “[T]he issue here is that by following the form of the ghazal, the writer could find 
herself tantalizingly liberated, surprising herself with unusual discoveries by being stringent with 
herself as she goes from one theme to another in couplet after couplet” (12). The notion of 
surprise is crucial, and it reinforces the notion of form as exercise and, more fundamentally, as 
habituation and self-formation, for to cultivate the ability to be surprised is to practice specific 
techniques that foster not only the capacity to be surprised, but also re-orient the self so that it 
can produce its own surprises.79 A poet can thus embrace the fact that she does not know herself 
or her world and yet she does possess the means for exploring what she does not know, for 
keeping that non-knowing open as a space for action rather than passivity. 
For Shahid, our acceptance of the form’s “ravishing disunity,” as his anthology title calls 
it, does not mean that we completely lose the thirst for unity, only that we reorient ourselves with 
respect to it. Now the expectation is that we will not find it, but will instead search for and feel 
its absence, albeit in new ways. Tellingly, Shahid’s vision of the “cultural unity” of the ghazal 
plays on the thematic disunity of form. The cultural unity lies in our being “in emotional tune” 
with the form’s rigors, as we saw earlier. Being so means, among other things, feeling the 
“desperation” of the form, which is Shahid’s second big selling point of the ghazal: “the ghazal 
offers English a chance to find a formal way, a ‘legal’ way out, to cultivate a profound respect 
                                                 
79 Shahid notes that a new ghazal writer may “find herself tantalizingly liberated, surprising 
herself with unusual discoveries by being stringent with herself as she goes from one theme to 
another in couplet after couplet” (12). He then goes on to stress that the discoveries can be 
political, even revolutionary. 
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for desperation—something that American poetry has not altogether lost. As for the English? Let 
me leave it there” (11). That tongue-in-cheek comment reminds us of Shahid’s enduringly 
fascinated and fascinating relationship to the concept of America—a topic for another essay. But 
what should interest us now is how Shahid tries to get us to see and feel the desperation in the 
form.  
To do that, Shahid appeals strategically to nostalgia (or exoticism, which often cannot be 
distinguished from a kind of nostalgia anyway), somewhat to his own, but more relevantly to 
what he hopes ours will be. He refers to the “breathless excitement” the form generates in 
context, and the context is not insignificantly social: the mushaira, i.e.,  
the traditional poetry gathering to which sometimes thousands of people come to 
hear the most cherished poets of the country—when the poet recites the first line 
of a couplet, the audience recites it  back to him, and then the poet repeats it, and 
the audience again follows suit. This back and forth creates an immensely 
seductive tension because everyone is waiting to see how the suspense will be 
resolved in terms of the scheme established in the opening couplet; that is, the 
first line of every succeeding couplet sets the reader (or the listener) up so that the 
second line amplifies, surprises, explodes. (8) 
The passage is, appropriately enough, in the present tense. Mushairas are still held, albeit less 
often (and less prestigiously) than in the past. Nonetheless, the loving description could easily be 
confused for a nostalgic vignette, and for a contemporary American poet to hear of “thousands” 
attending a reading, actively responding after listening with bated breath, is certainly to hear 
something like a nostalgic dream of what poetry was or at least should have been. The nostalgia 
is not, however, empty of suggestions for how to achieve it, and Shahid’s description of the 
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scene goes on at some length even after the above quotation ends in an attempt to get everyone to 
see how it is done. 
The ultimate nostalgic technique Shahid uses to share the form, though, is his own 
writing of ghazals. His work exemplifies various features of the Urdu ghazal that mark it as other 
than the ordinary American poem. He “urduize[s]” his language, as Jahan Ramazani observes 
(Hybrid 38). While that is obvious enough, and not a little deceptive, on the level of syntax and 
even vocabulary, where his real urduizing lies is in his marked preference for what ghazal critics 
call insha’iya over khabariyya utterances. Shamsur Rahman Faruqi glosses these terms as “non-
falsifiable” and “falsifiable” respectively: “Interrogative, subjunctive, vocative, imperative 
utterances are insha’iya; no determination can be made about their being true or false” (“On 
Reading Ghalib”). In Urdu, the word kyā helps encourage the explosion of meaning behind such 
statements. As Frances Pritchett observes,  
This versatile interrogative can be used to signal a positive exclamation (‘What a 
wonderful thing!’), or a negative one (“What—as if it’s a wonderful thing!’); or 
else it can introduce a yes-or-no question (“Is it a wonderful thing?”). Since 
classical ghazals were never punctuated, in many verses all three possibilities are 
available, and none can be ruled out. (123)  
While the same is less true of punctuated English, Shahid does a formidable job with 
multivalency, as I tried to show earlier in my reading of the relatively simple “I have loved.” To 
more specifically illustrate the principle here, however, we can consider the second line of the 
following couplet: “Ancestors, you’ve left me a plot in the family graveyard — / Why must I 
look, in your eyes, for prayers in Arabic?” The mood and tone of the line are quite variable. The 
somewhat strained syntax and overdetermined punctuation leaves “in your eyes” as variously the 
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site for searching (I must look in your eyes), the origin of the demand (in your eyes, I must do 
this), and the place where the demand is interpreted (in your eyes, I must do it this way, i.e., in 
Arabic). Is the speaker mourning the loss of his ancestral language or outraged that his ancestors 
still make claims on him? The couplet will not decide for us, and, Shahid suggests, the couplet 
prompts us to keep on proliferating meanings.  
One of the central insights to be gleaned from a reading of Shahid’s ghazals as an 
exercise is nostalgia is thus how open nostalgia is to other affective (as well as interpretive) 
possibilities. This point raises an important implication about nostalgia more broadly that has so 
far escaped much theoretical attention. There is a crucial set of differences among, for example, 
nostalgia as what Shahid calls a “formal feeling” (i.e., an exercise); what we ordinarily think of 
as a nostalgic mood; and the tone or affective quality of an artistic work itself.  These differences 
may be clarified somewhat by considering a quite distinct case. In a recent article in Critical 
Inquiry, Paul Allen Anderson takes up the question of “mood” music such as neo-Muzak and 
other forms of “affective self-management” (824), which are achieved via a kind of “sonic air 
conditioning” (816). Intriguingly, Anderson argues that nostalgia is key to understanding this 
phenomenon, because of its reliance on the music’s being familiar. “Such music is likely to 
temporarily induce pleasant psychic involution through nostalgia and thus reduce negative forms 
of anxiety-inducing stimulation keyed to the present or risk-assessment about the future,” he 
claims (834). Finding fault with the tendency of cultural critics to reduce nostalgia to “pastoral 
and reactionary images” (which I might prefer to call a set of nostalgia genres with recognizable 
tropic patterning), Anderson persuasively extends nostalgic paradigms to include 
“retrospection…focus[ed] on exciting and energizing non-pastoral images from music-critical 
periods in a listener’s youth” (835). Anderson’s point is powerful, but risks going too far if we 
199 
 
assume nostalgia simply empties the music of whatever conceptual and emotional content it 
might be said to have “on its own.” There is a crucial difference between a 35-year-old woman 
listening nostalgically to riot grrrl bands, recalling a feeling of revolutionary feminist potential, 
and a 70-year-old man wistfully listening to Christmas music from his childhood. There is, in 
fact, a difference between any number of nostalgic repetitions one could engage in (forms of 
nostalgic exercise), so we must not reduce them to the fact of their musical repetition alone (a 
category or mode of nostalgic exercise), let alone subsume them within an overarching 
framework that would include all modes of nostalgic recall. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has tracked Shahid’s investments in nostalgia from an early thematic interest that 
already disrupts conventional, cognitive accounts to a later, more free-floating set of exercises 
meant to rehearse and build off of nostalgic sentiment. It has thus provided a much-needed 
deepening of a frequent observation about Shahid’s poetic career, namely what Kazim Ali has 
characterized as a “trajectory” that Shahid’s poetry “traveled…from sense to sound” (1). Bruce 
King independently arrives at the same conclusion, albeit in consternation. The intuition, though, 
as we now see, is well-founded, even as it remains vague and a bit misleading. After all, it is not 
as though Shahid’s early poems were unmusical. Now we can see that, in terms of nostalgia, the 
trajectory can be followed with a bit more precision: from a more object-oriented nostalgia to a 
more exercise-oriented one. The path is not perfectly linear, of course. Shahid’s early poetry 
already evinces many of the later investments, and vice versa. However, by attending to it, we 
can see the phenomenological and affective contours of Shahid’s nostalgia and thereby shift our 




CHAPTER 4: NOSTALGIC INNOVATION 
INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter was able to make its case for nostalgia as an aesthetic exercise largely by 
appealing to the convenient fact that Agha Shahid Ali’s nostalgia could be accounted for in 
largely non-referential terms, terms that avoided talking about his beliefs about the past or even 
about states of affairs in the world. Reference came in only as a fore- and after-thought—
something that gave rise to conditions suitable for his particular nostalgic exercise, and which in 
turn allowed him to affirm the exercise after the fact, but that did not primarily shape the exercise 
itself. In the case of Modern Sanskrit, however, reference presents itself as a problem almost 
immediately, particularly since postcolonial critics have often drawn attention to the claims to 
(and about) the past made by certain aggressive forms of nationalism.  
Shahid could pursue any of the various strands of aesthetic practice available to him by 
participating in well-established traditions of nostalgia poetry in English and co-articulating them 
with what he took to be parallel traditions in Urdu. No such luck presents the Modern Sanskrit 
nostalgist. There is no established tradition of nostalgia in Sanskrit—indeed, no word for 
precisely that phenomenon. A consequence of this is that the nostalgic practices of Modern 
Sanskrit writers necessarily take up the question of nostalgia at a more basic level. Whereas 
Shahid could see it simply as a poetic-linguistic practice that simply brought various facets of the 
world to attention, a Modern Sanskrit poet such as Radhavallabh Tripathi has to decide whether 
and how language (the object and lens of his nostalgia) can even be brought into contact with the 
world in the first place. In other words, Tripathi’s poetry raises the problem of nostalgic 
reference anew.  
This chapter argues that the “solution” that Tripathi offers is that, rather than 
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presupposing some relationship between then and now as most theorists have suggested, 
nostalgia can simply be the process whereby what counts as “now” comes into question. In other 
words, while love and desire for the past may result in a violent negation of the present, they may 
equally be a way of constructing a present that seems to offer some critical way forward into the 
future. In Tripathi’s case, as I will show, the word “critical” is particularly apt, since he takes up 
a stance of political and environmental critique at various points in his poetry. In the process of 
exploring this, we shall also see how nostalgia can own up to the newness it itself is in the world 
and thereby become a vehicle for innovation, rather than rote repetition. “Rote repetition,” after 
all, is precisely the charge Modern Sanskrit anxiously awaits, since its liveliness depends on its 
ability to claim something more than that.  
I begin this chapter, therefore, by sketching a brief history of Sanskrit as it comes to be 
modern, stressing in particular the way in which the language comes to stand as a symbol for 
nationalist memory even as its use as such presupposes its discursive death. With that historical 
framework in mind, I turn to my case study: Radhavallabh Tripathi’s Laharīdaśakam (Ten 
Waves). I suggest that this work, particularly its first poem—a nostalgic search for the “spring” 
of classical yore—is an extended way of asking what it means for tradition to be “alive” in the 
present (or for that matter, dead). I propose that one of the crucial insights arrived at in the poem 
is that the past, while unavailable for direct retrieval, is available for (re)describing the present in 
ways that are distinct from languages “of” the present. That process itself inevitably re-describes 
(and remediates) the images of the past it has taken up for its work. 
However, such use of “present” and “past” to describe these two sites comes under 
scrutiny as the poem and my analysis continue. As the poem proceeds, it ambiguates 
productively between temporal and spatial-conceptual interpretive frameworks in the service of 
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ultimately proposing a model of poetry that relies less on representation of the world than on its 
construction (Tripathi calls what he does “realizing”). There are many implications of this shift, 
which I suggest challenges, among other things, the influential distinction between reflective and 
restorative nostalgia proposed by Svetlana Boym.  
The new problematic signaled by the turn to political and ethical criticisms of nostalgia 
prompts me later in the chapter to examine key concepts such as “continuity” and “fidelity to 
origins” that have played a large role in postcolonial criticism as signs of danger or mistake in 
the process of coming to terms with colonialism. My reading of Tripathi’s poem suggests that 
these terms still require clarification and complication, despite (or perhaps because of) 
longstanding use as a kind of critical shorthand in postcolonial theory. 
In Tripathi’s case, I put forth a two-fold claim: firstly, that Tripathi is not interested in 
denying or suppressing socio-cultural discontinuity in the name of a “pure” and proud nation 
(i.e., the poem’s nostalgia is not fundamentalist); and secondly, that nostalgia’s critique of the 
present does not rely on a prejudgment of what the present is. Nostalgia can simply be the 
process of bringing the present into question, rather than an emotional after-shock of 
presupposing some particular, well-defined relationship between past and present. 
The final sections of the chapter concern the domains of poetics (what primarily seems to 
concern Tripathi) and politics (what follows from that concern for both Tripathi and his potential 
readers). Poetics allows me to reconsider the practical question of what fidelity to the past might 
mean in the case of this poem, assuming not simply that it tries to achieve it but that in some 
meaningful sense that it does (as the “realization” of spring suggests). It also allows me to 
specify some of what I take to be new and noteworthy about Tripathi’s case within the context of 
scholarship on postcolonial poetry. The question of politics is not, for this chapter at least, a 
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matter of advocated policy, nor of successful intervention in nationalist memory culture. The 
question is rather of the relationship between politics and the nostalgia at play in the poem. I 
argue in closing that while there are grounds for political concern or critique in the poem, they 
are ill-captured by the nostalgia paradigm; and conversely, the nostalgia paradigm can allow us 
to see the emergence of new, constructive ways of approaching political life in India.  
4.1 SANSKRIT’S ARRIVAL AS A MEMORY SITE: A BRIEF HISTORICAL SKETCH 
Modern Sanskrit literature cannot easily escape its status as an apparent oxymoron. Sheldon 
Pollock (2001) famously declared the “death of Sanskrit,” and regardless of the stance one takes 
in the debate that has followed Pollock’s article, thinking “Sanskrit” without raising the question 
of death has become nearly impossible. “Death” is in the air, and much of the best modern 
Sanskrit literature is inflected with the tension and uncertainty that come from seeking life in a 
“dead” language. In what follows, I chart one poet’s engagement with Sanskrit as a language of 
the past. By mining the memorial past encoded in Sanskrit’s literary and linguistic heritage, 
Radhavallabh Tripathi accomplishes a kind of nostalgic innovation that opens up unique—albeit 
rather tame—forms of contemporary social, political, and ecological critique. It is not Tripathi’s 
(lack of) radicalness that is the subject of this chapter, however, but rather the distinctive 
structure of his critique and the possibilities it affords, both aesthetically and politically. My 
contention is that Modern Sanskrit foregrounds a new problematic for theorizing postcolonial 
nostalgia that allows us to approach contemporary critical conversations about untranslatability, 
multilingualism,  and cultural identity in new and invigorating ways. 
Sanskrit, with its several-millennia-long history, occupies an especially resonant place in 
the cultural imagination of contemporary India. As the language of the ancient Veda and other 
canonical religious texts, Sanskrit is often made to stand as the symbol par excellence of Indian 
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tradition, particularly in its specifically Hindu dimension.80 In so doing, conservative ideologues 
seek to harness the language and its attendant memorial images to “stop time, to block the work 
of forgetting, to establish a state of things, [and] to immortalize death” (Nora “Between” 19). It 
thus functions as what Pierre Nora calls a lieu de mémoire, or site of memory. For Nora, a lieu de 
mémoire can be “any significant entity, whether material or non-material in nature, which by dint 
of human will or the work of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of 
any community” (“From Lieux” xvii). Although he initially intended them to be uniquely French, 
later scholars have found the concept useful in other contexts as well, particularly with reference 
to modern nation-state formation.81  
As with Nora’s lieux de mémoire, the dominant understanding of Sanskrit is premised on 
rupture and discontinuity, recalling for many a pre-colonial golden age before the Indian 
subcontinent was “violated” by the intrusion of outside forces (whether Islamic or Western). But 
whereas Nora takes the notion of rupture seriously—“Given to us as radically other, the past has 
become a world apart” (17)—we should understand the contemporary mobilization of Sanskrit 
qua memory-site as a performance of rupture. It is not that “an immense and intimate fund of 
memory [has] disappear[ed]” (Nora “Between” 12), causing it to be reconstituted as a lieu de 
mémoire. Rather, Sanskrit’s use as a lieu presupposes and surreptitiously produces the gulf 
between past and present that conservative politicians then claim to be able to bridge. Therefore 
my reading of Sanskrit is not another rehearsal of Nora’s methodology in the Indian context 
                                                 
80 Contemporary memory of Sanskrit as being especially Hindu is of course deeply problematic. 
Sanskrit has been used by diverse heterodox religions such as Buddhism, as well as for a wide 
variety of secular uses. For a historical overview of the functions of Sanskrit, see Pollock’s 
(2006) magisterial account of what he calls the “Sanskrit Cosmopolis.”  
81 For examples in the Indian context, see Erll (2009) on the ‘Mutiny’ of 1857 and Talbot (2016) 
on Prithviraj.  
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(though a sustained look at Sanskrit from that perspective would be helpful to scholarship). 
Instead, I am looking to a particular corpus for its subversions of the logic of such lieux. 
But before I turn to that corpus, it is necessary to understand a bit more concretely what 
that logic is. It is, first of all, a product of colonialism. To see how, we must briefly rehearse the 
story of Sanskrit’s use in the modern period. As noted in the Introduction, what I am calling 
“Modern Sanskrit” began in earnest somewhere in the late 18th or early 19th century. Anglo-
American scholars note it negatively when they claim that the object of their study—i.e., 
‘authentic’ Sanskrit—continues “well into the nineteenth century” (Peterson 1). Indian scholars, 
on the other hand, locate its inception a bit more positively when they compose compendious 
lists debunking the supposed “death” of their language. Both sides—to the extent that they care 
to talk about it—could probably agree with the late Sanskritist, V. Raghavan, that it began with a 
bifurcation. Some pandits continued along the traditional path, while others interacted more 
interestedly with the colonial government and its new institutions. They (the latter collaborators) 
gave birth to a complex series of renegotiations, borrowings, and innovations that can only be 
accounted for under a new historical heading: let’s call it “modern.”82 
They, however, did not yet recognize the trait that would become the defining feature of 
their language’s modernity, namely, its death. More precisely, they had not yet come to see the 
liveliness of their own language use as up for question.83 They may have sensed that their 
                                                 
82 See the next section below for a discussion of what kind of “modernity” is at issue in Modern 
Sanskrit. My use of the term is largely heuristic, however. I am not making any strong claims 
about the status of “the modern” in colonial or postcolonial India. Much fine theoretical work has 
been done elsewhere on questions related to that.  
83 As noted in the introduction, language “death” is a multivocal term that can refer to a variety 
of phenomenon. In the case of Sanskrit, the three most common senses of “life” from which 




cultural capital was dwindling, but they still felt confident enough in the language to use it for 
political leverage, writing odes to colonial figures, for example. Warren Hastings, an early 
administrator in Bengal, attested to the vitality of the language (and this gesture) by collecting 
Sanskrit panegyrics “to be filed against his impeachment” (Raghavan 3). Sanskrit writers were, 
however, soon to find the world less receptive to their continued activity. By the time India 
achieved independence, no writer in Sanskrit (excluding perhaps—and to a very limited extent—
those pockets of traditional pundits mentioned earlier) could take for granted the liveliness of 
their language. They didn’t agree that it was dead, but they knew that what they were doing was 
disagreeing. 
An important implication of the story I have just sketched is that Sanskrit’s death is a 
specifically retrospective observation, made possible (or rather inevitable) by the frames of 
colonial and later post-colonial historiography. This fact entailed the collapse of a distinction 
between local practice and orientalist knowledge. Specifically, Sanskrit—insofar as it “dies”— 
becomes identical with the object of the colonial Indologist’s study. The historical mechanics of 
this collapse are beyond the scope of this chapter, but we can note several snapshots of this 
history in order to get an impression of its import. 
To begin, Sanskrit encounters the colonial education system. The early nineteenth 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) openness to grammatical evolution in response to conditions of everyday speech (in which 
case Sanskrit died when it was fixed by the grammarian Panini in the 4th century BCE)  
(2) currency as the primary vehicle for large-scale literary production and circulation (the 
condition which Pollock’s “The Death of Sanskrit” suggests ceased to obtain somewhere around 
the 11th century) 
(3) relevant and available for meaningfully productive use. 
It is the last sense that will hold the attention of the rest of this chapter, for it is the anxiety or 




century saw heated debates between so-called “Orientalists” and “Anglicists,” camps which 
advocated the education of colonial subjects in indigenous classical languages and English, 
respectively.84 Macaulay’s infamous 1835 “Minute on Education” marks the eventual triumph of 
the latter, but prior to their defeat, the Orientalists managed to gain enough traction that some 
Sanskrit schools were established. The founding of one such institution, the Sanskrit College in 
Calcutta, provoked a letter in 1823 from one of the canonical “makers of modern India,” 
Rammohan Roy.85 This letter gives us our first snapshot of Sanskrit’s Indologization, for Roy 
needs to appeal to the colonial government and what better way to do that than to use their own 
discourse? Roy is himself a bit of an Anglicist as far as education is concerned, as he believes 
that Sanskrit schools will prevent Indians from gaining currency in the types of knowledge that 
yield power and viability in the new colonial order. He makes his point scathingly:  
This seminary…can only be expected to load the minds of youth with 
grammatical niceties and metaphysical distinctions of little or no practicable use 
to the possessors or to society. The pupils will there acquire what was known two 
thousand years ago, with the addition of vain and empty subtleties since produced 
by speculative men, such as is already commonly taught in all India. (111, 
emphasis added) 
The sentiment could as well have been expressed by a colonial figure: Sanskrit’s sole offerings 
lie in ancient history, and at best the intervening years have decadently finessed and multiplied 
                                                 
84 For an analysis of this controversy that illuminates some of the following discussion by 
highlighting the shared assumptions on both sides that Christianize religious discourse in India, 
see Raf Gelders and Willem Derde’s “Mantras of Anti-Brahmanism.” I do not subscribe to all 
that they argue, but find their highlighting of those shared assumptions clarifying. 
85 I allude to Ramachandra Gupta’s anthology of major voices in the political-intellectual terrain 
of modern India, The Makers of Modern India. 
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its outmodedness. Certainly progress has not been made. That is why the colonial education 
project is necessary in the first place.  
And yet, as Bruce Carlisle Robertson points out, in 1826, just three years after making the 
above remarks, Roy “founded his own Vedanta College to train his growing band of 
followers…to read and teach Vedanta in Sanskrit” (35). Moreover, the original letter goes on to 
point out that it is not the promotion of Sanskrit that he objects to, but rather the non-teaching of 
English and its associated arts and sciences, “for there have been always and are now numerous 
professors of Sangscrit [sic] in the different parts of the country, engaged in teaching this 
language as well as the other branches of literature which are to be the object of the new 
seminary” (43). This is a quite different argument. Sanskrit, although antiquated, is not dead. In 
fact, its life is so well attested that teaching more of it is redundant.86 This second line of 
argument, however, recedes into the background as colonial history progresses and the Anglicists 
win out. What is remembered and remediated in future discussions of Sanskrit is the first line: 
Sanskrit’s antiquatedness and its latter-day decadence. As Christophe Jaffrelot has noted, it was 
during the period in which Roy’s reformism flourished that the concept of a “Vedic ‘golden age’ 
when Hinduism was superior to Christianity can be seen to crystallize” (Reader 8).  
Where Roy had diminished the scope of Sanskrit’s claim to greatness even in its ‘golden 
age’ to “grammatical niceties and metaphysical distinctions,” later figures such as Dayananda 
Saraswati would expand the claims to an exhaustive scope: 
While the Brahmo Samajis [members of a reformist society established by Roy] 
                                                 
86 I realize that there is some slippage here in referring to the language as “living” or not as a 
medium of education on the one hand and as a medium of production on the other. That 
distinction, though, is not especially pertinent in light of the manifest continuation of literary 
production in Sanskrit that provides the object of my study. The various works on Modern 
Sanskrit by Raghavan provide an overview of material produced during this period. 
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focused on the religious dimension of the Vedic ‘golden age,’ Dayananda argued 
that, in addition to its spiritual glory, Indian antiquity was imbued with cultural 
and social greatness. The Vedic epoch was in his construction no longer 
embodied only in spirituality but also in a people—in its culture and its land. 
(Jaffrelot Reader 9) 
That is by the 1870’s, and it marks the beginnings of Hindu Nationalism as we know it today. 
Figures who take up this line of thought no longer accept Roy’s welcoming of English 
knowledge. Sanskrit now becomes an unequivocal ideal, vying in direct opposition to colonial 
intrusion, conceived both in terms of British and Islamic invasion. Specifically, Sanskrit 
becomes the site for defending such colonially disapproved practices as caste. The association of 
Sanskrit with these defenses becomes so great that by the turn of the twentieth century, Har Bilas 
Sarda, writing a book called Hindu Superiority (1906) could refer in defense of his position to a 
paper delivered by a Hindu to the International Congress of Orientalists in Berlin in 1881. That 
the paper was delivered in such a context is telling enough, but what is most interesting is its 
title: “Sanskrit as a Living Language in India.” Sarda quotes a paragraph of the essay, which it 
turns out is neither about Sanskrit literary production nor its use as a spoken medium of 
instruction, but about the glories of the caste system in Vedic times, before it was corrupted in 
later practice (Jaffrelot Reader 53).  
By the twentieth century, then, the “life” of Sanskrit is debated in terms (and venues) 
entirely consonant with Indological discourse, namely in ways that unify Sanskrit as “a” culture, 
glorify its past, and find it decadent in intervening years (to the point where an early modern 
work of interest becomes an oxymoron). The same phenomenon holds in literary discourse as 
well. While religious and political discourse tended to focus on the Vedic golden age, Indologists 
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and the Modern Sanskrit writers who looked through the Indologist lens tended to focus on 
classical Sanskrit’s apogee in the sixth-century figure of Kālidāsa—an assessment that aligns 
with Romantic aesthetic sensibilities in the wake of Goethe’s valorization of Kālidāsa’s 
Abhijñānaśakuntalam. It is not for nothing that Modern Sanskrit writers often refer to their 
language as “the language of Kālidāsa,” probably with greater frequency than any other epithet, 
including even the classical “language of the gods.” As we shall see later in this chapter, 
Radhavallabh Tripathi’s poetry is replete with allusions to Kālidāsa with nary a mention of even 
the most canonical poets of the later classical period, such as Māgha or Śriharṣa, let alone writers 
in the immediate precolonial period.  
Such is the “logic” of Sanskrit’s use as a lieu de mémoire. It signals a distant past, before 
corruption and “foreign” contamination. It borrows the terms of the colonizer to oppose him, and 
in so doing re-conceives itself. This is not a new observation in the South Asian colonial context. 
From Gyanendra Pandey’s analysis of the “construction of communalism” to Christophe 
Jaffrelot’s examination of the formation of Hindu Nationalism as a process of “stigmatising and 
emulating” its others (11), there is a well-developed field of scholarly inquiry exploring various 
facets of this constructed past and its symbols. A detailed history of Sanskrit specifically within 
that framework awaits, but what what work we have has shown enough to give us a pretty good 
picture of its outline. What the rest of this chapter will do is not to flesh out that history, but 
rather to examine a new and distinctive way that one Modern Sanskrit writer, Radhavallabh 
Tripathi, has undermined some of that logic even as he re-engages and participates in it by 
remediating the Sanskritic lieu in Sanskrit.  
It is precisely the gulf between past and present presupposed by the logic of the lieu that 
Tripathi, like many writers of Modern Sanskrit, seeks to trouble, not wanting to consign their 
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language to empty repetitions of nationhood on the political stage. For the most part, national 
memories of Sanskrit are not primarily experienced in Sanskrit. We find them in the casual 
intertextuality of everyday speech, in the rhetoric of religion and politics, and in the reflexive 
literary tradition that continues to draw on images and themes thousands of years old. But when 
Modern Sanskrit writers engage with the lived experience of such cultural memory in and 
through the Sanskrit language, something interesting happens. Tensions are brought to the fore. 
The language is estranged from itself, as are the memories it carries. By translating Sanskritic 
memories “back” into the language from which they are supposed to have come, writers like 
Tripathi alter the very structure of memory, language, and identity. 
It is important, though, to distinguish what I am discussing from another parallel 
“modernity of Sanskrit,” which Simona Sawhney has named and which others have joined her in 
discussing. Her discussion begins in a way strikingly resonant with the account I have just given: 
[B]ecause the moment of nationalism itself was often responsible for giving shape 
and name to the nation’s past, and in particular to its “classical” age, that past is 
now accessible to us only as the past of modernity: one that belongs to it and 
cannot be dissociated from its own projects and preconceptions. (14) 
Sawhney’s book accordingly “concentrates on instances where modern texts explicitly position 
themselves as readings or rewritings of early texts, thus exposing the complex relation between 
the two” (14). Therein lies the impetus for her methodological difference from mine, which 
(aside from our objects of study) consists of two parts. First, Sawhney conceives her study in 
terms of the relation between pairs of texts. I, on the other hand, am interested in how one 
language becomes two—the “living” and the “dead”— in a single text. Second, Sawhney is 
concerned with how to read the past. Her book, she says, “is written as a way of asking how we 
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might read Sanskrit texts today” (15). I, however, ask how we are to read today’s Sanskrit texts. 
To illustrate these differences, let’s consider an example. One set that Sawhney takes up 
includes Hindi writers such as Dharamvir Bharati, who deploy in a modern context myths 
beloved by nationalism. Bharati’s Andhā Yug (The Blind Age) famously rewrites the 
Mahabharata as an allegory for Partition. Such “teleological extrapolation,” as Akshay Kumar 
calls it, “brings the nation-centric postcolonial present in contact with the supranational 
civilizational past” (31). That notion of “contact” is important to both Sawhney’s project and my 
own, but whereas what Bharati brings in contact are “histories” and narratives, what someone 
like Tripathi brings together is more fundamental: language and world, or simply two 
worldviews. Exactly what this means will have to become clear as my analysis proceeds, but 
suffice it for now to say that he is not simply renegotiating the meaning of a text (neither the 
Mahabharata nor “Sanskrit” itself conceived textually). Doing that would preserve Sanskrit as a 
lieu de mémoire. Instead he asks whether the textuality of Sanskrit remains available in the way 
he believes it must—that is to say, wondering whether it must be a lieu after all, a ritualized site 
of remembering that breaks past from present in the name of its preservation. As a consequence, 
the various memorial functions of Sanskrit are inevitably altered in the process, and we may 
indeed feel compelled to revisit the living quality of old texts as a result (as Sawhney would have 
us), but we can also turn our attention to a more distinctly present-oriented creation of the new. 
We may thus find that nostalgia is innovative and that that innovation is worth thinking in terms 
that are not bound in referential terms to the past.  
4.2 INTRODUCING POET AND POEM: RADHAVALLABH TRIPATHI’S 
LAHARĪDAŚAKAM 
So far I have only discussed how Sanskrit has become a lieu de mémoire in general terms. I have 
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yet to show that Tripathi in particular engages with it as such. That is to say, it remains to be seen 
whether the above sketched framework is a relevant way of approaching this modern literature. 
To begin, we must meet the poet. Born in 1949 in Madhya Pradesh, Radhavallabh Tripathi is one 
of the most systematic and active proponents of the Sanskrit language today. A retired professor, 
he has published many dozens of books in Sanskrit, Hindi, and English, and served as the Vice 
Chancellor of the Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, a nationally funded institute for the propagation 
of Sanskrit (and since 2002 a “deemed university”—the Indian government’s term for a 
specialized institution of higher learning functioning at a level sufficient to warrant some of the 
privileges of official academic standing). In 1994, he was awarded the Sahitya Akademi Award 
for Sanskrit from India’s National Academy of Letters. The focus of the discussion to follow will 
be a 1986 collection, Laharīdaśakam (Ten Waves), from which several poems were reworked to 
form the 1989 book that won him the prize (Sandhānam).  
Initially published in a first, Sanskrit-only edition in 1986, Laharīdaśakam was reprinted 
in 2003 in a dual language edition that incorporated a Hindi translation and commentary to allow 
access to a greater audience. As we shall see, this Hindi translation often undoes some of the 
more subtle memorial work of the original by simplifying complex temporalities and losing the 
estranging effect of certain of the original’s neologisms. I argue that this loss suggests that there 
is something uniquely productive about the encounter between past and present in a text that 
self-consciously mobilizes classical imagery and literary allusion to explore and experience the 
present in a new way. The juxtaposition of the text with its translation (coupled with a 
commentary that sheds light on the impetus behind certain allusions and metaphors) motivates 
my choice to focus my attention on the intricate workings of one work rather than spread it more 
thinly across his much larger oeuvre. My argument is not that this text is “representative” of 
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Tripathi’s literary output, let alone that of Modern Sanskrit as a whole. Rather, my desire is to 
use this especially self-conscious and meta-poetic work to point to some of the key theoretical 
and methodological issues that are presented in the study of Modern Sanskrit more broadly, 
including works that are notably less self-conscious. 
Laharīdaśakam, as its title indicates, is a work in ten “waves.” Each wave is a 
thematically distinct set of verses written in a shared meter. As with most classical Sanskrit 
poetry, each verse can be read as a stand-alone piece but gains when read within a larger context. 
All of the waves take place “in the modern context,” and deal with the issues of modernity as 
articulated in a classical idiom: environmental degradation read against the pristine nature of 
Kālidāsa, foreign travel juxtaposed with the journey of Kālidāsa’s famous Meghadūta cloud-
messenger, etc. 
This chapter invests most of its attention in the early part of the book, where the first 
three “waves” (laharyaḥ) deal with the sequence of seasons: “Spring,” “Summer,” and “The 
Rains.” As the Hindi commentary that accompanies the second edition tells us, these poems are 
meant to portray the specifically modern quality of these seasons. 
In the wave in question, spring in contemporary life is depicted. Departing from 
the portrayal of spring in traditional poetry, this poet underscores how difficult the 
reincarnation of spring has become amid the pollution and destruction of the 
environment. (1)87  
But it is not only on a thematic level that the depiction of spring is altered. The generic 
conventions of classical seasonal poetry (ṛtu-kāvya) are twisted and stretched so as to convey the 
                                                 
87 “prastut laharī meṃ ādhunik jīvan meṃ vasant ke anubhav ko vyakt kiyā gayā hai. Pāramparik 
kavitā meṃ jis prakār vasant ṛtu kā citraṇ hotā hai, us se haṭ kar paryāvaraṇ ke vināś aur 
pradūṣaṇ ke bīc vasant kā avataraṇ kis tarah kaṭhin ho gayā hai, yah kavi ne rekhāṃkit kiyā hai.”  
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estranging effect of co-experiencing modern spring and its classical textual counterpart. Of the 
three seasons, spring is especially resonant for the classical reader, and indeed it is there that we 
shall find Tripathi’s most sophisticated engagement with tradition. As will become clear, the 
very language itself is warped in the process and exploited so as to draw attention to the question 
of which aspects of the tradition are “alive” and which are “dead,” and what that means for the 
experience of the poet-speaker. The self-reflexivity thus engendered allows us to see the nuanced 
ways in which cultural memory shapes Tripathi’s landscape and vice versa.  
Laharīdaśakam’s self-reflexivity is by no means new in Indian literary history. As A. K. 
Ramanujan points out, the Indian tradition has always been one in which “[e]very poem is part of 
a larger self-reflexive paradigm; it relates to all others in absentia, gathers ironies, allusions; one 
text becomes the context of others” (Collected Essays 15). Not even the anxiety about Sanskrit’s 
obsolescence is new – Yigal Bronner, for example, points to the apparent need of Sanskrit 
writers to respond to growing vernacular traditions by developing intricate new genres. “When 
vernacular languages became literary at the turn of the second millennium, some Sanskrit poets 
responded by using their language to perform tasks that other languages were deemed incapable 
of performing,” especially writing extended works of śleṣa, punning narratives that tell separate 
stories simultaneously depending on how the puns are parsed.  Moreover, 
[w]hen Telegu and Tamil finally entered the sphere of śleṣa, each in its own way, 
Sanskrit poets may have responded by trying to outdo them. This may explain the 
seemingly sudden surge of bitextuality in Sanskrit in the south after an apparent 
lull between 1300 and 1600 CE. Think, for instance, of bidirectional bitextual 
poets, invented in the late sixteenth century, exactly when Telugu poets were 
starting to compose bitextually. (139) 
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We shall have occasion to return to this parallel below. Nevertheless, there is something unique 
in the way Laharīdaśakam participates in this tradition of reflexivity, and we would do well to 
note the insights it offers about a specifically postcolonial engagement with cultural memory.  
One of the reasons why I want to stress the postcolonial valence of Laharīdaśakam is that 
the structuring themes of language death, modernity, and recuperation are all bound up in 
(post)colonial discourse. Whether Sanskrit died one thousand years ago, at the moment of 
colonization, or never, the language of “death” and recovery is very much shaped by the colonial 
project. I do not want, however, to suggest that Laharīdaśakam is primarily concerned with 
colonialism or imperialism as such. Tripathi’s repeated critiques of local government and 
references to such regional problems as Iraqi oil spills suggest that he is ultimately more 
concerned with problems of the moment than their relation to a colonial past.88 Nonetheless, the 
poem’s anxiety about Sanskrit tradition and its concern with specifically “modern” problems 
situates it necessarily within the postcolonial problematic.89 
That postcolonial problematic is precisely where the importance of Tripathi’s 
engagement with the memorial function of Sanskrit lies. Part of what Sanskrit does in its 
common function as a nationalist lieu de mémoire is to condense a vast history of diverse places 
and texts into a seemingly unitary, transparent, and ideal past. We can read Laharīdaśakam as 
participating in the “remediation” of that memorial paradigm, as Astrid Erll puts it, especially in 
the poem’s initial assumption that Sanskrit offers access to memories of a time before the 
                                                 
88 Though the poem’s reference to spring being caught between the “winter of imperialism” 
(sāmrājyavādaśiśira) and the “summer of terrorism” (ātaṅkavādanidāgha) shows that Tripathi is 
not entirely eliding the connection (see verse 26 of the book’s first poem).  
89 For an excellent account of how colonialism changed the conceptualization of language in 
South Asia generally, including the turn toward seeing languages as living things capable of 
dying, see Mitchell (2009). 
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“disappearance of spring” and environmental degradation. Erll uses “remediation” to  
refer to the fact that especially those events which are transformed into lieux de 
mémoire are usually represented again and again, over decades and centuries, in 
different media. What is known about an event which has turned into a site of 
memory, therefore, seems to refer not so much to what one might cautiously call 
the “actual event,” but instead to a canon of existent medial constructions, to the 
narratives, images and myths circulating in memory culture. 
Laharīdaśakam, of course, is not about an “event” in Erll’s sense. Nonetheless, we might say 
that it remediates a particular vision of what Sanskritic India “was” by drawing together a set of 
intertextual references in order to participate in the continued construction of a stark opposition 
between the problems of today and the glory of a pre-colonial golden age. At least initially, the 
poem suggests an investment in fixing and finding such cultural origins. However, the very act 
of using the classical language to describe the problems of today carries with it the possibility of 
undoing the past/present opposition it seeks to portray. By evincing the continued vitality of 
Sanskrit, Tripathi exposes the problem with neat “Sanskritic” lieux de mémoire and points to a 
different, more productive engagement with memory. Remediation thus becomes a kind of 
remedy, a therapy for the compulsion to repeat and return, even as it opens up the “origin” for 
new departures.  
For example, in referring to an Iraqi oil spill, the poem alludes to what is perhaps the 
most famous classical drama in Sanskrit, Kālidāsa’s fourth-century play, Abhijñānaśākuntalam: 
chāyāś caranti kusṛtāḥ piśitāśanānāṃ 
tailena sāgarajalaṃ paridūṣayantyaḥ (12) 
[Shadows of flesh-eating demons swarm, 
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polluting the sea with oil.] 
For readers steeped in the Sanskrit literary tradition, these lines cannot help but evoke the 
passage in Kālidāsa’s play when  
chāyāś caranti bahudhā bhayam ādadhānāḥ 
saṃdhyāpayodakapiśāḥ piśitāśanānām  
[…shadows of flesh-eating demons swarm 
like amber clouds of twilight… (Miller 120)] 
By inserting mythic demons, the infamous rākṣasāḥ, into a contemporary scene, Tripathi not 
only insinuates that these are “degraded times,” that we are in the kali yuga (the last and most 
decadent age in the cycle of universal creation and destruction). He also invokes an entire 
discourse of politics and of the consequences of misrule. In Abhijñānaśākuntalam, the demons 
swarm the land because the king is being decadent and selfish in devoting all his attention to 
lusting after the titular heroine of the play, thereby neglecting his duties as protector of the forest. 
While I don’t want to imply that Tripathi’s book just rehashes the politics of the classical age, we 
would be remiss not to pick up on the implied continuity between past and present. (We shall 
have occasion to ask what kind of continuity later, so for now I note only the minimal extension 
of past into present via something like analogy or resemblance). The verse reminds us that 
misrule has always been a problem, even as it also highlights the literality of environmental 
degradation in our contemporary era. More importantly, the very ability of old metaphors to give 
such contextually rich meaning to a contemporary phenomenon suggests that any putative break 
between pre- and post-colonial eras cannot be so strong as to render our memory of the former 




4.3 FROM SEARCH TO REALIZATION 
If we turn now to a close reading of the poem’s narrative trajectory, we can trace the 
development of what it is that Tripathi attempts over the course of the first “wave.” In this poem, 
on spring, the poet’s conception of what a season is slowly and dramatically shifts, lending to a 
crucial eventual “realization.” At first, he seems to imagine that the external season can and 
should be understood as literally instantiating (or failing to instantiate) the poetic imagery that 
tradition associates with it, thereby affirming a nationalist discourse of glorious origins. By the 
end, however, he has done something better described as internalizing the mood “spring” as a 
relation to the world rather than a factual state of the environment.90 I shall suggest that the 
relation he establishes, or more precisely the method for establishing it, points to a view of 
nostalgia that challenges the influential binary typology of nostalgia put forward by Svetlana 
Boym.  
The text’s opening verse already evinces an uneasy juxtaposition of internality and 
externality. 
śabdā yathā smṛtim upetya punar vilīnā  
sīdanti citta-jagati kvacid eka-koṇe 
udbhidyate ‘tha ca vināśam upaiti sadyaḥ  
kāvyāṅkuraḥ kavi-manaḥsu tathā vasantaḥ (1) 
[As words approach memory, dissolve,  
sink into some corner of the mind;  
as sprouts of poetry burst forth,  
                                                 
90 There is some imprecision in referring to a subject-world relation as “internal,” but it usefully 
suggests an important shift away from the rigorously external focus of the beginning. 
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and die suddenly, in the mind of a poet – so there is spring.]  
This verse raises the question of the relationship between poetic failure and the season’s failed 
arrival. One possibility, offered by the accompanying Hindi commentary, is that there is 
something about modernity that makes both poetic creation and environmental rejuvenation 
equally difficult. Degraded times have rendered success ever more difficult.  
But this is not the only interpretation. The verse itself conspicuously lacks temporal 
markers, suggesting that “modernity” may not be the ideal hermeneutic framework within which 
to read the poem. Even the present “is” that I supply in translation is elided from the Sanskrit, 
which simply reads, “so spring” (copulas often being tacit in Sanskrit).91 Moreover, the 
following verse complicates the relationship further,  
uktāv ubhau ca madhu-mādhava-mukhya-māsau 
vāsantikīṃ śriyam aho tanutaḥ suramyām  
māso madhuḥ sa iha naiva madhu vyanakti 
vyatyeti śūnya iva mādhava-māsa evam  (2) 
[Those two early months, Madhu and Mādhava, are said 
to spread forth the sumptuous glory of spring, 
Madhu yields no honey now, 
and Mādhava passes likewise, empty-seeming.] 
                                                 
91 It need not, of course, be a copula. The alternative of a parallel verb also suggests itself, but as 
I will discuss later below, pinning down what such a verb would be is easier said than done. And 
what is at issue here (now at the beginning of the poem) is precisely the being of spring. 
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The verse not only puns on the names of these spring months,92 which derive from the word for 
honey (madhu), but also draws our attention to the ways in which the poet’s search for spring is 
conditioned by what is “said” in the tradition and what the language itself suggests 
etymologically. Also striking is the poet’s choice of the word iha as the particle to contrast 
reality from what was “said.” I translate iha as “now,” following both the Hindi translation and 
the general thematics of the poem, but the word ordinarily denotes spatial placement: “here” or 
“at this place.” This ambiguity is essential, for it is emblematic of the temporality of the poem as 
a whole. Although the translation and commentary continually posit a temporal break between 
“now” and “then,” the poem itself cleverly eludes such easy distinctions. While we must 
understand the poem to “mean” now at this point in the narrative,93 the ambiguity suggestively 
anticipates the breakdown of a naïve conception of cultural memory as preserving pure 
knowledge of the past untouched by present concerns and interests. Thus we can read the verse 
as also dividing not then and now, but currently circulated poetic discourse and the lived 
experience of the poet-speaker. 
The poem goes on to explore a number of familiar tropes from classical seasonal poetry 
as the poet “searches” for the spring. He checks what he sees against the images he has imbibed 
from literature.  
āyāti naiva sumukhī tu rasālakuñje 
puñje gṛheṣu bahukṛtyabhare vilīnā 
                                                 
92 Madhu is a relatively common name for the first spring month, most often called Chaitra. 
Vaishakha is the usual name for the second, but as Tripathi’s commentary points out, there is 
Vedic precedent for calling the two months of spring “Madhu and Mādhava.” 
93 The fact that we are to read “now” into a text that does not actually say it is indicative of the 
assumptions made about Sanskrit (and reading Sanskrit in particular) that I am more generally 
referring to as Modern Sanskrit’s nostalgia. Only when the original is read nostalgically does the 
Hindi even “make sense” as a translation of it. 
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chinna bhavantyatitarāṃ manaso ‘bhilāṣāḥ 
śākhā ivāmraviṭapasya kharaiḥ kuṭhāraiḥ (5) 
[Lost indoors, amid amassing duties, 
a girl’s lovely face comes no more to the mango grove. 
The heart’s desires are hacked off –   
mango shoots cut by axes.] 
The verse is noteworthy for its ability to make sense of the world through classical images even 
when it wants to claim that the world has become unintelligible within that framework. Although 
the first image does not obtain anymore (the beautiful-faced girl who tends the mango grove, as 
does for example Shakuntala in Kālidāsa’s famous play), but the effect of its disappearance is 
still intelligible in terms of a classical image – “mango shoots cut by axes.” However, the poet-
speaker seems to take no note of this as yet.  
arvāktane kvacana kuñjhaṭipraṇaṣṭaṃ 
taṃ mārgaye svasamaye satataṃ vasantam 
ā prātar ā niśam ahaṃ bahukṛtyasakto 
jighrāmi gandham iva cāsya yadā kadācit  (7) 
[I search for it, always, in my time – spring, 
somewhere nearby, fog-destroyed. 
From dawn ‘til dusk, stuck with so much to do –   
I can almost smell its scent.] 
Like the girl who comes no more to the mango grove, the poet-speaker too is bahukṛtyasakto 
(stuck with so much to do). He still thinks the image of spring and the literal instantiation of it 
can exist in an unmediated way, without translation, just waiting to be discovered somewhere 
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“out there.”  
 As the poem progresses we are taken through a series of beautiful images depicting a 
destitute landscape. The images draw on a dense intertextuality, referring to myth (the famed 
Trishanku, a king stuck between heaven and earth), classical dramatic texts (Kālidāsa’s 
Abhijñānaśākuntalam), and the tropology of classical poetics itself (punning reference to the 
structure of atiśayokti, or what is often misleadingly translated as “hyperbole”). Eventually, we 
sense that the construction of these images – images that draw heavily and explicitly on classical 
rhetorical techniques – begins to give the poet an alternative sense of what spring might be. He 
goes from claiming that during this spring (of the world) that spring (as a concept) is “gone, 
vanished” (15) to rethinking spring altogether: 
lupto ‘pi vikṛtiṃ ca tathā gato vā 
śakyas tathā ‘nubhavitum eṣa ṛtuḥ kadācit 
sākṣātkaromi sahasā purato vasantaṃ 
paṅke praphullam aravindasamaṃ lasantam (43) 
[Although hidden, perhaps altered, 
the season can still be sensed sometimes. 
I realize it before me – a sudden, tangible spring:  
a new-blown lotus in the mud, glistening.]  
The idea of “realization” – here akin to “manifestation” or, more literally, “making [appear] 
before the eyes” – is a radical break from the earlier “search.”  
paśyāmi nūtanatanau prakaṭībhavantaṃ 




taṃ collasantam aniśaṃ bahalaṃ vasantam (48) 
[I see it taking new shape, 
making a new home, 
in the whirlwind of a clashing people— 
that great ever-flashing spring.]  
The verse itself mimes the movement of its thought: “I see” (paśyāmi) opens the verse, but the 
object is withheld until the very end—“spring” (vasantam, which I have translated adjectivally in 
order to preserve the word order). Thus while spring is both an internal potentiality (“I realize it 
before me”) and the “ever flashing” external stimulus that inspires it, it is the movement of the 
verse that makes its appearance possible at all in the first place. All of these aspects are essential 
to Tripathi’s project, for without the internalization of spring, there is no acknowledgment of the 
presencing of the past so characteristic of cultural memory, and without externality we lose the 
grounds for the book’s real-world environmental, political, and social critique.  
The fact of that critique is important.94 At the heart of the ambiguities of Tripathi’s poem 
lies a profound skepticism about the state of (among other things) the environment. Actual 
drought-induced deaths are foregrounded in the poem on summer, “Nidāghalaharī,” which 
highlights the specificity of the events by citing the number of Rajasthani children listed dead in 
a particular issue of a newspaper.  And the internalization of spring in the poem we have been 
analyzing, while productive in itself, also hints at a genuine problem in the world. The question 
becomes how to turn back from the internalized spring to the external without losing sight of the 
insights gained in forsaking an overly literal turn to the past through revivalism. Tripathi notably 
                                                 
94 I will return to the specific politics of the poem in the final section of this chapter. Now my 
concern is merely with the fact of there being critique at all. 
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does not make this second move explicit. The poem suggests rather that there is something in the 
process of “realizing” spring that enables a renewed engagement with the environmental 
concerns outside. 
The refusal to resolve this ambiguity is precisely what makes Laharīdaśakam’s nostalgia 
not only innovative, but constructive. This refusal ought to prompt us to rethink the terms in 
which we ordinarily discuss nostalgia. Specifically, what I am characterizing as a constructive 
kind of nostalgic innovation troubles Svetlana Boym’s influential distinction between reflective 
and restorative modes of nostalgia. Playing on etymology, Boym sees in restorative nostalgia an 
emphasis on nostos, the “return home,” where the reflective nostalgic emphasizes algos, the 
“longing.” Whereas the former wants a literal recuperation of the past, the latter lingers over the 
pain and does not deny the distance between past and present.  
Boym’s distinction – while avowedly provisional, marking “tendencies” rather than 
“absolute types” (41) – risks widening the gulf between temporal and spatial categories that 
makes nostalgia problematic in the first place. This is first evident in Boym’s assertion that, 
whereas restorative nostalgia “attempt[s] to conquer and spatialize time,” reflective nostalgia 
“temporalizes space” (49). By attempting to collapse temporal distinctions and instantiate the 
past in this or that place, the restorative nostalgic seeks to erase time altogether, leaving only 
space to hold it all together. The reflective nostalgic, on the other hand, experiences space as 
marked or scarred by time, each place evoking different memories, losses, and possibilities. 
What I find troubling about this distinction, and what I believe Laharīdaśakam offers an 
alternative to, is its tendency to lose track of the simultaneous efficacy of both time and space as 
one holistic lived reality. The restorative nostalgic certainly runs into trouble when he/she tries to 
render time harmless. But reflective nostalgia, as theorized by Boym, has its own roadblocks 
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insofar as it gets caught up in abstract reflection on time, thereby avoiding the concrete space in 
which it finds itself and to which it must respond. Space seems to exist only as something out of 
which time and memory emerge, but not as the site of future projects informed by that memory. 
In its attempt to avoid the spatial abuses of restorative nostalgia, reflective nostalgia runs too far 
in the other direction and disengages from space except as an abstract field of temporalities. 
Ultimately, both of Boym’s tendencies rely on beliefs about the past-present relationship: 
namely, whether the past can be instantiated again or whether one admits it to be past.  
Laharīdaśakam would disagree. Past and present are both out there—not quite brute 
facts, but realities of a sort nonetheless. The question is how to construct our “here” out of them. 
The poem suggests on the one hand that there must be literal, concrete instantiation of the 
nostalgic experience in the poem itself (a kind of “restoration” of the language). Abstract, 
affective meditation is insufficient. On the other hand, as we have seen, the poem also resists 
squaring the circle and trying to force the present onto a ready-made template of the past. Hence 
it nicely disrupts the more sectarian invocations of Sanskrit as the “pure” (śuddha) language of 
Hindu India. Tripathi suggests that both Hindu and Muslim politicians are guilty of the same 
cheap tactics: 
tāṅgākhya vāhana-gatāś ca hayā vyathante 
rāmasya durbalatarāś ca rahīma-bandhoḥ 
dharmasya raja-naya-kañcuka-saṃvṛtā yad 
rāṣṭre rathāḥ pravicaranti lasat-patākāḥ (28) 
[Weak horses hooked to tonga-carts falter. 
Flag-waving carriages tour the nation 
cloaked in the politics of religion –  
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whether Ram’s or Rahim’s.] 
By writing in Sanskrit, however, and by keeping both the spatial and the temporal in (frustrated, 
ambivalent, productive) play, Tripathi is able to foreground the difficulties and pitfalls of 
translating the past into present action without thereby forsaking the endeavor itself.  
Part of what prevents Laharīdaśakam from falling into the reflective/restorative binary is 
the peculiarity of working with a lieu de mémoire that is also a language. Unlike the material that 
makes up the majority of Boym’s analysis, the cityscape and the ruin, “Sanskrit” is not a 
locatable site in the world. Accordingly, the paradigmatic options available to the nostalgic 
confronted with ruins—restorative nostalgia’s “total reconstructions of monuments” and 
reflective nostalgia’s “linger[ing] on ruins, the patina of time and history” (Boym 41)—present 
themselves much less dichotomously to a modern Sanskrit poet. However much one may 
aestheticize Sanskrit as a site of ruins or invoke it as a lieu de mémoire, something always 
exceeds the metaphor when it is actually put to use. That excess lies at the heart of what Tripathi 
“realizes” when he realizes spring.  
4.4 TOWARDS A TRANSLATIONAL SANSKRIT 
The claim that Tripathi is attentive to (or, to state it more minimally, that he draws on) that 
excess may seem to be belied by his explicit investment in continuity,  perhaps the most 
consistently recurring preoccupation of the volume. As I will argue across the next several 
sections, the continuity at issue does not involve the kind of seamless or pure identity that is 
often associated with nostalgia. Instead, it entails the more complex problem of making “past” 
and “present” mutually available for new departures. Those scare quotes are crucial, for they 
signal (however awkwardly) a holding at bay of ontological and epistemological questions in 
favor of more pragmatic engagement with querying the construction of those two categories. 
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This section in particular will explore the value of “translation” as a conceptual frame for this 
analysis. 
The “wave” that takes up this theme most explicitly, “Even Now” (“adyāpilaharī”), opens 
with this introduction in Hindi: “This wave poetically describes the continuity and 
progressionality of life and world” [‘yah laharī jīvan aur jagat ke sātatya aur gatimaytā kā 
kāvyātmak nirūpaṇ kartī hai’]. But it turns out that this rather generic sounding theme is actually 
much more precise than “life and world” might imply.  
Admittedly, the poem opens generically enough. Here is the second verse: 
sparśaḥ purā paricito niyataṃ ya āsīt 
sañjīvanaś ca manasaś ca rasāyanaṃ yat 
lupto ‘dhuna jaṭilajīvanajīrṇamārge 
‘dyāpīha gārbhir iha taṃ ca gaveṣayāmi. (127) 
[That touch so assuredly familiar before— 
that elixir to enliven the mind— 
is lost today on the worn-out road of a tangled life. 
Even now, here, I reach out for it with words.] 
That he searches “with words” gives an initial specification of the problem, but only with the 
third verse does the poet really get to the heart of it: 
kolālahale ‘tra vikaṭe vikalāḥ praṇaṣṭāḥ 
śabdāḥ purātanamanīṣijanaiḥ susṛṣṭāḥ 
śabdeṣu śabdān militān kilādyān 
anveṣayāmi timire navadīpikābhiḥ (127-8) 
[Distorted in this monstrous din, 
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words crafted by wise men of old vanish. 
I search the dark for words among words, 
look for the primordial with new lamps.] 
The problem quite directly concerns words. More specifically, two kinds of words: one lost 
among the other. Can the old “primordial” words be found again? The question crucially is not 
epistemological, nor even ontological, but rather methodological, as the next verse clarifies 
somewhat by repeating the question in other terms. Now what he looks for is a “path” that is 
“lost amid [his] own new footprints” (128). The words, though, are punning: path is also style 
(paddhati), and footprints are also words (pada).  
As we shall see later, Tripathi rejects the wholesale adoption of the classical Sanskrit’s 
corpus of standardized themes and tropes. What, then, can it mean to search after styles and 
words? All three verses suggest an answer that pertains to the ability to go forward. Consider the 
figurative frame deployed. It consists of two parts: confusion (“tangled,” “din,” a confusing mess 
of footprints) and dullness (being “worn out,” the need for an “enlivening” elixir). That is to say, 
the poet is both lost and tired. What is at issue is the ability to “make sense” in both the transitive 
and intransitive uses of the phrase: to gain an organizing sense of things and then to do 
something within it that itself “makes sense.” The poet wonders if he can find words that allow 
him to move—words that are not themselves dead. With such phrasing I anticipate Sanskrit’s 
coming into question itself. That will come later in my argument. But for now we need only 
specify that the “life and world” taken up by Laharīdaśakam are inextricably bound up in 
questions of language, creativity, and livability. Nothing about modernity’s valuation is 
presupposed, therefore. This nostalgia need not entail pre-fixing or prejudging of the present, but 
can be precisely the means by which the present comes into question.  
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Tellingly, Tripathi avoids explicitly thematizing Sanskrit’s role in all this—neither as site 
of linguistic continuity, as stable tradition, nor as source of nationhood. In general, he avoids 
naming Sanskrit entirely. Nonetheless, throughout Laharīdaśakam, we find all the trappings 
associated with that usage of the language. There is the perfected order of all aspects of 
Kālidāsa’s world. There is dismay at the political state of affairs. One verse even arguably sets 
up the glorious Sanskritic world as caught between Islam (“the summer of terrorism”) and the 
West (the “winter of imperialism”) (11). And yet it does not quite come to that. The verse keeps 
the referents decidedly ambiguous and insists that what is threatened is the present, not the past. 
And that is precisely my point. This is not the kind of appeal to Sanskrit we are used to in the 
nationalist context, where “Sanskrit texts appear…as signs of themselves, allegories of (Hindu-
Indian) antiquity,” and “elicit not reading as much as passion: the love of those who are driven 
by fidelity to an origin, for whom Sanskrit becomes a prop in the staging of a violent drama of 
cultural continuity” (Sawhney 4-5). In fact, Modern Sanskrit writing in general is surprisingly (or 
perhaps not so surprisingly) resistant to the idea that its commitments are to the past. Even a 
book as clearly “Hindu Nationalist” as Arjunwadker’s Kaṇṭhakānjaliḥ, which devotes entire 
sequences to denunciations of the Chinese and of Pakistanis (read: Muslims), can claim that the 
available political choices are temporally short-sighted, with the Hindu nationalist movements 
coming under attack for “engag[ing] themselves in unearthing the past only; they condemn the 
present and the future” (Kantakarjuna 73, translation in original). 
In condemning fundamentalist commitments as being “driven by fidelity to an origin,” 
Sawhney both names a real problem and, I think, insufficiently characterizes it. For one thing, 
fidelity is a notoriously fickle concept, and its not clear we have named the problem of 
fundamentalism if we simply accept as exhaustive its claims to fidelity. There are many ways to 
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claim fidelity. I want to suggest that Tripathi’s poetry offers a different model than do fanatics 
who would violently destroy all traces of discontinuity. Rather than abandoning the concept of 
fidelity altogether, as Sawhney seems to suggest, Tripathi draws on something more akin to the 
translator’s notion of fidelity in order to complicate any too-easy claims to continuity between 
past and present. For if past and present are indeed in need of “translation,” then the fidelity 
Tripathi strives for in his poetry cannot facilely imagine seamless continuity. Translation 
requires the performative separation and temporary fixing of source and receiving context. Past 
and present neither are of the “same” socio-cultural substance, nor can be straightforwardly 
made to be so. Instead, in focusing on the need to be faithful to both – to “faithfully” portray 
contemporary life on the one hand and to do so in a way that is “faithful” to the poetic tradition 
in which he writes on the other – Tripathi must reconfigure the entire triad of modernity, 
tradition, and poetic identity. This is so precisely because modernity, tradition, and identity were 
not stably available beforehand for easy repetition. The resulting reconfiguration becomes its 
own kind of fidelity, which strives to avoid both the violence of conservative orthodoxy and the 
rootlessness of an imagined break with the past. Much work remains before we can specify what 
“faithful” means in this context. (It is not, I want to anticipate, a matter of accurate 
representation.) What I can assert now, though, is that a translational encounter of past and 
present raises the question of the kind of continuity involved (and indeed whether it is best called 
continuity and not rather resemblance or contiguity); it does not deny it. 
In speaking of this encounter as “translational,” I echo Sawhney’s own account of the 
“modernity of Sanskrit.” Sawhney suggests that classical texts, because they belong to a “world 
long vanished,” foreground their rhetoricity and disrupt our complacency as readers.  
We are then forced to confront the work as a text and to recognize that its 
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language does not offer itself immediately as communication. Texts that are 
remote from us present this phenomenon most vividly. Their language vividly 
strikes us as a mode of apprehending the world; the movement of its tropes has 
not yet been effaced for us by habit or daily use. We encounter such language in 
the process, as it were, of translation: as a language that, in the words of Walter 
Benjamin, “envelops its content like a royal robe with ample folds,” instead of 
forming “a unity like a fruit and its skin.” (3-4, emphasis added) 
To be “in the process, as it were, of translation,” while perhaps theoretically imprecise (what 
exactly is the force of the ‘as it were’?), is nonetheless suggestive for where to turn our attention. 
As with the poetry of Agha Shahid Ali, the fidelity at issue here demands consideration in terms 
more closely associated with process than product. Again we are directed toward sense-making 
rather than the sense made. 
But Sawhney’s suggestive account must also be modified to fit our context. Tripathi’s 
Sanskrit is not simply translational for a reader from a temporally distant culture, which is to say, 
metaphorically. It is also more literally translational to the extent that it uses the correspondence 
of meaning across languages as a creative force. More precisely, by thematizing correspondence 
as an unresolved question, Tripathi invites translation into his poem as a necessary constituent of 
meaning. While it is true that Laharīdaśakam was not written first in a vernacular and then 
translated into Sanskrit, its Sanskrit nonetheless retains the distinctive marks of translation, often 
assuming specific knowledge of contemporary vernaculars.  
This is particularly true in those moments when the ability of the “old” language to 
access the “new” world is left an open question. Such moments recall Yasemin Yildiz’s 
expanded definition of “literal translation,” which includes not only the usual word-for-word 
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translation of original texts, but also “passages directly written as ‘literal translation’ [that] do 
not rely on the existence of an original text, but rather on a reader’s recognition of linguistic 
forms as stemming from elsewhere” (144). In one notable verse of Laharīdaśakam, for example, 
we find this punning play on borrowed neologisms: 
stambhena vidyuta ihātatalauhatantāv 
uttānapādavanamya śiraḥ svakīyam 
vyālambate sa khalu carmacaro vihaṅgo 
vyatyāsam eva sṛṣṭigataṃ vivṛṇvan (10) 
[Copper cords of lightning carry  
featherless fliers 
hanging by their feet, 
betraying nature’s perversion.] 
This verse plays on the literal etymologies of modern Sanskrit-derived vernaculars to “expose” 
the strangeness of modernity. For example, in Hindi, the word for electricity is bijlī, which 
derives from the Sanskrit vidyut. Both words mean lightning, but the Hindi word has taken on the 
common additional sense of electricity. Likewise the word for wire commonly comes from 
words meaning “string” or “cord.” Because classical Sanskrit lacks words for these modern 
phenomena, it must draw on such borrowings and neologisms; and contemporary poets regularly 
do so as a simple matter of course. Tripathi, however, thematizes it. He seizes on the 
defamiliarizing potential of these moments of translation.  
Yildiz clarifies the relationship between these two types of borrowing, which she calls 
“loan translation” and “literal translation” respectively, by turning to two German terms for 
“mother tongue,” Muttersprache and Mutterzunge. The former, originally a loan translation from 
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the Latin lingua maternal, has been so absorbed into the language that its “translational origin” 
has been entirely forgotten. “The latter, on the other hand, loudly announces its difference.” 
Coined by Turkish-German author, Emine Sevgi Özdamar, Mutterzunge is a direct, “literal” 
translation from Turkish, which, like English and unlike German, allows “tongue” (here, Zunge) 
to mean language. As Yildiz points out, “This in/visibility of translation is the dividing line 
between ‘loan translation’ – a widespread form of expanding the lexicon of any language – and 
‘literal translation’ – a potential poetic resource precisely because of its marked eccentricity” 
(148). Like Mutterzunge, Tripathi’s vidyut announces its difference, even if elsewhere poets may 
use it unselfconsciously. 
That last caveat is important. Tripathi’s Sanskrit muddies the distinction a bit between 
loan translation and literal translation. But Yildiz’s account is nonetheless quite helpful in 
accounting for the cultural work done by Tripathi’s estranging “copper cords of lightning.” 
Translational literality in the texts she considers is tied specifically to trauma and its structure of 
recurrence. While we must take care to distinguish between the literally violent trauma Yildiz 
finds at the heart of Özdamar’s work and the experience of modernity by a relatively successful 
male Indian intellectual, I argue that Tripathi’s work is structured by the discursive violence 
inherent in the “death of Sanskrit” that I outlined in Section 1 above. That postcolonial “trauma” 
then finds expression in the translational Sanskrit employed in Laharīdaśakam. 
There are two additional benefits of expanding and borrowing the discourse of translation 
to talk about Tripathi’s Modern Sanskrit more broadly. One is its conscious effort. The other is 
its focus on the context of utterance. For Tripathi’s translational Sanskrit is neither stumbled 
upon (tripping over the present language while looking backward), nor a statement “about” the 
source culture out of which it translates, whether we call that the vernacular present (translated 
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into Sanskrit) or the classical past (translated into the language of the present). The same could 
be said of Özdamar’s Mutterzunge, which is neither an accident of inattention while thinking of 
Turkey, nor a statement about Turkey. Both Mutterzunge and Tripathi’s vidyut are conscious 
statements about a translationally, translingually constructed present. We might say it is about 
co-presenting two languages in one utterance. That they are both capable of being felt and that 
they do not finally conflict, but rather tensionally enable each other might be taken as a good 
description of what “fidelity to an origin” can mean in a case like this.  
4.5 REFERENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF ORIGINS 
Conveniently, nostalgia has a habit of calling reference into question. This as true in Sanskrit as 
in English. If nostalgia loves one figure of speech above all others, it is what we might call a 
tense deixis. It involves not the contrast between here and there or then and now, but this and 
“this,” where the object of deixis is contrasted with its own empty self.95 This spring—the one I 
can point at—is actually not spring at all, despite the fact it manifestly is. Let us recall that it is 
only in the fourteenth verse that Laharīdaśakam becomes explicitly nostalgic. We have already 
discussed how in general ambiguation plays two senses of spring off of each other, but only in 
this verse does the poet lay the contrast bare. We are told now a flagrantly contradictory state of 
affairs obtains in the world today: “spring is gone this spring” [‘vasantasamayaṃ 
vigataṃ…asmin vasantasamaye’ (7).] More precisely, the speaker sees that this is so (hence the 
accusative case). 
The figure is worth reflecting on at some length, as it gives us an “indigenous” point of 
reference against which to locate Tripathi’s nostalgia and its particular brand of reference. 
                                                 




Always a first-person utterance, the figure is ubiquitous not only in Sanskrit but across a wide 
array of contexts. Consider Attia Hossain’s novel of pre-Partition Lucknow and its fading 
Muslim culture of “decadence” (the word is her orientalism, not mine [125]). At a crucial point 
midway through the narrative, a character observes to another that “[n]othing as changed,” but of 
course everything has: “I can still see a man’s profile in the shape of that peak over there; the 
same noises come up from the bazaar below; the same human ants move about” (179). What he 
means is that although the world hasn’t changed, he has. (He has been abroad in England for ten 
years). But we readers know more than that, that the novel as a whole is underscoring the fact 
that even what is the “same” is in fact not. 
Sanskrit poets have also loved that same figure, though not necessarily to the same ends. 
David Shulman has discussed one instance in marvelous detail, taking up an indexical series in a 
letter voicing the concerns of Kādambarī, who points successively to each part of her body to 
express its sameness only to struggle with the all-important contextual differences, notably the 
absence of her love. Shulman calls this nostalgia, and I don’t disagree, but a better example is 
furnished by the counterpoint he himself names, the famous poem quoted by Mammaṭa in 
illustration of a “figureless” poem that is nonetheless powerful:  
yaḥ kaumāraharaḥ sa eva hi varas tā eva caitrakṣapās 
te conmīlitamālatīsurabhayaḥ prauḍhāḥ kadambānilāḥ 
sā caivāsmi tathāpi tatra suratavyāpāralīlāvidhau 
revārodhasi vetasītarutale cetaḥ samutkaṇṭhate  
The man who took my virginity 
is now my husband. These are the same 
nights of spring, the same wind soaked  
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with Kadamba and jasmine in full bloom.  
And I'm still me, the same woman. 
It’s just that my heart keeps longing 
for the love games we once played  
there, on the river bank,  
amidst the reeds. (Shulman More than Real 46)96 
The verse is certainly among the most poignant and condensed examples of nostalgia in Sanskrit 
poetry, but we could add others: another verse quoted by Mammaṭa, this time in Prakrit (“taiā 
maha…” quoted in Chapter 3), or the moment in the third act of Bhavabhūti’s Uttararāmacarita 
when Sita sees Rama again in the forest but sees him as something that has “ceased to exist for 
me” (197).   
My point in going so deeply into possible intertexts is to stress first that nostalgic tropes 
and strategies are not new to Sanskrit, and second that, from such a formal perspective, nostalgia 
can be used for a great many ends. Kādambarī’s nostalgia is not the same as the “yaḥ 
kaumāraharaḥ” poet’s, nor is Sītā’s. Much less is the speech by Hossain’s nostalgic colonial 
returnee functioning within the same discursive universe as any of those three. But all of them, 
Tripathi included, share a concern with identity, desire, and the passing of time—all articulated 
through deictic reference to the world around the speaker, which seems to throw the stability of 
language into question, or rather the meaningfulness of the stability that manifestly does obtain.  
Now is an excellent point to remind ourselves of another way in which Sanskrit is not 
(and never has been) “dead,” namely in the artificiality and fixity of its words. While it is true 
that kāvya tends to retread the familiar rather than break new ground in terms of its objects and 
                                                 
96 For the rest of Shulman’s excellent discussion of this figure see More than Real 39-48. 
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standards of comparison, this observation has sometimes led less careful observers to conclude 
that Sanskrit deploys a moribund set of fixed meanings, which it at best deploys in ever more 
complex permutations in search of that ever-elusive thrill of surprised delight (camatkāra).97 
Admittedly, it does not help things that poeticians would take stock examples for their 
illustrations, simplifying in the case of one passage by Appayya Dīkṣita to a list of how every 
major figure can be stated as a permutation of face and moon (see early in the Citramīmāṃsā 
discussion of upamā). But the consistent comparison of face and moon never implied that a poet 
was describing the typicality of the typical (unless of course he was parodying or otherwise 
playing with convention). And, as the above examples of nostalgia illustrate, the face that is 
always like a moon is not always like the moon in the same way.  
One way of stating the lesson to be derived from what we have seen so far is that this 
kind of “I am still me”/“Spring is not spring” utterance ought to prompt us to avoid either of two 
reductions. On the one hand, we could assume that Tripathi’s separation of spring from spring is 
a matter of pure reference; he is talking about an actual then and an actual now (or at least 
believes he is doing so). In this case, the language (Sanskrit) is entirely incidental to the message. 
It is at best a symptom, or perhaps a contributing cause in his saying it. On the other hand, we 
could assume that he is practicing a purely semiotic exercise, appealing to the unity of a system 
of signs to avoid engaging the messiness of the present. This says that the only thing that matters 
                                                 
97 I won’t rehash a list of bad readers of Sanskrit kāvya, but I will note one of the better ones 
flirting with this mistake: Daniel H. H. Ingall’s discussion of Sanskrit’s “artificiality” in his 
introduction to his translation of Vidyakara’s anthology. The discussion almost undoes itself as 
he goes on to admit that some poets are not artificial in this way; or, even better, when he quotes 
a contrastive example of English liveliness: a few lines of archaic pastoralism that even for an 
ardent reader of English poetry today may conjure less than many a stereotypical Sanskrit verse 
(which is not to say that they are bad, merely that liveliness is not guaranteed by anything more 
than attachment and mode of reading).  
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about his statement is the play of its language; message is incidental to the coherence of 
language. If, however, we take the Sanskrit tradition to which Shulman draws our attention as 
our reference point and treat nostalgia as in some sense “about” the enabling fiction of identity 
given in language, then Tripathi’s statement takes on a wider and more interesting resonance. 
But we still have yet to determine what has a problematic identity. Spring, yes. But that 
specifies little, for what does spring mean? It is not sufficient to jump to the end and call it a 
form of attention or a mode of relating to the world. And the initial answer, that it is “of the past” 
or even “of the literary tradition” is only helpful, but not exhaustive. What past? What does “the 
literary tradition” mean here? To answer these questions, we must grapple with the opening 
verse, the one that names vasanta as an issue.  
Let us refresh our memory of how it invokes the problem: 
śabdā yathā smṛtim upetya punar vilīnā  
sīdanti citta-jagati kvacid eka-koṇe 
udbhidyate ‘tha ca vināśam upaiti sadyaḥ  
kāvyāṅkuraḥ kavi-manaḥsu tathā vasantaḥ (1) 
[As words approach memory, dissolve,  
sink into some corner of the mind;  
as sprouts of poetry burst forth,  
and die suddenly, in the mind of a poet – so there is spring.] 
The second verse may present the problem as a problem (namely that the honey months yield no 
honey), but this opening does more to set up the metaphorical frame within which that problem 
makes sense. It does so by means of that most popular of Sanskrit figures, the upamā. Usually 
translated as simile, the upamā is an act of “measuring against,” of taking the matter at hand (say, 
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a woman’s face) and taking stock of it (e.g., in terms of beauty) by asserting that it is (like) an 
object whose value is well-established (say, the moon). There are therefore four parts that go into 
making a “full” (pūrṇā) upamā, which is what Tripathi presents us with here: each of the two 
objects, a shared property, and some word to trigger the comparison.98 To spell them out, 
including their Sanskrit names: 
• upameya: “spring” 
• upamāna: “words” and “poetry-sprouts” 
• sādhāraṇadharma: on-again-off-again fickleness 
• dyotaka: “as” 
The fact that we have two upamāna-s—a fact which earns this upamā the designation mālā, 
“garland”—should make matters of interpretation that much simpler. The problem, though, is 
that spring is not typically conceived in such on-again-off-again ways in kāvya literature. We 
can, of course, supply our own inferences. Perhaps it is the cyclical arising and disappearing of 
seasons to which the poet refers. But that does not account for the rapidity of change we find 
exemplified in the upamāna-s. Both words and poetry-sprouts flash and disappear in the blink of 
an eye. The verse tells us so quite explicitly: “suddenly” (or perhaps “immediately” is more 
precise for the Sanskrit “sadyaḥ”). There are other explanations as well, but they all hinge on 
trying to make up for the fact that the traditional sahṛdaya (knowledgeable and receptive reader) 
would not have a ready way to fill in the blank and complete the sentence the poet leaves 
unfinished. What corresponding verb are we to attribute to spring to make the simile complete?  
                                                 
98 Not all upamā-s are pūrṇā; many are missing various elements, including the trigger word that 
would be requisite to qualify as a simile in English, e.g., candramukhī (moon-face) as an epithet 
of a girl is a stock example of upamā.  
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Rather than attempt an answer outright, we can observe the crucial mechanism by which 
this verse works. What is important is that the simile’s force comes from pulling the rug out from 
under the object of comparison and telling us almost nothing about it except its relation to the 
standards it is “like.” Moreover, it does not allow us simply to replace our old notion of spring 
with a new one. The reference to poetry-sprouts evokes not only the continued focus on spring’s 
natural flourishing but also on the whole tradition of intertextuality that links poetry with 
flowers, readers with bees, beautiful women with watering, etc. The poem indeed forces us to 
mobilize all that we know spring means even as we admit that what it means in this simile is 
both more and less than that.  
There is nothing new in the idea that a word might evoke more than it specifically 
“means” in context. The theory of suggestion (dhvani) that revolutionized the field of Sanskrit 
poetics also allows that saying, for example, that a village is “on the Ganges” might evoke 
associations of purity and coolness in addition to its plain designation of location. This, 
philosophers of meaning contend, is the result of the stumbling block to understanding provided 
by the grammatical twist of having the village be “on” the Ganges, rather than merely on the 
shore of it.  And yet that example does not quite fit this case. There is no quick paraphrase that 
could resolve the issue as “shore” does in the Ganges example. The resolution only comes when 
we have read on and realize what we did earlier in our discussion: namely, that it consciously 
ambiguates terms. Is spring a time of the year, a state of affairs, or a kind of attention deployed 
by the poet? We are back where we started. 
We have, however, set ourselves up to make two crucial observations. First, spring is an 
odd upameya. Sanskrit poems generally give definite items as upameya-s. An abstraction 
generally appears under the guise of another figure entirely: utprekṣā (e.g., “the darkness smears 
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itself on our bodies, like ointment”). Personified traits like “glory” might play a role in an 
upamā, but doing so requires that the reader agree to consider the object more or less clearly 
defined. An utprekṣā gives being or form (sambhāvayati) to the unformed, whereas an upamā 
measures one term against another. Spring is often personified via the love god in classical 
Sanskrit, so we can certainly accept this verse as not too far from the traditional mark. What 
remains somewhat strange, though, is that while spring may be locally the upameya in a classical 
poem, it is far less likely to be the global prakṛta, the relevant “matter” at hand (another 
occasional synonym of upameya, albeit with slightly different resonance signaling the real 
“subject” of the verse).  
This leads to the second observation, which is less directly related to the verse at hand. 
Spring and its attendant happenings (blossoming flowers, etc.) is classically the stuff of 
upamāna-s. Works are traditionally about people and their emotions (bhāva-s), not about nature 
per se. And yet this poem seems to take the classical upamāna-s as its subject in some 
meaningfully different sense. What is at issue is whether or not the upamāna-s are there. Where, 
though? Not in the world—there was no need that they be “in the world” before, at least not in 
the poem, since they are by supposition “aprakṛta,” not relevantly at hand, not an issue. “In the 
mind of the poet” begins to answer the question, but it needs elaboration. An upameya is, 
literally, that which is “to be measured,” whereas an upamāna is the thing doing the “measuring.” 
The problem, I propose, is precisely that the poet feels himself confronted with a world that is 
upameya (to be measured) and yet wonders if he has the tools necessary to complete the 
measuring, the upamāna-s. This is explicitly a question of value. An upamā is by definition a 
positive comparison. If one can’t find one, the issue of there being any value in the first place is 
raised. The modern world might be one in which evaluation (and hence value) are unavailable. 
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That, at least, is a familiar modernist concern.  
But Tripathi is not Wallace Stevens.99 His concerns are not that modernity per se has 
vitiated our standard claims to value. Death in human terms is not the issue, nor is the 
Nietzschean death of god. It is bound up with the “death of Sanskrit,” as I have been suggesting 
all along. That is to say, Tripathi in this poem is faced by the fragility of his claims to Sanskrit’s 
vitality. In public statements, he claims that Sanskrit has always been vitally, unproblematically 
available for him in a way that seems quite at odds with the anxiety we find in his poetry.100 Of 
course, the fact that he feels the need to claim it as alive is precisely what is at issue. In such a 
claim, there is always the possibility that it won’t be recognized or that is own work won’t make 
it manifest. That latter concern is what I take to be at the heart of this opening verse. The 
question is whether the vitality he perceives in the language can take root in his own writing, 
whether he can participate publicly in Sanskrit’s vitality rather than merely witness it privately.  
Tripathi’s nostalgia is thus a claim for a present, not for a past—a point to which I shall 
have to return in the next section to articulate what that means in political, factual terms; for now 
I can characterize what I understand that present in more temporal/philosophical terms. It is 
emphatically not a present in which “spring” takes on a definite, untroublesome content that can 
then be left behind. That would be the spring of cliché, a dead metaphor from a dead language. 
Nor is it the kind of imposed unity (or fantasy thereof) that Derrida would criticize as a fetish for 
metaphysical presence. It is rather a possibility, felt as emerging out of one’s understanding of 
                                                 
99 For recent work on Wallace Stevens’ poetic struggles with the problem of valuing in the 
modern world, see e.g., Altieri Wallace Stevens and the Demands of Modernity: Towards a 
Phenomenology of Value. Stevens is certainly not alone in this concern. I invoke him here 
merely synecdochically .  




the past (but not out of the past per se if by that we mean some fantasy of epistemological and 
ontological certainty that it was and can be made again to be just so).  
A counter-example may help bring some shape to these claims. In discussing A K 
Ramanujan (whose work we examined earlier, in Chapter 1), Jahan Ramazani finds that he too 
engages in a kind of translational encounter between past and present. Ramazani claims that this 
encounter is paradigmatic of postcolonial aesthetics in general, especially in poetry, and that it is 
best captured theoretically by the discourse of metaphor with its frequent talk of “stereoscopic 
vision” and tension between terms. Specifically, Ramazani finds that the “postcolonial 
experience is one of twin temporalities, seemingly unrelated, surely unintegrated, yet suddenly 
bridged, breached, and transfused by unpredictable moments of resemblance” (Hybrid Muse 81). 
The resemblance is of the kind that philosophers such as Paul Ricoeur have carefully captured in 
all its tense unpredictability (of new meaning) and world-shaping consequence. I am very 
sympathetic to this characterization, especially as developed by Ricoeur across his work, but 
especially The Rule of Metaphor and the three-volume Time and Narrative. But that kind of 
discussion, particularly as it gets taken up by Ramazani, ends up missing something crucial about 
Laharīdaśakam in particular and Modern Sanskrit in general.  
The problem lies in Ramazani’s emphasis on “unpredictability.” Tripathi, like Ramanujan 
in the verse Ramazani considers, translates. But Tripathis more specifically strives to “trans-
late,” i.e., to bear across, for “translation is the mode through which what is dead, disappeared, 
forgotten, buried, or suppressed overcomes its determined fate by being borne (and thus born 
anew) to other contexts across time and space” (Brodzki 2007, 6). That is quite a different 
experience from when 
[t]he traffic light turns orange 
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on 57th and Dorchester, and you stumble, 
you fall into a vision of forest fires, 
enter a frothing Himalayan river. (Ramanujan 2011, “Chicago Zen” lines 7-10) 
Whereas Ramanujan’s Chicago walk turns suddenly, accidentally, and almost violently into a 
chance-encounter with a lost homeland, Tripathi’s search for a Sanskritic spring is slow, 
deliberate, and effortful.101 The stumbling of the figure in Ramanujan’s poem is a mark of 
inattentiveness, rather than nostalgic attention.  
What this means, though, is not simply a matter of effort. Ramazani has been criticized 
before for attending only to English-language poetry in his books on postcolonial poetry and 
transnational poetry, so I won’t rehearse that complaint here.102 There is much value in his work 
nonetheless, but the difference at play here is almost certainly the result of only considering 
works by those who feel that their language and their past are alienated from each other 
(especially those in the Anglophone diaspora), which is a very different problem from the 
alienation of language and world or an alienation felt to be internal to language as such. 
Translation has been a guiding word in many postcolonial and diasporic studies, and it figures 
equally often in the primary literature such studies examine. Most scholarly accounts of this 
tendency focus on translation as a cross-cultural encounter. Waïl Hassan’s (2006) account of 
“translational literature” is an excellent example of this. Hassan writes, 
In the space between translators and translated, there are texts that straddle two 
languages, at once foregrounding, performing, and problematizing the act of 
                                                 
101 Part of the reason Ramanujan’s encounters with the past are accidental is that his translations 
are cross-cultural, the unexpected resemblance between two worlds his speaker imagines to be 
incompatible, or at the very least impossibly far from each other.   
102 See, for example, the introduction to Ignacio Infante’s After Translation: The Transfer and 
Circulation of Modern Poetics Across the Atlantic.   
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translation; they participate in the construction of cultural identities from that in-
between space and raise many of the questions that preoccupy contemporary 
translation theory. I call such texts translational literature. While all bilingual and 
multilingual discourse dramatizes the interaction of languages, the texts in 
question lay special emphasis on translation as an essential component of cross-
cultural contact. (754, emphasis added) 
Indeed, Hassan is not discussing Arabic postcolonialism but Anglophone writing by Egyptian 
Arab writer Ahdaf Soueif. But what Tripathi presents us with is another kind of translational 
literature, one that remains curiously intra-cultural—it is translational from a position resolutely 
within a multilingual context. But I do not want to claim for the poetry some closed unity of 
culture within which it can be called “intra.”  The most essential component of this translational 
literature is the contact between a memorial image and the world to which it is supposed to bear 
some predetermined relationship, which is to say it that “culture” is anything but taken for 
granted, either as a singular or plural entity.  
Therefore the resemblance between one culture and another is not available to find even 
consciously by Tripathi, let alone “accidentally” as in Ramazani’s Ramanujan. Such a 
resemblance actually requires a great deal of pre-fixing of language and culture. In the poetry of 
Ramanujan, for example, we often find a generic “East” represented in such moments of 
translation: “frothing Himalayan river,” “monkey temple,” even just “the Indies, the antipodes” 
(“Chicago Zen”). That is to say, the stuff of anything but a living or livable language of the 
present (which is precisely the point of Ramanujan’s poem).  
That raises another significant change or challenge Tripathi’s poem raises for standard 
accounts of postcoloniality and its poetry, at least as articulated in the study of anglophone 
247 
 
poetry with its diaspora-heavy concerns. For effort per se is not all that distinguishes 
Laharīdaśakam from the paradigmatic postcolonial engagement with the past; it is also the end 
to which that effort is directed. Discussing diasporic consciousness in postcolonial poetry, 
Rajeev S. Patke (2006) writes,  
The voice of the poem records the struggle of a person twice dispossessed: of 
home and memory. The language enacts the effort required to learn a new skill: 
memory. Remembering the past is like learning a foreign language, translating 
thoughts into new sounds and hieroglyphs. Language itself is a foreign 
experience, an estrangement from feelings and ideas that has not found the forms 
in which to express them. (170-1) 
The suggestiveness of this passage in relation to Laharīdaśakam – in its foreign(izing) language, 
in the effort of memory – is tempting. Nonetheless, we must be careful not to forget that 
Laharīdaśakam is a resolutely presentist poem. It is not that Tripathi wants to remember what it 
was like “back then.” Instead, he calls on the language of memory to help articulate the present.  
Of course, efforts to remember are themselves located in the present, and for that reason 
existing analyses of postcolonial remembering can be useful even in the quite different context of 
Tripathi’s memory-translated present. Patke continues his above analysis of the effort to 
remember by commenting on Ania Walwicz’s poem, “Poland” – “The poem localizes the idea of 
home as a country of the mind, a fictional space masquerading as a real place. ‘Poland’ treats the 
past as the utopia (literally ‘no-place’) from which migration took place” (171). Tripathi’s past, 
like Walwicz’s Poland, can be thought of as a fictional past “masquerading” as a real past, a 
place in his mind out of which the present becomes intelligible. What Tripathi’s work illustrates 
so nicely is the process of coming to terms with the fictional nature of the masquerade without 
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abandoning the tremendous descriptive power it offers. However, we must be careful in speaking 
in this way of not falling prey to naïve conceptions of “fiction” or “masquerade.” A metaphor is 
not a lie, and a fiction is something less than false. I am inclined to follow Ricoeur in considering 
what we are calling masquerade to be rather an attempt at re-description. The origins of 
Tripathi’s poetry (i.e., the origins it constructs for itself as points of departure) become thus a 
kind of “seeing as” wherein both what is seen and what it is seen as are changed in the tense 
encounter, leaving a “semantic surplus” around which further interpretations of the world 
center.103  
4.6 INTERROGATING IDENTITY 
My claim that Tripathi’s translational encounter with the past is present-oriented (his is a 
reception-oriented translation theory, we might say) might seem to invite rebuke of nostalgia talk 
altogether. If he is more concerned with the present, why call it nostalgia? And to the extent that 
he is concerned with the past, why not just call it cultural memory—a term I have myself already 
had recourse to in this chapter? After all, Sanskrit itself has no word for nostalgia. I don’t mean 
simply that it lacks a word for the historically distinct meshing of public and private narrative 
that Peter Fritzsche and others tell us developed in nineteenth-century Europe. Sanskrit’s many 
words for desire, loss, and sorrow do not map well onto even the simplest of English definitions 
of nostalgia, such as the desire for a past state of affairs. 
At the broadest level, I want to suggest that the discursive horizon of the (denied) death 
of Sanskrit makes poetry such as Tripathi’s in some minimal sense inevitably nostalgic. But I 
                                                 
103 Tripathi seems quite aware of the force of this “seeing as,” acknowledging the humorousness 
of it in a series of gently self-ironizing verses in another poem in the volume, where he goes on 
his first trip abroad on an airplane, imagining each aspect of the journey in comically 
inappropriate classical terms.  
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also have a simpler, more immediate answer: because we (as readers) must want and love (or 
read as if wanting and loving) the past in order to make sense of the poem in the first place. 
“Want” and “love” are both used provisionally here, suggesting a certain positive affective 
investment, a desiring involvement in text and world. I return once again to the opening verse by 
way of specifying this claim.  
We know by now that it ambiguates spring in two crucially different senses. First, the 
contrast between two springs, one expected and one found (“spring is gone this spring”). And 
second, the nature of the difference between those two; i.e., is the other sense an elsewhere, an 
elsewhen, or some other else entirely? The latter ambiguity has dominated the discussion so far, 
but the former deserves a bit more attention.  
As we have seen, the opening verse works by taking what is historically its most 
overdetermined element, vasanta (spring), and using a simile to render it newly underdetermined. 
Spring is, of course, absolutely ubiquitous in classical Sanskrit poetry. From mahākāvyas, which 
formally “require” description of the seasons, to dramas that use it to set the mood and mark 
time’s passing, spring is everywhere, and everywhere it means the “same” thing: love, beauty, 
youth, and unspecified desire. But here it simultaneously means all of those and none. And it 
does that by means of that ambiguation: what the word seems to or should mean against what as 
a matter of fact it does mean in the object before me. The fact that the simile does not complete 
itself by elaborating the “spring” clause is more than a mimesis of spring’s failure to manifest 
stably (though it is that, too). It also produces the space for that ambiguity to grow and 
productively sustain itself across the next set of verses until we come to the explicit contradiction 
of a not-spring spring.  
There remains, though, a further specification of that ambiguity. For it seems to me more 
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than a slippery continuum of meaning. It is rather a kind of pun, simultaneously meaning two 
quite distinct things. In other words, the poem is, in an important sense, an example of 
“bitextuality” in Yigal Bronner’s sense of the term, namely an extended use of śleṣa to tell two 
stories simultaneously. Now, while medieval and early modern poets may have used this 
technique to tell two quite different stories, as in the case of the twinned 
Mahābhārata/Rāmayaṇa retellings, “Vasantalaharī” uses it for a much more subdued purpose: 
telling two versions of the same story leading to an ultimate synthesis in the realization that they 
are in fact one story after all. And yet even that is perhaps too bold a statement of what this poem 
does, since there aren’t very many overtly punning verses in precisely the sense I am describing. 
In fact, most of the puns that the commentary calls attention to as instances of śleṣa are about 
other matters entirely, such as the following:  
[I will insert an example and very brief explanation of it here. I haven’t decided 
which example will illustrate my point most clearly] 
Nonetheless, I believe the śleṣa tradition is useful for thinking through this particular 
poem’s originality. This is so for a number of reasons and despite the fact that the poet himself 
likely never thought of the association (likely not even holding it unconsciously, I might add, 
give his colonially-influenced conception of the classical, which bypasses the major śleṣa poems 
in favor of the earlier and simpler Kālidāsa). Not least of those reasons is that Modern Sanskrit is 
likely to come under fire for many of the same reasons that the śleṣa poets did under the gaze of 
the colonial Indologist, namely that it is artificial and unnatural, an “incredible and incessant 
torturing of the language.” So says Satya Vrat Varma on the śleṣa poet Kavirāja (quoted in 
Bronner 10), but I can easily imagine someone saying something similarly haughty and 
dismissive of Tripathi’s verses about airplanes and smog. Indeed, it is in some respects to such 
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presumed detractors that Tripathi writes vasantalaharī.  
More than its superficial, but important parallels in scholarly attitude, it is śleṣa’s 
conceptual framing that helps us characterize what Tripathi’s poem does, for it forces us to 
expand the horizon beyond the most explicitly ambiguous verses and to see the ambiguity quite 
consciously stretching over even seemingly straightforward verses of what is called in Sanskrit 
poetic theory svabhāvokti, “saying it like it is.” Secondly, the conceptual framework of śleṣa also 
draws our attention to an important historical parallel in the history of Sanskrit poetry’s 
innovations. Finally, it provokes an important question about the relationship between the two 
meanings in Tripathi’s poem, one that fascinated and plagued theorists across the figure’s 
history. More precisely in Tripathi’s case, it forces us to ask just what the nature of those two 
meanings are and whether that particular duality of meaning has ever before appeared in Sanskrit 
literature.  
But lest we get ahead of ourselves, we must begin with the first insight gained: expanding 
the dual-meaning approach beyond “iha” and the lightning-bat verse. Or rather, establishing that 
those verses do constitute a kind of śleṣa to expand out from. Having spent a good deal of time 
already on the iha, let’s turn to the bats and their lightning. How can we read this as śleṣa? To 
remind ourselves, here is the Sanskrit:  
stambhena vidyuta ihātatalauhatantāv 
uttānapādavanamya śiraḥ svakīyam 
vyālambate sa khalu carmacaro vihaṅgo 
vyatyāsam eva sṛṣṭigataṃ vivṛṇvan (10) 
Tripathi’s commentary mentions nothing about śleṣa. It says simply, “In the bat, a description of 
creation’s perversion is made possible, therefore the figure utprekṣā is suggested” [‘camgādaḍ 
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meṃ sṛṣṭi ke vyatyās ko nirūpit karne kī sambhāvnā kī gaī hai, ataḥ utprekṣā alaṃkār vyaṃjit 
hai’ (10)]. That remark immediately prompts two questions: why is it only “suggested” (vyaṃjit) 
and by what means does the suggestion take place? For “suggestion,” vyañjanā is a technical 
term in Sanskrit poetics for the capacity of language to mean more than is explicitly stated. To 
answer these questions, we must first consider what utprekṣā normally is when it is stated 
explicitly (i.e., when it is vācya not vyaṅgya).  
This commentary’s description clearly echoes Mammaṭa’s canonical definition of 
utprekṣā as “the making-possible of the matter [at hand] by means of a similar [thing]” 
[‘saṃbhāvanam athoprekṣā prakṛtasya samena yat’ (10.6)], which refers essentially to the 
concretizing of an abstraction by means of a parallel. Mammaṭa helpfully cites an example: 
“darkness smears the limbs” [‘tamo limpatīva aṅganāni’], wherein the ‘pervasion’ (vyāpana) of 
darkness is ‘made possible’ (sambhāvita) by means of the concreteness (rūpatā) of the act of 
smearing ointment across the body. In other words, a concrete gesture (smearing) makes the 
spread of darkness tangible and hence “possible” for us to conceive.  Or, in our present case, the 
bat gives tangibility to the abstract phenomenon, perversion.  
That all seems rather straightforward, with no need for the commentary’s specification 
that the figure is “suggested.” There are, however, two idiosyncratic features of this verse from 
the perspective of utprekṣā. First and most apparently, the figure is usually accompanied by the 
word iva, like, or as it is ubiquitously translated by early translators, “as it were.” So we can 
imagine that the commentary merely wants to emphasize that we are to infer such a word from 
the verb “reveals.” But there is also the second curiosity in that utprekṣā generally entails “the 
fanciful, imaginary nature of the object of comparison” (Shulman, More than Real 56). But a bat 
is not fanciful in the same way as a darkness able to smear itself on people or as a mountain 
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acting as a woman’s breast for a cloud to rest on.104 In fact, the verse simply does not make sense 
if we accept that it is only about a bat, as the Hindi suggests. What is perverted about a bat 
hanging on a wire? Certainly nothing more than a bird alighting on a house. I suggest that the 
verse only makes sense as utprekṣā if we take it to be about a bird—in other words, if we take it 
also as an instance of śleṣa.  
Working under that assumption, the verse unfolds as a series of dual meanings: vidyut as 
electricity/lightning; tantu as cord/wire; carmacara vihaṃga as bat/featherless bird. This last pun 
works because the Sanskrit etymologically signifies a “skin-moving sky-goer.” Now there is 
some real perversion: a featherless bird dangles wrong-side-up from a metal cord of lightning. 
Given my discussion of this verse earlier in the chapter, this conclusion is not shocking, but now 
we have the conceptual apparatus to understand its reverberations elsewhere in the poem. If we 
read this verse as an instance of a persistent śleṣa running through the poem, we can conclude 
that the two meanings in any given verse are to be expected to work on an ordinary, mundane 
level and on a fanciful level. We might expect, moreover (though we need not conclude 
therefore), that the fanciful level will pertain to strict adherence to classical norms (birds and 
lightning are the stuff of poetry, not bats and electricity) and to the “origins” of the expression 
(whether etymology, historical source, or otherwise). This verse also suggests that the fanciful 
meaning is born of a kind of (nostalgic) desire on the part of the poet—one only sees the bat as a 
bird if one wants the world to be the stuff of classical poetry. 
This is all very suggestive, but I must extend the discussion beyond the context of the 
obviously punned verse if I want the interpretation to hold. Here is a more or less random half-
verse from the first half of the poem: “Smoke-enshrouded faces of those on the road / gulp down 
                                                 
104 The latter is Shulman’s example from Kālidāsa’s Meghadüta, see More than Real 54-55.  
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the polluted wind” [‘dhūmavṛtāni vadanāni tathādhvagānāṃ / vāyuṃ pradūṣaṇayutaṃ nigiranti 
bhūyaḥ’ (7)]. On the surface, there is no reason to read this bitextually. The scene is familiar 
enough to anyone who has spent time in the polluted urban streets of developing Asia. But if we 
strain—if we follow the poet himself and listen nostalgically for classical resonances—we might 
begin the verse a bit more hopefully. The traveller, the smoke, the face—any and all of these are 
familiar to the classical Sanskrit idyll, whether the hermitage of Śakuntalā or the pastoral scenes 
of later poems from the Subhāṣitaratnakośa.105 Romila Thapar, for example, reminds us that the 
“smoke ris[ing] from the sacrificial fires of the ṛṣis” is part of what makes Shakuntala’s 
hermitage “the epitome of gentleness, harmony, and peace” (51), which itself is meant to 
heighten the eroticism of the encounter with Shakuntala’s face. Hearing this resonance, of 
course, is a strain on the poem, but a strain is precisely what it asks of us.  
From the beginning, we have been told that spring is a fickle presence: it flashes forth 
and then disappears, like le mot juste that haunts poets, just out of reach (1); the speaker feels “as 
if” he scents it out on the wind (4). He is quite consciously searching for the spring, and I believe 
we are to see it briefly in that first pāda (quarter verse) before the image is stolen from us (and 
the poet) in the second. That is precisely why the second line is successful (if indeed it is) in 
making the reader feel the weight of the nostalgic grief. Otherwise, the line is just in the present, 
here and now, and we have no reason to be anything more than annoyed at the smoke, just as the 
                                                 
105 For the latter, see for example, verses 196, 302 and 303. These Pala dynasty-era pastoral 
poems are probably the strongest late-classical precedent of “Vasantalaharī,” especially as they 
turn their attention away from perfection to focus on aestheticized suffering and imperfection. 
Verse 304 by Vaishya is an especially strong example of this. I have emphasized the early 
classical precedents in Shakuntala because those are the most clearly marked in the poem as 
constitutive of the meaning of the poem, but verses such as Vaishya’s may have a quieter 
enabling presence as well, especially when Tripathi approaches the landscape with more 
affection and hope as at the end of the poem or in the early portions with the fisherman and the 
grandfatherly Vindhyas.  
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average commuter is. 
We might, therefore, want to soften my earlier claim that the poem is an extended 
exercise in strict bitextuality. Instead, but equally crucially, the poem can be seen to create two 
levels of possible meaning, which only occasionally rise to the surface as co-articulated in 
actuality. The dual layer of possibility and the nostalgic desire that drives the movement from 
one to the other is the motor driving the poem’s forward movement. And it appears in a variety 
of ways, perhaps most saliently in the tension between spring as figure and spring as mundane 
season.  
This, therefore, is the motivation for appealing to the critical framework of “nostalgia” 
rather than cultural memory: the poem is far more concerned with how memory’s affective 
purchase on our lives shapes and enables different ways of engaging the world than it is with 
what memories seize us. In a sense, this threatens to put us outside of “memory” altogether in 
terms of disciplinary investment. As Astrid Erll points out, “Across the disciplines there is a 
general agreement that ‘remembering’ is a process, of which ‘memories’ are the result, and that 
‘memory’ should be conceived of as an ability” (Memory in Culture 8). Jan Assman goes so far 
as to gloss “memory” as “reference to the past” (2). If my reading of Laharīdaśakam insists on 
the irrelevance of “memories” and past-oriented reference as distinct concerns for the poem, I 
seem to banish both remembering and memory from the theoretical framework available to me. 
And yet I find that “nostalgia” (as theoretical framework) reintroduces cultural memory under a 
new guise. Now the past is not the object of reference, but the deliberate means of reference 




I said earlier in this section that the conceptual framework of śleṣa highlights some 
productive historical parallels as well. Now I am in a position to name them. Bronner’s take on 
the development of the figure, as noted earlier, involves an anxiety about Sanskrit. What kind of 
“specialized niche” can Sanskrit make for itself to inhabit amid the potentially overwhelming 
“rise of regional literary languages?” Bronner suggests bitextuality was one solution (133). That 
solution entailed a massive project of working and reworking the language by developing 
lexicons and other means for writing extensive śleṣa poems that were not easily (if at all) 
replicable in the vernacular at that stage in their literary-historical development.  
While the lack of clear reference to this prior boom by Tripathi prevents me from saying 
that he is participating in that “tradition” of anxiety and language-reform, I believe the historical 
parallel is real, albeit now in an exaggerated form. Sanskrit is perceived to be under much greater 
threat than ever before. It seems at times that Sanskrit has no role in the contemporary world. 
The poet can wonder if he hasn’t lost the old road amid his own footprints, which go every 
which way: into the vernacular, into Sanskrit, and into silence. As a result, he is left exploring 
what the uniqueness of Sanskrit could be as a linguistic medium. Here it is worth reminding 
ourselves, following Sheldon Pollock, that languages, especially literary languages, “never exist 
as pure, self-identical, thinglike isolates, but are instead processes, in fact, mutually constitutive 
process” (Introduction 15). What is at stake in work such as Tripathi’s is the very being of 
                                                 
106 This particular use of memory is not foreign to memory studies. In a famous passage, Maurice 
Halbwachs spoke of his experience arriving in London with the baggage of Dickens’ novels he 
carried with him in his memory. The books he had read prefigured the city and shaped his 
experience, and “so,” he says, “I took a walk with Dickens” (quoted in Erll, Memory in Culture 
169). Halbwachs, though, is only interested in this as an argument for memory being “shared” 
among author and readers.  
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Sanskrit in the postcolonial world?  
4.7 THE POLITICS OF REALIZING NOSTALGIA 
My investment in this chapter has been in suggesting that nostalgia can be constructive in a way 
not generally acknowledged. That is, it can be unpredictably innovative, and it need not deny that 
innovation simply “out of nostalgia.” A secondary claim that arises from this is that there is 
nothing to guarantee nostalgia’s conservatism in any sense stronger than a refusal of discourses 
of radical breaks with the past. While Sanskrit is often deployed in politically disturbing ways, 
we do not adequately characterize those ways by naming their nostalgia, for not all Hindu-
nationalist appeals to Sanskrit are nostalgic, and not all Sanskrit nostalgias are Hindu nationalist. 
In this closing section, I want to go deeper into the politics of Tripathi’s poem. My goal, 
however, is not to characterize in any exhaustive or even locally precise way the specific 
interventions Tripathi’s work does or claims to do. Rather, my more modest aim is to establish 
that the secondary claim about nostalgia’s progressive potential does indeed follow from the 
primary claim that nostalgia is or can be constructive and innovative.  
It would for that reason be relatively trivial to list thematically the points where Tripathi’s 
poetry is new or progressive. There is nothing stopping anyone from writing in Sanskrit, and 
nothing stopping them for using it for any purpose. If an idea or an impulse can be conceived, it 
cannot be excluded a priori from the language. There should therefore be little surprise in one 
work’s innovations—not at least the kind of surprise that demands immediate historical stock-
taking. It would, moreover, be misleading to parade Tripathi’s or anyone else’s Sanskrit verse as 
an example of how Sanskrit is a “progressive” language, if by that we meant an inevitable force 
for progressivism. Counterexamples would flood the desk of anyone looking to prove that. What 
is interesting and important is that even being nostalgic in Sanskrit need not lead to cultural 
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revanchism or stifling stagnation. Structurally, formally, Sanskrit offers the avenues out of itself 
as a lieu de mémoire precisely when it is engaged in some of the most nostalgic ways. That is to 
say, I must establish not that only there are innovations, but that they are specifically nostalgic.  
Although a list of themes is no end in itself, it still provides a rich starting point from 
which to proceed. What is important is that our focus is not on political claims themselves but on 
how they emerge out of and are enabled by nostalgic engagement with language, form, and 
tradition. One thing that stands out to me in reading “Vasantalaharī” is a small moment in the 
background of an unremarkable verse which in its foreground wonders in a now-familiar way 
whether spring still exists. The verse quite conveniently conjures up all the same images and 
language as the opening: 
śabdeṣu teṣu bahuleṣu supuṣpiteṣu  
prollāsivāgvipulapallavite vitāne 
rūḍhāṅkureṣu nagare navasaṃskṛtīnām 
ābhāsa eva kimu śiṣyata eṣa cāsya (12) 
[Among all the flowering sounds 
in a field blossoming wide with words aglimmer, 
among the established sprouts of new cultures — 
is all that remains of it mere semblance?] 
What stands out, though, is the plural: cultures. Although this verse seems to set them up as 
an antagonist of “it” (spring), we know that the ultimate answer to the question is no, it is 
not mere semblance. It is precisely in all of that diversity that spring resides. Thus the poem 
casually affirms the plurality of saṃskṛti, that most sacred word of cultural nationalism. 
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Lest we dismiss this as a slip of the pen (or metrical filler), another verse affirms the notion 
more positively, when it finally locates the object of desire: 
paśyāmi nūtanatanau prakaṭībhavantaṃ 
navyāṃ tatheha vasatiṃ parikalpayantam 
saṅgharṣayuktajanajīvanacakravāte 
tam collasantaṃ aniśaṃ vasantaṃ. (10-11) 
[I see it taking a new shape, 
making a new home here 
in the whirlwind of a clashing people— 
that great ever-flashing spring.] 
“A clashing people,” for that matter, need not require the additional article, “a,” when 
rendered in English. “Clashing people” is certainly a more liberal foundation for nationhood 
than timeless unity, but there is also nothing to prevent the compound from being read to 
offer a less inclusive vision: “the whirlwind that is the life of a people bent on fighting.” That 
more pessimistic-sounding reading, however, does not mesh with the thrill of discovering a 
new spring. More tellingly, the poem never mentions nation or nationhood, it is much more 
resolutely focused on the small things: the village girl who “comes no more to the mango 
grove” (3), the sweaty laborer with shovel in hand, and the wife in her turmeric-stained 
kitchen (19). 
That last list of romanticized figures might raise the critical hackles of some readers, 
but I want to keep the focus on the nexus of language, nostalgia, and innovation for a bit 
longer. If Tripathi is nostalgic, as I claim, what is he nostalgic for? Much of my dissertation’s 
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argument hinges around destabilizing and reformulating that question. The ready-made 
formulation so often wants to jump the gun and get to the point of the text and its desire, 
which seems to miss so much. But I will entertain the question for a  moment here. We can 
say definitively the nostalgia of Laharīdaśakam is not for a world gone by. The affirmation 
of the present is too strong, and the poem pays no attention to the past per se. Nor is it for a 
way of writing. Tripathi tells us explicitly, 
kāvyāṅgaṇam samavatārayituṃ samīhe 
sarvaṃ purātanam idaṃ nahi varṇyajātam 
tyaktvā camatkṛtitatiṃ pratibimbakalpāṃ 
vāsantikīṃ viśadayantu giro madīyāḥ (47) 
[I do not want to bring that whole old poetic system 
that I have been describing down.  
Having abandoned that mass of correspondence-like camatkāra 
may my words scrape clean [the glory] of spring.] 
The technical term, camatkāra, is the tradition’s word for the sudden burst of delight and 
surprise that attends the reading of well-figured poem,107 but in this case the important thing is 
that Tripathi does not want to inherit the clichés only to revive them with various surprises of 
combination and permutation. In other words, he doesn’t want to keep rewriting the same basic 
poetry.  
One could simply give up and say that the poem is not nostalgic for anything, but rather 
                                                 
107 The word itself is onomatopoeic, referring to a “camat” sound of some kind that accompanies 
that pleasure. Raghavan believes it is the sound of someone smacking their tongue in relish over 
their food. Shulman believes it to be closer to the clicking of the tongue that expresses approval 
at a particular performance.  
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works through and rejects nostalgia. But that too is unsatisfactory, not least because one poem 
should suffice for that, and yet Tripathi and his Sanskrit cohort continue to produce much more 
than that. The alternative that I put forward is that Tripathi’s nostalgia is for a mode of 
apprehending the world. Or rather, his nostalgia asserts that his way of seeing and articulating 
the world is not obsolete.108 And his way of apprehending the world is both “the old way” (i.e., 
in Sanskrit) and newly nostalgic. Sanskrit itself simply “is” nostalgic when approached in this 
way. We noted this much earlier in the chapter when we discussed how Sanskrit arrived at its 
current role as a lieu de mémoire. To write in a dead language is to write doubly: a living and a 
dead half, as it were. Nostalgia affirms both and in so doing can’t help but innovate, for the two 
never quite coexisted like that before.  
To return one last time to that opening verse, we see that it contains the workings of the 
whole poem. Spring is a productively elusive creature. It is active—words approach memory, not 
the other way around. Tripathi, after all, sees the kavi (poet) in ways entirely consonant with the 
Vedic ideal of the ṛṣi (seer).109 But the poet nonetheless is not entirely passive, since seeing and 
seeking are actively constitutive of the experience. The reader, too, experiences something of this 
when she makes sense of the disjuncture in the opening simile. She can almost see how spring is 
like words coming to mind, but drawing the connection requires weighing tradition against one’s 
understanding of the world and finding it impossible either to call the two commensurable or to 
reject the measurement entirely.  
Nostalgia across the poems of Laharīdaśakam can be a source of pathos (over 
environmental destruction), anger (over government ineptitude and corruption in handling a 
                                                 
108 The threat posed by the “lightning wires” is not in fact that the world has become perverted, 
but the tools for seeing, understanding, and speaking about it have lose their access to it.  
109 For more on this connection, see his discussion of poetic creation in Kāvya aur Kāvyaśāstra. 
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drought) or humor (the traveller who can’t help but see an airplane as a Kālidāsan elephant). But 
in all cases, the result emerges out of a conspicuously nostalgic desire to co-experience present 
and past in a moment of mutual constitution. The village girl whose tasks indoors have 
multiplied and whose duties no longer take her to “mango groves” only appears under the guise 
of a traditional convention of erotic scenes that require the opposite.  
This is not to suggest that the poem—and Modern Sanskrit literature more broadly—is 
politically perfect. There are many reasons for readers to object. Gender remains an 
overwhelming problem. Writers remain overwhelmingly male, and their vision is 
predominantly paternalistic.110 The wife and daughter here become figures, along with the 
farmer, of renewed connection to spring and hence to Sanskrit. On the one hand, we can be 
grateful that, unlike so much nationalist mobilization of women, this paints them neither as 
victims in need of protection or revenge (e.g., as Mother India) nor, strictly, as guardians of 
tradition. On the other hand, the greatest challenge facing a modern writer in Sanskrit 
would be to negotiate what it means for so much of kāvya imagery and imagination to rely 
on sedimented feelings about women and not on actual women’s feelings. Even more 
pertinently, we might observe another line of critique that would object to the consistent 
return to the government as the legitimate site of grievance and expected redress, re-
legitimizing the current nation-state formation. This objection, however, even more 
obviously than the last, makes clear that these problems arise not out of nostalgia but 
contemporary political formations and their ideological foundations.  
                                                 
110 And those writers who are women are not necessarily advancing feminist or anti-caste 
positions. See, e.g., Kṣamā Rao’s thoroughly “Sanskritized” biography of the bhakti saint 





At the largest disciplinary scale, I have sought with this dissertation to move conversations in 
postcolonial literary studies away from their recurrent interest in representation, with its implicit 
reflection/consolidation of (often national) objects of desire. Instead, I have proposed to advance 
discussion along lines attentive to the local affective movements of particular texts within and 
across language lines. In doing so, I have tried to show that often the objects of postcolonial 
desire are far less fixed than has been supposed in previous analysis. Specifically, in the case of 
the past discovered in postcolonial nostalgia, that past is not given as a discrete object for 
nostalgia; rather, it emerges as the obverse of a present brought into (often political) question. 
As one specific strategy for moving away from representation, I have proposed that 
postcolonial literary studies pay more attention to genres other than the novel, which is now so 
firmly entrenched in debates about national representation that escaping the pull of those debates 
is all but impossible. More particularly, I have suggested that Anglophone postcolonial poetry’s 
close relationship to local, non-Anglophone literatures tends to thwart any attempt to assimilate 
that poetry to overarching, large-scale political projects like “narrating the nation” or “writing 
back.” Instead, postcolonial poetry (Anglophone and non-Anglophone) invites us to consider the 
ways in which texts question and explore the liveliness of specific genres and languages for use 
in the present, whether politically or otherwise.  
In raising the question of the “liveliness of specific genres and languages,” I am not 
pointing to an empirical or theoretical problem. Empirically, one might wonder whether texts are 
being written in such-and-such a genre. Theoretically, one might ask—as has often been asked—
whether “authentic” Indian literature can be written in English. The issue that has interested me, 
however, is aesthetic, and it is internal to the particular texts that raise it. That is to say, 
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individual poems may be seen to work through and explore the capacities of “their” tradition (a 
tradition constituted in the work of the poem) to continue into the present.  
In the case of English, for example, I have shown how poets of the postcolonial 
generation in India faced a language seemingly frozen by the colonial encounter in a moment of 
Oriental Romanticism, where to write in English simply “meant” to write of “skylarks and 
nightingales,” according to the young Arvind Krishna Mehrotra. That meaning, of course, is not 
necessary. Native speakers of English in the United States, for example, are unlikely to feel their 
language thus frozen. Nonetheless it presented itself as a problem for these poets, who needed to 
overcome it and in so doing to reproduce it as a problem overcome (i.e., by writing in their 
revitalized English they produced and reinforced the idea that “skylarks and nightingales”—and 
all the linguistic tics that go with them—are a thing of the past).  
In the case of Sanskrit, I have shown how one recent poet, Radhavallabh Tripathi, used 
the seeming frozenness of his language as precisely the source of its present power. By playing 
on the tension between the language’s connotative pull toward the past and its attempts to speak 
denotatively of the present, Tripathi’s work undermines dogmatic attempts to claim the past for 
communitarian solidification while still keeping open the productive yearning his awareness of 
the past brings him.  
By placing these two languages beside each other, I therefore also draw attention to a 
parallel that has been overlooked in South Asia studies so far, namely that both languages 
became entwined at the same time and by the same forces, namely, through the project of 
Orientalist translation during the early colonial period. In the postcolonial period, writers in both 
languages then faced the problem of how to find life in seemingly dead languages (albeit dead in 
different ways—Sanskrit in supposedly absolute terms, while English was only stifled by too-
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close association with a particular body of work and a specific, colonial mode of encountering 
it). Writers in both languages turned to forms of what I have called translingual nostalgia to do 
so.  
In the process of explicating these translingual nostalgias, I have had occasion to call into 
question some of the most prevalent theoretical accounts of nostalgia, both generally and in 
specific reference to the postcolonial context. In particular, I have argued against the common 
assumption that nostalgia knows its object of desire concretely, an assumption that underpins 
Svetlana Boym’s hugely influential distinction between reflective and restorative nostalgias, 
where the former acknowledge that their object is unattainable and the latter insist on the 
contrary. By developing my more context-sensitive and phenomenologically rich model of 
nostalgia, I have sought to contribute to nostalgia criticism in particular and memory studies 
more broadly a more productive framework for approaching literary nostalgia.  
Throughout this dissertation, I have insisted on the political relevance of my analysis. 
Although I turn attention away from familiar connections between the novel and the nation and 
thus lose one of the easier points of political analysis in postcolonial literary studies, I gain a 
more fine-grained view of the way contexts of production and reception shift the political impact 
of nostalgia. As I showed in the case of A. K. Ramanujan, whose nostalgic “Prayers to Lord 
Murugan” could variously reclaim the body from Orientalist stereotypes, reinforce Dravidian 
nationalisms, or provide a translation aesthetics for poet peers in other parts of the subcontinent, 
nostalgia’s lack of clear object keeps it open to varied, even opposing, uses. This fact is one that 
has so far been overlooked by scholars who have sought to describe the politics “of” nostalgia, 
rather than to explore the many ways in which nostalgia opens onto politics.  
On the other hand, I have also shown how the assumption that nostalgia has a particular 
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politics, and a particular way of accessing that politics, has shaped the production of postcolonial 
poetry, most notably in the case of A. K. Ramanujan’s original work, with its nostalgic shame. 
By drawing attention to that impact of nostalgia discourse, we can begin to see some of the 
unwitting consequences of our critical discourse as a force for repeating the colonial relationship 
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